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This dissertation approaches holistic healthcare as a problem of disciplinarity in that it articulates 
a challenge with which any holistic endeavor, however conceived, would invariably contend. I call 
this challenge disciplinary fragmentation. The understanding of disciplinary fragmentation given 
by the dissertation is informed by the Biglan model of subject matter difference. Appearing in 
1973 as a tool to study the organization of the research university, the model formalized a system 
of subject matter classification that hinges on three pairs of oppositions: 1) applied-pure, 2) hard-
soft, 3) life-non-life. The model’s creator, psychologist Anthony Biglan, postulated the existence 
of cognitive styles drawn along these lines. Conceiving disciplinary fragmentation as the 
theoretical splitting of cognitive styles into these categories, the dissertation asks what would 
consolidate the styles and how could they pose unforeseen obstacles to the flourishing of more 
holistic approaches in mainstream medicine. The answer it gives involves medical textbooks, 
learning objectives, electronic medical records, cultural competence training materials, peer-
reviewed journal articles and several other pervasive and mundane forms that govern the three 
arms of mainstream medicine: patient care, research and medical education. Using a new formalist 
methodology, the dissertation shows how the form of these pervasive and mundane forms could 
enact the three pairs of Biglan oppositions postulated to underlie disciplinary fragmentation. In so 
doing, it renders a grounded explanation of why disciplinary fragmentation makes mainstream 
medicine inimical to holistic healthcare while providing concrete ways it could begin to cultivate 






The completion of this dissertation has been quite the journey and it would not have happened 
without the great number of wonderful people in my life. In roughly chronological order, I wish 
to sincerely thank:   
 
My mom, my dad and my brother for teaching me how to have a happy life, something that would 
prove invaluable when making a new life for myself in Illinois and taking up the challenges that I 
did.  
 
The administration of the Medical Scholars Program – Jim Hall, Nora Few and James Slaugh – 
who admitted me to the program and gave me the opportunity to see where combining my love of 
literature and philosophy with medicine would take me.   
 
Lisa Haake and Paul Joffe, whose wise advice guided me through many tough spots.  
 
My committee – Mara Wade, Sam Frost, Dan Llano, Stephanie Ceman, Vicki Mahaffey, Justine 
Murison, and Stephanie Hilger – for many productive conversations that steered and contributed 
to the intellectual development of the project. I want to especially thank my advisor from the 
beginning, Stephanie Hilger, for her patience, guidance, generosity of spirit and time, and 
confidence in me.  
 
The lifelong friends I’ve met at Illinois, including Andrew Skoirchet, Nick Strole and Leigh 
McLennon, Meg Smith and Tim King, Mar Camacho, and Gwen Derk.  
 iv 
My husband, Joseph Baldwin, for not only planning most of our wedding in the midst of my final 
year of writing, but also for being an unconditionally loving, supportive, fun, and inspiring partner 
both before and after.  
 
This dissertation is dedicated to Betty Pearl Chester-Nelson. Without her generous moral and 
financial support of my education, this dissertation would not exist.  
  
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 










CHATPER 3: A FORMALIST DISCIPLINARY INTERVENTION……………………  94 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION – IMAGINING DISCIPLINARY RECONCILIATION 





























CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION -THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLISTIC HEALTHCARE   
 
 
1.1 SEARCHING FOR HOLISTIC HEALTHCARE 
 
This dissertation responds to a longstanding and widespread yearning for holistic healthcare. 
Though notions of holistic healthcare abound, realizing one that lives up to the intuitive yet 
unfathomable notion of an entirety that is at once complete and unbroken – a whole – has proven 
elusive. In face of this elusion and guided by the simple hypothesis that no such healthcare would 
be possible without many thoughtful comparisons across a vast expanse, I work within a field 
traditionally divorced from medicine – comparative literature – to seek a notion of health and a 
kind of healthcare worthy of the word whole. To those ends, health and healthcare must be clearly 
distinguished. Healthcare refers to the organization of time, people, buildings, paper forms, 
materials and knowledge to meet the formidable task of creating and maintaining health for the 
members of a society. Health is the collection of values that society chooses to constitute well-
being. Healthcare thus seeks to realize health.  
With regard to holistic healthcare that takes whole at its word – that is, healthcare that 
would consider and somehow integrate everything from cells to the global climate, biosphere and 
beyond in deference to the holistic value that regards health as an irresolvable function of all those 
factors – the final message of this dissertation is at once sobering and hopeful. It almost goes 
without saying that holism in this sense cannot flourish in Western allopathic medicine, now 
widely recognized as the world’s dominant healthcare force and the most powerful arbiter of the 
values that constitute health. What is more difficult to grasp is why. The answer I put forth is 
disciplinary fragmentation. After elucidating how disciplinary fragmentation renders mainstream 
 2 
medicine a space inimical to holism, the dissertation speculates on the possibility of disciplinary 
reconciliation that might make holistic thinking not only possible but safe. 
The safety to which this reconciliation aspires evokes Richard Rorty’s use of the word in 
his characterization of the writings of Descartes, Hobbes and other foundational figures of early 
modern European thought. These writers were not trying to write philosophy in the modern sense 
of the word but were rather, Rorty writes, “fighting (albeit discreetly) to make the intellectual 
world safe for Copernicus and Galileo” (131). Rorty’s paradox of fighting to ensure safety 
corresponds with the necessity of engaging in unpleasant upheavals to secure the exchange of ideas 
that would, in the world preceding those upheavals, face threats inhospitable to their development. 
To the extent that this dissertation does similarly paradoxical philosophical work, it does so to 
contribute to securing the intellectual exchanges that would be necessary to bring holistic medicine 
to fruition.  
 Appreciating the nature of an intellectual world in which such exchange could occur, albeit 
without the threats it faces in the current one, begs for a more precise way of defining holistic 
healthcare. One definition employs, perhaps surprisingly, what is perhaps the fundamental idea of 
traditional Western biomedicine: the therapeutic target. The term refers to any biological molecule, 
tissue or process that responds to a medical intervention, whether pharmacological, surgical or 
otherwise. For the purposes of this dissertation, holistic medicine takes this understanding of 
therapeutic target and simply extends it. In other words, holistic medicine partakes of many 
therapeutic targets beyond biology. If engaging with non-biological therapeutic targets goes 
squarely against contingent and hence mutable legacies of the intellectual world that created 
biomedicine, then overcoming them might dissolve obstacles that hinder holistic healthcare.   
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The reflective observations of one of biomedicine’s founding figures, Louis Pasteur, helps 
to define disciplinary fragmentation while situating it as one such legacy. Writing in the March 
1871 volume of the Revue Scientifique, Pasteur looks outside the laboratory to pose several overtly 
political questions. In a provocatively titled essay, “Why France Did Not Find Superior Men at 
Moments of Crisis,” Pasteur discusses the explanation for the eponymous statement on which he 
believes he is most qualified to speak: a half-century’s worth of disinterest in great ideas, 
particularly those in the sciences.1  For him, this disinterest manifests as a single term: “applied 
sciences” [les sciences appliquées] (Pasteur 214). Branding it a “completely incorrect phrase” [une 
expression fort impropre] (214), Pasteur emphatically asserts that “no, a thousand times no, there 
exists no scientific category that can be called applied science” (215). 2 Those that insist on 
recognizing this category have, Pasteur believes, no interest in great ideas. Sensing the capacity of 
language to shape discipline, Pasteur questions the use of this “incorrect phrase” on the grounds 
that its continued and earnest use sows dangerous practices.  
The phrase’s insidious danger derives from the damaging rupture that it posits in what 
Pasteur sees as a highly interconnected process. “There is science,” Pasteur writes, “and there are 
applications of science, as bound to one another as the fruit is to the tree that produced it”3 (215, 
emphasis mine). To think of scientific problems solely from the vantage of application is to sever, 
per the logic of the organic metaphor Pasteur employs, the vital connection between the useful 
application of an idea – the fruit – and the careful labor, creativity, patience and perseverance that 
nourished the idea – the tree, the earth, the gardening, etc. The nourishing elements place ideas on 
a “superior order” [ordre suprérieur], rendering their application “facile,” which is to say, of a 
 
1 Pourquoi la France n’a pas Trouvé d’Hommes Supérieurs au Moment du Péril 
2 Non, mille fois non, il n’existe pas une catégorie de sciences auxquelles on puisse donner le nom de sciences 
appliquées 
3 Il y a science et les applications de la science, liées entre elles comme le fruit à l’arbre qui l’a porté.  
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comparatively lower order (215). It is on the basis of this difference in order that Georges Cuvier, 
the great French zoologist quoted extensively by Pasteur in the essay, locates a certain vulgarity 
in doctrines of practicality. If, as Cuvier believes, the discovery of truths presupposes, nay, requires 
a turn away from “practical cares” [soins nécessaires], then a doctrine that makes practical 
necessities its primary concern amounts to a superficial, self-defeating undertaking (215). This is 
what Pasteur believes the applied sciences to be: an undertaking that pursues what is ultimately 
lower order practical thinking and that therefore moves farther from the new and exciting 
applications it ardently desires.  
Where sciences appliquées relies on a categorical difference between it and its compulsory 
other, sciences théoriques, Pasteur’s preferred expression – science and applications of science – 
expresses the identical distinction recursively. For the purposes of this dissertation, recursion refers 
to the philosophical domain of difference-in-sameness, which is to say, a domain that imagines 
difference or change occurring without loss of similitude or continuity. Pasteur’s preferred 
expression is recursively defined in relation to science because the prepositional phrase “of 
science” embeds science, which is to say, the hard work, the perseverance, the love of knowledge 
for its own sake, in the application. Nesting does not partake of gaps or divisions as a twin set of 
qualifying adjectives – e.g. appliquée and théorique – does. The recursive formulation inherent in 
Pasteur’s preferred expression instead maintains a sense of organic, differentiated seamlessness, 
on the order of that between tree and apple, which the term applied science severs by virtue of 
oppositional difference with its compulsory opposite, theoretical science. Though Pasteur himself 
may not have recognized the recursive nature of his preferred thinking with regard to these 
disciplinary questions, recursion nevertheless represents a possible approach to reconciling the 
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fragmentation produced by the endurance of applied and theoretical sciences as terms that 
influence the operation of scholarly activity.  
To the likely dismay of Pasteur and Cuvier alike, applied and theoretical science have not 
lost their influence. Quite the opposite, this set of oppositions was one of three that achieved the 
prominence of formal codification with the 1973 emergence of the Biglan model of subject matter 
difference. Developed by psychologist Anthony Biglan, the model that bears his name met a 
crucial need for assessing the organization of academic activity in higher education. One question 
framed under this topic asked about the relation between departmental structure and the subject 
matter that it adopts. With no adequate understanding of subject matter difference at the time, 
research on this and other questions pertaining to the university could not proceed. As the fruit of 
two large sets of survey data analyzed using multidimensional scaling techniques, the model at 
which Biglan arrived classified subject matter difference along three general characteristics: 1) use 
2) systematicity and 3) sentience of the object of study. Biglan determined that the combination of 
these three characteristics best fit data obtained from surveys distributed to a representative sample 
of 168 faculty members from 36 academic departments of a large, public, research-intensive 
university, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and 54 members of a small, unnamed 
liberal arts college. The choice of the two vastly different institutions – one exhibiting high and 
one exhibiting low disciplinary diversity – made for stronger evidence that whatever 
characteristics emerged from the two data sets would serve as the best predictors or disciplinary 
difference writ large. The faculty members from each institution served as judges of subject matter 
difference, rendering their judgments through a sorting task that involved grouping academic areas 
or departments together based on perceived similarity. The same three characteristics best 
described both sets of the survey data, leading Biglan to conclude that they represented the most 
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pertinent characteristics marking subject matter difference. Accordingly, they became the basis for 
his model of subject matter difference, each characteristic corresponding, in accordance with 
multidimensional scaling techniques, to a scaled dimension with two poles in a Cartesian 
coordinate system. The two poles of the third dimension – object of study – were assigned the 
names ‘life system’ and ‘nonlife system’; the two poles of the second dimension – systematicity – 
were assigned the names ‘hard’ and ‘soft’; finally, the two poles of the first characteristic – use – 
were assigned the names ‘pure’ and ‘applied.’  
Once formed, the Biglan Model became a means of grouping any number of academic 
departments into a manageable set of eight clusters. Figure 1 below shows one such eight-part 
clustering from a validation study that Biglan published alongside the article that introduced his 
model:  
Figure 1: Academic departments sorted across the three characteristics of subject matter differences 
identified by the Biglan Model  
 
While the list of academic departments clustered in Figure 1 is far from exhaustive and may not 
lend itself to classifying the disciplines created since the model’s appearance in the early 1970’s, 
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it nevertheless shows how the Biglan model functions and how it could still be used to understand 
university activity. One of the research directions that Biglan singles out involves understanding 
the cognitive processes of different fields. Not only does Biglan claim that the model “provides a 
systemic framework for exploring the role of cognitive processes in academic fields,” but also that 
its three dimensions represent “the three most important dimensions for characterizing the 
‘cognitive style’ of an area” (Biglan, “The Characteristics” 202).  
The notion of distinct cognitive styles constitutes the sort of disciplinary fragmentation that 
this dissertation proposes as an inimical force to holistic healthcare. As distinct cognitive styles 
become categorically different cognitive styles, the possibility of holistic healthcare – an endeavor 
that, by dint of its ambition to partake of infinite therapeutic targets, would cultivate a limitless 
plurality of cognitive styles – becomes increasingly remote. Understanding the three 
characteristics alleged to define the categorically different cognitive styles of disciplinarity thus 
could present a crucial first step in creating an intellectual world capable of supporting a holistic 
approach to healthcare. To that end, brief discussions given in the next three sub- 
s describe the salient traits of each subject matter characteristic with respect to Biglan’s 
analysis before opening up further questions about the splitting of the characteristic at hand into 
discrete categories.  
 
1.1.1 First Biglan Dimension: Use – Applied vs. Pure 
 
The discussion section of the article that introduced the Biglan model primarily serves an 
exemplary function of the first subject matter characteristic: it offers education, engineering, and 
agricultural areas as examples of applied areas that stand in contrast to such pure fields as the 
humanities and social sciences. Biglan’s accompanying validation study, which attempts 
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predictions of departmental activities and dynamics according to where the given area falls across 
the three dimensions (use, systematicity, and object of study), gives comparatively more insight 
into what the applied-pure distinction means, stating that one characteristic of applied areas is the 
preponderance of technical reports. “Presumably,” Biglan writes, “technical reports provide an 
ideal format for communicating detailed research results to the groups and individuals who are 
serviced by applied areas” (211). Biglan’s assessment of technical reports portrays applied fields 
as the mediators between theoretical or pure research and those that use or are serviced by it. Left 
unexplained is the nature of that mediation: there is little comment on whether the communication 
accomplished by technical reports serves a translational function whereby it clarifies practical use 
of pure research, or whether it performs a more perfunctory transmitting function.  
As a result of these and other unanswered questions, there is little indication of whether the 
applied-pure dimension reproduces the dangers Pasteur saw in the use of sciences appliquées. The 
intricacies of application are easy to underestimate, justifying a qualification to the general opinion 
held by Pasteur and Cuvier that it constitutes a lower order task. It would of course be a mistake 
to assume that creativity, perseverance, effort and love of knowledge, the very nurturing elements 
that made ideas of higher order in the estimation of the two scientists, do not appear in the task of 
moving an idea from, say, the laboratory to the farm. Nevertheless, the two 1973 articles by Biglan 
do little to articulate the nature of the intellectual exchange that occurs in technical reports, to say 
nothing of other aspects of the relationship between applied and pure areas. So while it might be 
hasty to locate in the applied-pure dimension the rupturing effects for which Pasteur accuses the 
distinction between sciences appliquées and théoriques, the Biglan model does in no way foreclose 
the possibility of regarding the applied and the pure as categorically distinct ways of thinking, the 
very categorical distinction that Pasteur feared.  
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1.1.2 Second Biglan Dimension: Systematicity – Hard vs. Soft 
 
Framed by Biglan as empirical evidence of Thomas Kuhn’s seminal 1962 analysis of the role 
paradigms play in the development of scientific thought, the second major characteristic of subject 
matter difference – systematicity – vindicates the degree of consensus around a single, cohesive 
body of theory – a paradigm – as a strong predictor of subject matter difference. “The paradigm,” 
Biglan writes, “serves an important organizing function; it provides a consistent account of most 
of the phenomena of interest in the area and, at the same time, serves to define those problems 
which require further research. Thus, fields that have a single paradigm will be characterized by 
greater consensus about content and method than will fields lacking a paradigm” (Biglan, “The 
Characteristics,” 202). Further corroborating Kuhn’s results, biology and physics – two fields 
designated by Kuhn as paradigmatic – emerge in Biglan’s analysis as academic areas with a high 
degree of consensus around a discrete set of principles, the Theory of Evolution, the Central 
Dogma of Molecular Biology and the Laws of Thermodynamics being just a few. By virtue of the 
broad consensus around these and other theories, biology and physics are deemed hard areas. In 
contrast, the humanities and education emerge as areas for which “content and method […] tend 
to be idiosyncratic,” earning them the soft designation (202). The multiplicity of theoretical 
frameworks in literary studies alone, which includes but is not limited to Marxism, Feminism, 
Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Structuralism and Post-Structuralism, Deconstruction, Queer Studies 
and Aestheticism, testifies to the possibility for greater freedom and, by that token, greater debate 
over content and method in humanistic areas.  
It is perhaps this sense of greater plurality, and not the paradigm concept itself, that 
constitutes the basis of the popular and often pejorative usages of the hard-soft distinction. The 
relative degree of theoretical pluralism can account for the popular understanding of hard as 
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incontrovertibly true and the soft as, while not untrue per se, far more open to manipulation and 
therefore suspect. It is understandable why a layperson might assume that a field where many 
theories vie for dominance is more vulnerable to academic charlatanism than one with only a few, 
highly established theories. While the Biglan model cannot assume full responsibility for such 
assumptions, the hard-soft dimension perhaps has a role in stoking a categorical difference that 
belies the burden on all academic areas to develop consensus for any new theory that it seeks to 
promote, regardless of whether that theory is “idiosyncratic” or in deference to a theory to which 
many researchers already subscribe.  
 
1.1.3 Third Biglan Dimension: Sentience of Object of study – Life system vs. non-life system  
 
The last characteristic of subject matter difference identified by Biglan involves the vitality of 
research objects. Insofar as it tacitly issues a ruling on what constitutes life and what does not, the 
corresponding life-nonlife dimension stands as the most dangerous of the three. The two initial 
Biglan studies offer virtually no insight into the criteria by which animate is distinguished from 
inanimate, almost as if to suggest that the distinction were self-evident. A survey of the areas that 
fall on the life end of the dimension reveals that all of the conventional candidates for living 
organisms – humans, animals, plants and microorganisms (e.g. bacteria, protozoa, fungi) along 
with their cells, tissues and physiological processes – all figure as animate objects of study. 
However, upon closer examination, grafting these conventional understandings of life on to a 
system of articulating academic subject matter leads to innumerable inconsistencies.  
It would be laughable, for example, to question whether microbiology, a subfield of what 
is, etymologically speaking, the study of life, belongs on the life axis of the dimension. Yet the 
assumption that it does glosses over longstanding debate on whether one of microbiology’s 
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undisputed objects of study, the virus, actually constitutes a living entity. The argument could be 
made that there is no inconsistency in consideration of how viruses must, by definition, interact 
with indisputably living things, thereby rendering the area that studies them a life area, even if 
viruses are themselves not living in their own right. The opposite case, whereby a living object of 
study falls on the nonlife pole, perhaps presents far graver intellectual and ethical problems in a 
situation where life is privileged over non-life. One area that might have particularly suffered this 
from error is communication studies, as Figure 2 below makes clear. Taken from Biglan’s 
validation study, the graph below shows a number of academic areas across two dimensions: 
applied-pure and life-nonlife.  
 
 
Figure 2: A coordinate system from the 1973 Article that introduced the Biglan Model showing 
communication in the nonlife, soft quadrant and microbiology in the life, hard quadrant  
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Though close proximity to the graph’s origin – the point (0,0) – indicates its position on the cusp 
of both dimensions, communication studies ultimately falls within the nonlife, applied quadrant. 
While communication studies may not study humans directly, calling its object of study a non-life 
matter reads as wholly arbitrary, particularly in light of the previous example involving viruses. 
Separating advertising and other media artifacts from the living humans that create and respond to 
them for the sake of justifying non-life status for communications studies is indefensible if a non-
living entity like a virus gets to remain in a life area by virtue of its necessary interactions with 
living organisms. These and numerous other inconsistencies speak to the often arbitrary and 
possibly insidious divisions created by the life-nonlife dimension.  
 
1.1.4 Categorical Disciplinarity, Disciplinary Fragmentation and the Biglan Model  
 
The Biglan model’s three dimensions no doubt raise numerous questions about the nature of the 
modern university as well as the proper tools by which to understand that nature. Subsequent 
investigation has reported numerous departmental variables successfully predicted by the Biglan 
model, including degree of social connectedness, departmental goals, and duties performed by the 
departmental chair, among many others.4 Together with Biglan’s suggestion that the three subject 
matter characteristics mark distinct cognitive styles, these successfully predicted variables justify 
the model as a useful tool for pursuing questions about disciplinarity, just as it was intended to do. 
Yet the problems outlined in the previous sections, particularly the problems highlighted by viruses 
and communication studies, show that the model is far from infallible.  
 
4 See Creswell and Roskens, Creswell and Bean, Smart and Elton.  
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In view of these considerations, the Biglan model is, for the purposes of this dissertation, 
taken as an idealized set of categorically different cognitive styles, albeit with the provision that 
the nature of what those categories mean is never completely fixed and can fluctuate. As a set of 
cognitive styles, the Biglan model stands as one way of doing categorical disciplinarity, which is 
to say, disciplinarity that relies on the categorization of cognitive styles and, in so doing, puts 
disciplinary fragmentation into operation. In the effort to build a theory of what disciplinary 
fragmentation might be, how it would contribute to an intellectual world inimical to holistic 
healthcare and, finally, how disciplinary reconciliation might be achieved, the dissertation 
considers the Biglan three dimensions in relation to traditional, Western biomedicine. 
Understanding this relation in turn requires a working familiarity with the formation of mainstream 
medical institutions in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
 
1.2 THE FLEXNERIAN ENTERPRISE: AN ALLIANCE OF PATIENT CARE, RESEARCH 
AND MEDICAL EDUCATION 
 
Considering Pasteur published his thoughts on sciences appliquées and sciences théoriques as 
early as 1871, the cognitive styles proposed to constitute disciplinary fragmentation undoubtedly 
collided with the post-bellum germination of the modern American medical system. The importing 
of medical knowledge from France, among other European nations, created ample opportunity for 
such collisions to occur. It was not until after the turn of the century, though, that the so-called 
Flexnerian Revolution established the first recognizably modern form of mainstream medicine: an 
institutional union of medical education, advanced scientific research and patient care. For the 
purposes of discussion in all forthcoming chapters, the term “Flexnerian enterprise” refers to this 
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basic tripartite institutional configuration and will supplant the phrase “mainstream, allopathic 
medicine,” which certainly contains but does not specify this tripartite configuration.  
The Flexnerian Revolution began with the 1910 report of the figure whose name they bear, 
Abraham Flexner. Funded by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, the so-called Flexner report called for the closure of for-profit, proprietary medical 
schools that were prevalent in post-bellum America and offered poor, unregulated, disorganized 
medical training. The report also galvanized the still nascent medical education reform efforts that 
had already begun before the turn of the century in isolated pockets of the country. Though the 
1893 opening of Johns Hopkins Medical School, for example, added to the small list of pioneering 
medical institutions for less developed schools to emulate, the confinement of medical education 
reform to the medical profession itself meant that the available resources diverted to such efforts 
fell far short of that necessary for large-scale reform. However, the Flexner report made medical 
education reform a cause célèbre, catapulting a confined, profession-limited undertaking into a 
sweeping national campaign. One of the primary reasons for the report’s success in raising public 
interest was its emphasis on the profound gap between the state of scientific knowledge and the 
practice of medicine. One particularly evocative illustration of this gap is the case of a Harvard 
Medical School graduate who, upon establishing his own practice in Nebraska, was “stunned” to 
learn that his microscope was possibly the only one in the region (Ludmerer 5). Considering this 
occurred in 1912, thirty years after the birth of bacteriology and the work of Pasteur, Koch and 
others solidified the germ theory, the instance of American physicians being well versed in the 
cutting-edge medical science of the day veered more toward the exception than to the rule.    
 To make mastery of cutting-edge scientific knowledge among practicing physicians the 
rule rather than the exception, the Flexner report built on – rather than began – the effort to forge 
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stronger institutional ties between medical schools and large research universities. Decades before 
the Flexner report of 1910, the institution of the medical school figured in strategies adopted by 
university presidents to consolidate the position and role of the university institution: the “control 
of medical school,” so the logic went, “would help validate the university’s claim to hegemony in 
all matters of education and professional training” (Ludmerer 14). Having claimed and actively 
working toward preeminent leadership in the tasks of knowledge production and transmission, the 
post-bellum American university boasted the infrastructure, resources and programs that could 
support the research activities underwriting the progress of medical science. Immersing medical 
students in the most current scientific research thus served the greater efforts of streamlining the 
application of scientific advances generated by research universities to medical problems, thereby 
guaranteeing the high quality of physician training as well.  
The development of affiliations between medical schools and American universities 
occurring in the late nineteenth century coincided with the latter’s reformation in the image of the 
German model. Extolling the virtues of the model that made it so appealing, Flexner himself 
declared that of America, England and Germany, “Germany has in theory and practice come 
nearest to giving higher education its due position” (Flexner 305). Less clear is what precisely 
accounts for the model’s success at home and subsequent appeal abroad. Many answers cite 
Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit, or the teacher’s freedom to lecture and research and the student’s 
freedom to follow a self-chosen course of study, respectively. These commonly mentioned ideals 
aside, another, less apparent explanation may lie in a productive, if under-appreciated, tension 
whereby the first modern academic division of labor developed alongside sustained conversation 
over the unity of all knowledge that extended at least as far back as the eighteenth century.   
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At least three foundational texts on the subject of the German university all celebrate and 
emphasize this unity. Friedrich Schiller, in his 1789 inaugural lecture as professor of history at the 
University of Jena, gestures to the subject by way of a comparison between the “philosophical 
mind” [philosophisch Kopf] and the “careerist scholar” [Brotgelehrte] (424). Whereas the 
“scholarship” [Wissenschaft] of the latter becomes increasingly “isolated” [absondert], that of the 
former works to “reestablish” [herzustellen] its “connectivity with the rest” [Bund mit den übrigen] 
(424). Schiller elucidates the full meaning of “reestablish” by noting that it was “abstractions of 
the intellect” [abstrahierende Verstand] that created the “boundaries” [Grenzen] in the first place 
(424). It would seem, if Schiller’s observations are any indication, that reestablishing connections 
in the pursuit of unity is coupled to understanding the workings of the mind.  
Friedrich Schleiermacher extends the question of scholarly unity to politics, arguing in an 
1808 essay that the “systematic” [wissenschaftlich] production of knowledge calls its practitioners 
to the high task of “dissolving” [aufzuheben] “the separation between different spheres” [die 
Trennung zwischen verschiedenen Gebieten] (23). To do so would thus presuppose a unity of all 
knowledge that extends far beyond and thus defies national and linguistic boundaries. For this 
reason, “the community” [die Gemeinschaft] in which Schleiermacher believes the State “must 
stand” [stehen müssen] “exists in scholarly activities as it does nowhere else” [nirgends 
aussprechen als in wissenschaftlichen Dinge] (25). However, barring a political adoption of the 
collaborative seen in scholarly activities, the state, Schleiermacher says, will put its interests first. 
The consequence of this “selfish” [selbstsüchtig] attitude for knowledge production is that 
scholarly advancements have no other value than to advance the state (24). Pasteur corroborates 
this reality, citing alongside his criticism of sciences appliquées the words of an 1868 letter of 
thanks to the Empress Eugénie from, presumably, a prominent scientist: “the great task of this 
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moment is to assure France’s superiority in science”5 (212). For the anonymous writer of these 
words, the purpose of scientific advancement has little to do with knowledge but instead with 
political supremacy.  
Finally, in what is perhaps a more optimistic assessment of the political relationships 
binding nationhood and discipline together, Wilhelm von Humboldt, to whom tradition ties the 
German university concept most closely, identifies three intellectual tendencies that do not belong 
exclusively to. but which are nevertheless found in, “the German national character” [Der 
intellektuelle Nationcharakter der Deutschen] (253). These tendencies are: 1) “to derive” 
[abzuleiten] everything from “first principle[s]” [ursprüglichen Princip] 2) “to develop” 
[zuzubilden] toward an “ideal” [Ideal] 3) “to connect” [verknüpfen] the principles and ideal in a 
“single idea” [eine Idee]. Thus, the practices outlined by Humboldt leave little doubt as to the 
importance of unity of knowledge in the German intellectual tradition.  
Alongside rich contemplation about the unified nature of scholarship was the first instance 
of systematically dividing knowledge production into a regulated, circumscribed endeavor, one 
given to fragmentation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the dust of the French 
Revolution settled, a number of previously languishing German universities finally closed, 
clearing the way for innovation and reform. Among these innovations was the creation of the 
academic discipline itself: “it was […] in the German universities, more than anywhere else, that 
the main fields of scientific inquiry developed into ‘disciplines’ possessing specialized 
methodologies and systematically determined contents” (Ben-David and Zloczower 48). Indeed, 
the first half of the century saw the rise of humanistic classical studies from which new branches 
of philological and historical research sprang. Alongside these rose the mathematical and natural 
 
5 La plus grande œuvre à accomplir en ce moment est d’assurer la supériorité scientifique de la France.  
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sciences, the latter going on to supplant philosophy as the preeminent intellectual pursuit. By the 
1860s, the four faculties of the medieval university – theology, law, philosophy and medicine – no 
longer existed, having been replaced by the fruits of an incessantly multiplying sequence of 
academic specializations, the differences between whose subject matter the Biglan model would 
later try to schematize in the late twentieth century.  
Regardless of the extent to which Flexner and the early university presidents who together 
shaped the American university in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries appreciated the 
complex tension between disciplinary specialization and the unity of knowledge in the German 
university tradition, the latter nevertheless afforded a division of academic labor that served the 
needs of medical research. Having presided over the proliferation of the modern disciplines, the 
German model naturally supported the germination of disciplines that medical science needed in 
order to progress. In the words of Flexner, “medicine stood almost still until the pre-clinical 
sciences were differentiated and set free” (14, italics mine). Indeed, the scholarly liberation and 
subsequent successes arising from academic differentiation made for a mutually favorable 
marriage of medicine’s needs with the disciplinary germination permitted by the modern, German-
inspired research university.  
The same could not be said for incorporating hospitals into the alliance. This incorporation 
encountered resistance from hospital administrators who did not welcome the prospect of aligning 
their primary mission – patient care – with those of medical research and medical education. 
Hospital trustees, among others, were wary of the inevitable disruptions and tensions resulting 
from scientists collecting tissues and gathering data or from medical students fumbling through 
basic tasks as they developed clinical skills. Yet hospitals had what both research and education 
increasingly required: patients. The aftermath of the Civil War saw the emergence of progressive 
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education whose emphasis on active learning translated into rigorous clinical experiences for 
medical students, while the maturation of the clinical sciences required access to actual cases of 
the diseases clinical scientists sought to better understand. Gradually, consensus that the three basic 
activities of what would become the Flexnerian enterprise – research, patient care and medical 
education – could enter into a symbiotic relationship emerged and by the 1920s, a new institution, 
the teaching hospital, was born. The teaching hospital helped promote the progressive educational 
value of active learning by supporting a system of clinical clerkships whereby each medical 
student, under the guidance of senior physicians, could assume responsibility for a limited number 
of patients in each of the core medical specialties. It also provided unlimited access to disease 
cases without which the work of clinical research could not proceed. In return, teaching hospitals 
enjoyed the financial benefits of university affiliation as well as the intellectual and physical vigor 
brought by medical students and researchers. With the final obstacles cleared by the 1920s, the 
Flexnerian system was complete, the modern medical enterprise achieved.  
But despite the decades of successes reaped by the Flexnerian trinity of medical education, 
research and patient care, the initial reluctance of hospitals to join the Flexnerian revolution would 
prove to have had some merit. The object of this reluctance lay hidden in plain sight, residing in 
the very guiding principle on which the Flexnerian enterprise was based: “harmony among 
education, research and patient care” (21). Ludmerer considers the faith in this harmony “one of 
the great ironies of medical education” given that this harmony “was never proven, only assumed” 
(21). The existence of such unexpected collisions would in turn explain Ludmerer’s observation 
that the equilibrium was “potentially unstable” (21). A testament to how this instability “would 
haunt both medical schools and teaching hospitals in a later era,” the spread of managed care in 
the 1980s and 1990s helped to disrupt this fragile equilibrium and thereby precipitated further 
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instability, both financial and logistical (21). The blows the Flexnerian enterprise sustained from 
the managed care movement and other forces, to say nothing of reforming it for holistic purposes, 
demand a closer look at the clashes both between and within its three basic activities.  
At the risk of oversimplification, the Biglan model gives an immediate impression of these 
clashes. With respect to cognitive style, medical research would, per the Biglan classifications, 
most likely have a pure-hard-life cognitive style, patient care an applied-hard-life style and medical 
education an applied-soft-life style. Though ostensibly aligned by their concern with life, the 
collision of applied and pure, hard and soft styles nevertheless presents opportunities for 
destabilizing clashes. These designations, however, only give the vaguest impression of the 
disciplinary fragmentation that proliferated under the alliance of medical research with the modern 
research university. The effects of categorical disciplinarity for medicine, as Flexner noted with 
celebration, were liberating, yet they also created troubling contradictions. One such contradiction 
arises from the categorical difference that distinguished fundamental research from preclinical 
research. Often regarded as the “handmaidens” of clinical disciplines like internal medicine or 
pathology, the preclinical disciplines such as physiology and microbiology distinguished 
themselves from fundamental disciplines such as biology and chemistry on the basis of 
“relevan[ce] to students and practitioners of medicine” (Ludmerer 34). Whereas the fundamental 
disciplines pursued fundamental questions, the former emphatically focused on “disease 
treatments and mechanisms […] even as,” Ludmerer points out, “biological and chemical 
techniques were increasingly used in their work” (34, italics mine). Distinguishing the missions of 
the preclinical sciences from those of the fundamental subjects thus belied a disciplinary cross-
breeding that resoundingly contradicted any claims to categorical difference both promoted by 
those same mission statements and possibly articulated by the Biglan model.  
 21 
Driven by the complex and inevitable collaborations between preclinical researchers and 
practicing clinicians, further categorical differences proliferated in preclinical research itself. 
Ludmerer characterizes the orientation of the preclinical sciences toward medicine as primarily 
reflecting “the fact that the smallest unit of study was the cell” (35). If the cell was the most basic 
biological unit and thus the territory of so-called basic biology, then a majority of the preclinical 
sciences divided tissues, organs or whole organisms among themselves, thereby marking their 
boundaries according to increasingly complex levels of biological organization. These levels made 
for “firm and inviolable” borders between subject areas: “biochemistry was biochemistry; 
physiology was physiology; pathology, pathology; and microbiology, microbiology – each subject 
taught by a separate department and defined as sharply and discretely by its intellectual content as 
college undergraduate subjects like mathematics, history and classics” (Ludmerer 35). 
Approaching these subject matter differences as not merely a function of content but of cognitive 
style brings the influence of disciplinary fragmentation into the realm of the Flexnerian enterprise. 
The reification of these differences over the late the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
would have cultivated a fragmentation of cognitive styles that would in turn render holistic 
medicine inconceivable.  
 
1.3 COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AND THE DOUBLE BINDS OF DISCIPLINARITY  
 
Before developing a more sophisticated understanding of how disciplinary fragmentation renders 
the Flexnerian enterprise an intellectual environment hindersome to holistic healthcare and making 
suggestions for an environment that would support it, some initially confounding problems with 
even doing so must first be addressed. First, positing disciplinarity itself as a sort of impediment 
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to holistic healthcare before endeavoring to get around that impediment altogether entails 
overcoming two seemingly intractable double binds. The first double bind has to be dealt with 
before work on the subject can even begin and is best expressed as a question: what basic activities 
of discipline – reviewing extant literature, theorizing, writing, organizing, measuring, etc. – could 
be trusted to understand disciplinary fragmentation? Put another way, what discipline or what 
single disciplinary framework can articulate a problem of disciplinarity? These questions 
effectively broach the disciplinary equivalent of the paradox with which philosophers of the mind 
grapple: can the mind understand itself? The genesis of the Biglan model, an effort made from 
inside the research university to create a framework to understand the research university, makes 
the dizzying self-referentiality of this problem more apparent. Biglan was a psychologist and the 
journal in which he published his model was the Journal of Applied Psychology. Psychology, 
whether conceived as a set of questions, practices, literature, group of researchers, is of course at 
least in part constituted by and thus existing within the modern regime of knowledge production, 
begging the question of what gives it, rather than other disciplines, the special capacity to step 
back and classify subject matter on behalf of the entire disciplinary regime.  
Of course, no discipline could step back more than an altogether alternative disciplinarity. 
Francesca Bordogna’s William James at the Boundaries: Science, Philosophy and the Geography 
of Knowledge makes multiple disciplinarities thinkable by “recasting the emergence of the modern 
regime of standardized knowledge production, one premised upon the quest for universal 
objectivity, the requirement of impersonality, and bureaucratic interactions among knowledge 
producers” (Bordogna 272). A historiographical account tracing the field-spanning professional 
career of William James and his resistance to the disciplinary boundary consolidation that his 
career coincided with, the book recasts the regime’s inevitability by showing that “the processes 
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resulting in the entrenchment of the new moral, social and epistemic rules governing scientific 
knowledge were heavily contested and their outcomes could have been vastly different” (Bordogna 
273). In light of these revelations about James’ career and his grave concerns with the foundations 
of what would become the research arm of the Flexnerian enterprise, it becomes possible to 
imagine an alternative disciplinarity with a different set of values. The idea of two disciplinarities 
in turn releases the first double bind: the alternative disciplinarity articulates the fragmentation of 
the one that creates an intellectual world inimical to holistic healthcare.  
Fortunately, what loosens the first double bind – alternative disciplinary – also loosens the 
second. The second double bind arises from how holistic healthcare, partaking of infinite 
therapeutic targets, would call for limitlessly integrating knowledge from theoretically unrelated 
traditions without losing the theoretical constraints that check intellectual anarchy. This is a calling 
that cannot proceed under the categorical disciplinarity of the Flexnerian enterprise, which hinges 
on disciplinary centers. The function of any disciplinary center is to impose limits by, among other 
things, a vocabulary, a set of techniques and procedures that dictates how the previous two are 
used. No matter how cleverly constructed the disciplinary center, its constraining capabilities 
would eventually buckle under the extensions demanded by truly holistic measures. For it is 
impossible to conceive of a stationary disciplinary center that could admit the mobile extension of 
the relentless and limitless integration that the intuition of holism would require. Hence, the need 
for exclusion, the imperative to keep things out of the center for the sake of maintaining constraint. 
Yet exclusionary measures, by definition, do not promote completeness and thus cannot be 
considered holistic. Such is the intractable double bind that disciplinarity imposes on holistic 
aspirations. An alternative disciplinarity could get around this double bind in two ways: eschewing 
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disciplinary centers altogether or installing change as a disciplinary center. The alternative 
disciplinarity proposed by this dissertation seeks the latter course.  
Having postulated a change-centered alternative disciplinarity as the solution to these two 
intractable double binds, the question arises of where best to search for the solution and how 
cultivate it. The most tempting answer would be outside conventional disciplinarity, which is to 
say, independent of any major, mainstream academic institution. However, the major disadvantage 
of this option is that the regime of categorical disciplinary could always deny the onus of taking 
seriously any of the criticisms that it does not produce itself. The resources and cultural authority 
enjoyed by categorical disciplinarity suggest that it would need to buy in to any alternatives to 
itself. Therefore, these criticisms must come from within the regime of categorical disciplinarity 
while still being enough outside it to observe and cultivate alternative values. The discipline that 
perhaps best strikes this balance is Comparative Literature. Of all reputable academic disciplines, 
Comparative Literature has long had the most complicated relationship with the constraining 
limitations inherent in categorical disciplinarity. For factions that would overlook the field’s 
position among university academic departments and contest its very reputability, Comparative 
Literature is an anti-discipline of sorts where any disciplinary procedure is permissible. One of the 
field’s leading figures, Haun Saussy, suggests that the field’s “transnational” approach to literature 
and culture – its signature and yet most risky disciplinary procedure – helped sow, more than 
anything else, the field’s reputation for dilettantism (3). And yet this same approach of working 
across national literary boundaries has been also, Saussy argues, at least partially responsible for 
the very concept of interdisciplinarity, perhaps the most rehearsed academic talking point, a point 
he sums up by saying that “our conclusions have become other people’s assumptions” (3). Though 
the debate over the disciplinary validity of Comparative Literature’s transnational approaches 
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continues, the debate over the role that approach has in establishing Comparative Literature’s 
connection to world literature is well established. It is the fruitful alliance between Comparative 
Literature’s concern with comparison and world literature’s aspirations for a holistic perspective 
that creates an intellectual space in which to cultivate the change-centered disciplinarity that could 
permit holistic healthcare.  
Understanding the close relationship between Comparative Literature and world literature 
helps explain why the former enjoys this distinction. Many commentators acknowledge 
Comparative Literature’s debt to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s conception of a Weltliteratur, or, 
world literature. Though Goethe himself did not write widely on Weltliteratur, he nevertheless 
helped establish what would become Comparative Literature’s two traditional axes of comparison: 
language and nation. That is, Goethe proposed the idea of a discipline that compared literary texts 
on the basis of the language in which they were composed and the national identity of the author. 
He also anticipated a crucial tension – that between nation and world – which he evoked most 
concisely in his famous dictum: “national literature is now rather an unmeaning term; the epoch 
of world literature is at hand” (23). Subsequent scholarship on the meaning of Goethian 
Weltliteratur, composed against the backdrop of globalizing forces that render nation an 
increasingly “unmeaning term,” frames the debates that have arisen over the discipline’s traditional 
axes of comparison as well as what the study of world literature would even entail. One point in 
the debate made by Robert J. Clements in Comparative Literature as Academic Discipline (1978) 
takes issue with the definition of world literature given in the American Comparative Literature 
Association’s (ACLA) first report on the state of the discipline, published in 1965. Clements 
characterizes the 1965 ACLA report’s definition as a “sanction to a misnomer invented largely by 
textbook publishers” and offers an alternate definition of world literature as “the maximum 
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geographic dimension of comparative literature” (Pizer 23). With this definition comes the 
challenge of “developing a discipline fully cognizant of the still developing age of cultural 
globalization” in the twenty-first century (223). One of the primary ways of doing so seems to be 
finding alternate axes of comparison in view of the increasingly accepted reality that in a 
globalized world, language and nation no longer explain, and in fact may obscure, the crucial 
differences and similarities comparativists seek to articulate. Discovering alternate methods of 
comparing the whole globalized world, while ever avoiding the pitfall of forcing them to conform 
to a totalizing schema, is the mission that seems to motivate the alliance between Comparative 
Literature and world literature.  
In what amounts to a disciplinary variation of that same mission, Fedwa Malti-Douglas 
calls for the use of comparative methods “beyond what we normally defined as literature into a 
wider variety of texts, understood in the largest possible context, and encompassing the rich areas 
of law, medicine and science” (175). Malti-Douglas’ proposal extends the purview of Comparative 
Literature and thereby infinitely broadens the meaning of the word literature itself such that it 
refers not only to literary texts but to the texts of virtually any field or discipline (why stop at “law, 
medicine and science”?). In Malti-Douglas’ proposal, the maximum geographic dimension of 
comparative literature – the world – would mean all disciplines. The disciplinary ambition inherent 
in this proposal in turn does justice to three realities: 1) the reality that disciplines function as 
(contingent) segmentations of the world; 2) the reality that a great many, if not all, disciplines 
already refer to the textual corpora with which they engage as “the literature”; 3) the reality of 
incessant calls for interdisciplinarity that render discipline, like the nation in Goethe’s estimation, 
an increasingly “unmeaning term” and thereby stoke the rumblings of a post-discipline university. 
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These three advantages help to set up Comparative Literature as an alternative disciplinarity to the 
categorical disciplinarity of the Flexnerian enterprise.  
The redefinition of three terms – comparative, world, and literature – to reflect a pan-
disciplinary ambition helps give further shape to an alternative disciplinarity capable of supporting 
the development of holistic healthcare:  
● The first term – the adjectival transformation of the verb “to compare” – refers to centrality 
of comparison. Comparing is a practice, among many, upon which every discipline, in one 
way or another, relies. The practice of holistic healthcare would not only stress reflection 
on practices in general but also rely on bold, inventive comparisons to make decisions and 
create new ideas.  
● The second term – “world” – would signal the holistic implications of studying 
disciplinarity as such. To the extent that disciplinarity establishes a division of academic 
labor that presupposes the world’s segmentation into manageable, researchable domains, 
the term ‘world’ is a reminder of that easily forgotten segmentation as well as the holistic 
value that health is ultimately a function of the world.  
● The final term – “literature” – refers to the body of texts according to which a discipline 
orients itself and measures its progress. The citing of literature ensures that orientation and 
rigor still exists, even if it changes as part of the reflection on practices, in the alternative 
disciplinarity of holistic healthcare.  
A disciplinarity defined by the meanings of these three terms thus gives an impression of an 
alternative disciplinarity that would not only enjoy the privilege of articulating the disciplinary 
fragmentation of the Flexnerian enterprise’s research arm but also of possibly cultivating the 
change-centered disciplinarity capable of supporting holistic healthcare.  
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1.4 LOOKING AHEAD  
 
Having situated the problem of holistic healthcare vis-à-vis disciplinary fragmentation, the tri-
partite institutional configuration of modern medicine and the alliance between Comparative 
Literature and world literature, chapter one is finished. Looking ahead, chapter two offers an 
overview of holistic medicine as it manifested, at overlapping moments, in each of the three arms 
of the Flexnerian enterprise. The chapter considers two holistic attempts at patient care – 
biopsychosocial model and Integrative medicine – along with their respective holistic research 
operations – General Systems Theory and Integral Physiology. As neither of these mounted a 
recognizable vision of how their respective ideas could be taught at the post-baccalaureate level, 
narrative and schema-based medicine – two projects falling under the medical or health humanities 
rubrics – stand as two attempts at holistic medical pedagogy. Each overview balances an 
elucidation of the characteristics that qualify the projects as holistic with a sympathetic critique of 
why they failed to achieve or, if they are still active, have yet to and will almost certainly never 
achieve the holistic ideals envisioned by their respective proponents. The explanation given for 
this sobering assessment hinges on a reluctance to mount an adequate intervention in disciplinary 
politics, leaving intact the categorical disciplinarity that is inimical to holistic healthcare. The 
chapter concludes with an impression of the sort of disciplinary interventions that the critiques of 
the failed holistic projects call for.  
The third chapter assembles methodological tools to make these interventions by a 
disciplinarity not beholden to a fixed set of tools with verifiable affiliations between one another 
but instead simply collects what is needed to accomplish the goals it has set for itself. As the 
resulting set of tools for this dissertation shows, however, this manner of collecting is not random, 
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arbitrary and incoherent. Besides pragmatically responding to some of the challenges of holism 
elucidated in chapter two, the tools all share one characteristic: a radical re-thinking of formalism. 
With one exception, no theorist would identify as formalists. Nevertheless, their tools converge on 
productive ideas about form, defined in its broadest possible sense as an arrangement of elements. 
Altogether, these tools help create a formalism called recursive formalism.  
Chapter four subsequently tackles a task proper to recursive formalism: understanding 
disciplinary fragmentation as it modulates and fluctuates in the Flexnerian enterprise. Informed by 
the methodologies expounded in chapter three, chapter four examines three forms, one from each 
domain of the Flexnerian enterprise, to elucidate their role in consolidating disciplinary 
fragmentation along Biglan lines. For example, the chapter discusses written exams, a form that 
unquestionably influences medical pedagogy, in relation to the applied-pure dimension. Board 
exams join the electronic medical record (EMR) and the peer-reviewed journal article, two forms 
belonging to patient care and research, respectively. Following the same basic procedure for the 
three Biglan dimensions amounts to an analysis of nine forms that collide with one another across 
the three domains of the Flexnerian enterprise. Table 1 summarizes the nine forms according to 
the Flexner domain to which they traditionally pertain and the Biglan dimension to which they are 







Table 1: Summary of the Flexnerian forms examined in chapter 4 and how they are discussed in relation 
to the Biglan Model’s oppositions 
Arm of Flexnerian 
Enterprise 
Biglan Opposition 
Applied vs. Pure Hard vs. Soft Life vs. Non-life 
Education  Written exams and 
mnemonics  




Research  Peer-reviewed 
journals and journal 
articles  
Medical Textbooks  Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) 
Guidelines 
Patient Care Electronic Medical 
Records (EMR)  
Evidence hierarchies   Cultural Competence 
Trainings 
 
 Finally, chapter five speculates on how disciplinary reconciliation might be achieved, using 
























CHAPTER 2: HOLISTIC HEALTHCARE UNDER CATEGORICAL DISCIPLINARITY 
 
2.1 POLITICAL WEAKNESSES OF PAST ATTEMPTS AT HOLISTIC RESEARCH, 
PATIENT CARE AND MEDICAL EDUCATION  
 
Past and current attempts at holistic patient care, research and medical pedagogy make little, if 
any, attempt, to contest disciplinary categories, let alone disciplinary categorization itself. Working 
under categorical disciplinarity in turn thwarts holistic interventions at every turn because 
disciplinary fragmentation, which is to say, categorical distinctions between cognitive styles, 
operate. Truly holistic healthcare, by contrast, would only be feasible with something akin to an 
integrating cognitive style. As if to confirm that the integration required by holism cannot occur 
without significant disciplinary political work, cognitive scientist Margaret Boden considers 
integration at once the “only true form” of interdisciplinarity and a destabilizing force to 
disciplines themselves (20). For integrative interdisciplinarity is a situation, Boden writes, “in 
which disciplines are rigorously – politically – exposed at their frontiers to the risk of skirmishes, 
invasions, violence, change and death, with no horizon of quiescent knowledge in view” (20-21). 
The high political stakes of integrative interdisciplinarity – together with no guarantees that it 
would create new knowledge – offer a satisfying explanation for why a holistic healthcare would 
decline to do the work that this dissertation proposes. At the same time, this work is necessary if 
there is to be any possibility of holistic healthcare: critical examination of disciplinary 
categorization so as to begin to imagine how possibly to move beyond categorical disciplinarity.  
 To further understand how addressing disciplinary issues may be paramount to creating 
holistic healthcare, the discussion below will consider six holistic interventions, two for each arm 
of the Flexnerian Enterprise, which have tried holistically to rethink patient care, medical 
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education and research but have not contested disciplinary categories. The holistic patient care 
endeavors are the biopsychosocial model and integrative medicine. The holistic research 
endeavors are General Systems Theory and integrative physiology. The holistic medical pedagogy 
endeavors are narrative and schema-based medicine. Discussing each set of projects together as 
pairs, a description of the characteristics that qualify each pair as holistic interventions precede 
assessments of how categorical disciplinarity operates within them. The purpose of the 
descriptions is not simply to provide sufficient background information for understanding the 
critiques but to also develop a genuine appreciation for the stakes, challenges and innovations of 
these particular attempts at holism as well as of attempting holistic health care in general. The first 
part of the chapter presents the descriptions of the six projects, amounting to a comprehensive 
picture of how all three arms of the Flexnerian enterprise have imagined holistic versions of 
themselves. The second part of the chapter presents the critiques centering around their handling 
of categorical disciplinarity.   
 
2.2 DESCRIPTION: SIX ATTEMPTS AT HOLISTIC HEALTHCARE IN THE FLEXNERIAN 
ENTERPRISE  
 
The rise of General Systems Theory in the 1940s, the emergence of the biopsychosocial model 
and the early medical humanities in the 1970s, the establishment of integrative medicine in the 
1990s, the appearance of integral physiology and the further development of higher impact medical 
humanities in the 2000s have made for nearly seven decades worth of holistic alternatives to 
biomedical conventions. The search for holistic alternatives not only continues as the beginning of 
another decade approaches but seems to have accelerated. The earnestness of a desire for holistic 
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healthcare is perhaps matched only by the tremendous challenges, at once intellectual, logistical, 
ideological, economic and political, that achieving it presents.  
 
2.2.1 Holistic Patient Care – The Biopsychosocial Model and Integrative Medicine 
 
First introduced in a 1977 Science article by psychiatrist George Engel, the biopsychosocial model 
soundly rejects the foundational biomedical premise that biochemical and physiological factors 
are the ultimate criteria defining disease by expanding the notion of health to include the 
psychological and the social. In so doing, Engel sought “to fill a strongly felt need: that of uniting 
the disparate elements of human life in such a way as to legitimize a holistic approach” (McLaren 
91). One way to ascertain what the biopsychosocial model was striving for in the way of social, 
psychological and biological-oriented patient care is to consider a comparison that Engel draws in 
his 1977 article between diabetes and schizophrenia, two diseases made categorically different by 
biomedicine’s insistence on empirically verified physiological causations of disease. Without 
evidence for etiology or physiological causation, schizophrenia falls into the category of 
psychological disease whereas diabetes, a condition for which such evidence exists, falls into the 
category of somatic disease. With the diabetes-schizophrenia comparison, Engel endeavors to 
dissolve not only the categorical difference between somatic and psychological disease but also 
that between disease and its lived experience. From six philosophical observations about patient 
care, Engel constructs six points of comparison along which to consider these and other 
distinctions anew. The somatic-psychological divide as well as the disease-illness divide, while 
not completely dissolved, are at least weakened in the reflective space generated by these six 
observations about clinical medicine:  
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1) Somatic defect is a necessary but not sufficient condition for clinical variability. In the 
event that the discovery of a convincing, widely-accepted biochemical explanation for 
schizophrenia gave it the same clinical status diabetes enjoys as a so-called somatic disease, 
it still would not account for the clinical variability of schizophrenia any more than insulin 
deficiency does for diabetes. The clinical picture of any condition can exhibit considerable 
variability, which can also include but is certainly not limited to a suite of what Engel calls 
“core clinical manifestations” (132). The core clinical manifestations for schizophrenia 
include such positive features as hallucinations, delusions and agitation and such negative 
features as anhedonia and attentional impairment. The clinical manifestations of diabetes 
are excessive urination (polyuria), excessive thirst (polydipsia) and weight loss, among 
many others. To be sure, diabetes and schizophrenia need not present with all of these 
symptoms. Five identical laboratory results may in fact accompany five different 
combinations of the core clinical manifestations of diabetes. Since the biochemical defect 
does not exhaust the variability of clinical picture, consideration of psychological and 
social factors is always needed in order properly round out the clinical manifestation.  
2) Finding correlations between bodily processes and clinical data requires a rigorous 
approach to assessing and documenting behavior. Ascertaining “core clinical 
manifestations” in the first place presupposes an understanding of the “psychological, 
social and cultural determinants of how patients communicate the symptoms of disease” 
(Engel 132). By assuming a standardized mode of communication, the biomedical model 
discounts the influence of language and culture as potentially confounding mediators in the 
collection of crucial clinical data related to such as ostensibly simple activities as going to 
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the bathroom, where a few core clinical manifestations of diabetes arise, or more complex 
behavior like paying attention, a core clinical manifestation of schizophrenia.  
3) Living conditions are a variable in disease onset and progression: “Psycho-physiological 
responses to life” influence such clinical considerations as “time of onset, the severity and 
course of a disease” (Engel 132). Discounting both the psychological reactions to life 
events, disease and disease as life events, along with intervening social factors, 
impoverishes the understanding of these three crucial clinical factors. Insulin deficiency in 
a high stress, urban food desert inundated with low-cost, high-fructose food is different 
than insulin deficiency in a slower-paced, rural community surrounded by farmers’ 
markets. Likewise, schizophrenic hallucinations in a supportive, tolerant environment are 
different from those in a hostile, fearful environment.   
4) Non-biochemical factors play a role in patienthood: Though the biomedical model obliges 
anyone on the receiving end of an abnormal biochemical finding to assume the status of 
sick person or patient, it makes no provisions for when that status is rejected. The rejection 
of patient-hood out of a felt sense that the abnormal finding is wrong could lead to the 
correction of such mistakes as a simple misinterpretation of a biochemical finding or even 
a technical error leading to a patently inaccurate finding. In the event that there is no such 
mistake and the client simply resists the news, there is no provision in the biomedical model 
to make any effort to engage the resistance on its own terms. Therefore, abnormal 
hemoglobin A1c finding, a crucial tool for establishing a diagnosis of diabetes, may, under 
certain circumstances, be no more convincing to the would-be diabetic than documentation 
of hallucinatory behavior is to the would-be schizophrenic. With psychological or 
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sociological insights, the rejection of patienthood could be better understood and possibly 
overcome so that treatment could proceed.  
5) Somatic treatment does not necessarily restore health: Perhaps the most persuasive reason 
for the consideration of psychological and sociological factors as routine medical practice, 
as well as the damaging rebuke of the classical biomedical model, is the discrepancy 
between “correction of biochemical abnormality” and “treatment outcome” (132). To the 
extent that the biomedical model promises a restitution of health, any dissatisfaction 
following the repair of the biochemical defect suggests that the biomedical model’s de 
facto theory of health as a function of primarily biochemical activity is insufficient. In the 
event that schizophrenia could be pharmacologically managed to the same extent insulin 
injections and other interventions manage diabetes, these interventions themselves exert 
effects that may or may not restore well-being.  
6) The physician-patient relationship influences clinical outcome: Engel maintains without 
question that the influence of the physician-patient relation extends even to somatic 
diseases like diabetes, to say nothing of psychiatric diseases like schizophrenia. In either 
situation, the trust a patient has for a physician plays a role in whether the former will 
accept the findings and recommendations of the latter. Trust is still consequential in a 
somatic disease like diabetes considering physician recommendations will likely include 
potentially difficult or inconvenient diet and lifestyle adjustments. The incapacity of 
biological factors to promote trust justifies psychological and sociological considerations.  
Perhaps the most striking theme to emerge from Engel’s six-part clinical justification for the 
biopsychosocial model is that the biomedical model, on top of advancing a limited, even 
impoverished notion of health, does not even make the provisions necessary for achieving the 
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attending goals of that limited notion. To the extent that the biomedical model seeks, as its primary 
clinical goal, to develop a detailed clinical picture built of reliably collected clinical data for the 
purpose of restoring a biologically-determined state of health, it is self-defeating to discount 
possible distortions of that data by language or culture and to ignore the influence psychosocial 
variables have on biochemical process, the primary constituents of health and well-being as 
determined by biomedical values. Scant attention to either the doctor-patient relationship or the 
resistance to assuming the positions that permit biomedical intervention further highlights the 
possibility that the biomedical does not equip itself with all available tools useful in the fulfillment 
of the clinical goals and ideals it sets for itself. Engel’s fifth observation, crucially, dispels the 
convenient assumption that addressing the weaknesses elucidated in the other points is all that 
would be needed to perfect the biomedical model. The instance of dissatisfaction with the state 
following management of or complete repair to the somatic defect would spell the impoverishment 
of biomedicine’s notion of health, justifying a completely new model.  
 Engel’s justification for a new model cannot be separated from his own area of clinical 
expertise, psychiatry, the medical specialty harboring the greatest ambivalence to biomedicine. 
This ambivalence is in fact the subject of the mise-en-scène that opens the 1977 article introducing 
the biopsychosocial model. Against the backdrop of a conference on psychiatric education, various 
voices cry for psychiatry’s strict adherence to the biomedical model. One “critical” voice, rendered 
anonymous by Engel to create an almost symbolic or archetypical effect, considers psychiatry “‘a 
hodgepodge of unscientific opinions, assorted philosophies, and ‘schools of thought,’ mixed 
metaphors, role diffusion, propaganda, and politicking for ‘mental health’ and other esoteric 
goals’” (Engel 129). In contrast to psychiatry, the rest of medicine is “neat and tidy” (129). Engel 
names the two proposed solutions to the crisis: 1) “removal of the functions now performed by 
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psychiatry from the conceptual and professional jurisdiction of medicine and their reallocation to 
a new discipline based on behavioral science” or 2) strictly defining psychiatric disease as 
biochemical or neurophysiological in nature (129). Both solutions revolve around a central pivot 
point: the biomedical model. Either psychiatric disease conforms to the model or it is expelled 
from the medical profession altogether.  
 Rather than join one of the two camps, Engel opts for a solution that seeks to deliver 
psychiatry from its crisis of ambivalence by addressing nothing less than the pivot around which 
that ambivalence fluctuates: the biomedical model. If those that favor psychiatry’s expulsion from 
the medical profession are biomedical “apostates” and the “true believers” are those that support 
its remaining under medicine’s purview on the condition of rigid conformation to biomedical 
principles, then Engel advocates for a “heretical” position (130). In the search for an altogether 
new faith, Engel recommends that psychiatry not simply abandon its assorted, potentially-flawed 
philosophies and schools of thought. In so doing, he invites the accusation that he obstinately and 
irresponsibly defends psychiatry’s alleged messiness merely to spite the pristine biomedical model 
he does not like. However, the stark contrast between messy psychiatry and tidiness of the other 
specialties that begins his article points to a different explanation. The contrast merits a Dorian 
Grey analogy: psychiatry is to biomedicine as the portrait is to Dorian. Saddled with the unhappy 
lot of registering the biomedical model’s deepest messiness, inconsistencies and problems, 
psychiatry is the horrifying portrait that allows the rest of biomedicine to retain a rational gleam 
as it proceeds unpunished down its path. According to the logic of this analogy, Engel’s celebration 
of psychiatry’s messiness would seek to register the disturbing but urgent truth of the biomedical 
model’s sins. It follows that any attempt on psychiatry’s part to clean up its act by either excising 
itself from or conforming to the biomedical model only perpetuates a problem that, in Engel’s 
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estimation, cannot be solved by merely redistributing labor across the same, longstanding 
professional boundary lines constituted, or at least, bolstered by a biomedical account of health.  
 The biomedical dogma around which the contested lines of professional territory are drawn 
is none other than the assumption that the biopsychosocial model fundamentally rejects, namely, 
that biological indices are “the ultimate criteria defining disease” (Engel 133). Engel rejects this 
assumption on the grounds that it generates a “paradox” in which “some people with positive 
laboratory findings are told that they are in need of treatment when in fact they are feeling quite 
well, while others feeling sick are assured that they are well, that is, they have no ‘disease’” (133). 
Engel’s biopsychosocial model resolves this biomedically-induced dualistic paradox by 
“encompass[ing]” both sides of it. The 1977 article gives little indication of what such 
encompassment means or how it would solve such paradoxes as the one Engel describes. The 
means of encompassing can be inferred, however, and betray a relationship to disciplinarity that 
would thwart the holistic-patient care efforts Engel sought.  
 Though Engel’s neologism – biopsychosocial – endures, the goal of providing more 
holistic approaches to patient care at some point fell under the responsibility of Integrative 
Medicine. In recent decades, Integrative Medicine has achieved a level of professionalization the 
biopsychosocial model arguably never did. The professional organizations that extend the reach 
of integrative medicine include: The American Academy of Integrative Health and Medicine 
(AAIHM); the American Board of Integrative Medicine (ABIM), which administers the exam that 
leads to board certification in integrative medicine; The Consortium of Academic Health Centers 
for Integrative Medicine, which consists of integrative medicine programs at sixty-two institutions, 
or forty percent of all major universities and health centers across the United States and Canada.6 
 
6 Statistic from Integrative Medicine (Rakel), page 3.  
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In most cases, the programs offer post-residency fellowships in integrative medicine, which 
physicians must complete in order to sit for the board certification exams.  
 General definitions of integrative medicine abound, each professional institution offering 
its own vision. The vision statement on the AAIHM website lists “establish[ing] a new paradigm 
of health care” as one of its visions, recalling Engel’s ambition to develop healthcare that moved 
away from the biomedical model (Medicine). The definition of Integrative Medicine given by the 
website of the ABIM and the Consortium of Academic Health Centers for Integrative Medicine is 
“the practice of medicine that reaffirms the importance of the relationship between physician and 
patient, focuses on the whole person, is informed by evidence, and makes use of all therapeutic 
approaches, healthcare professionals and disciplines to achieve optimal health and healing”  
(Specialites, italics mine). Though perhaps lacking the strong sense of redefining health care that 
the AAIMH mission espouses, this definition nevertheless advances an all-encompassing vision 
that does not leave any consideration out of the healthcare process. The consortium members echo 
this wide-ranging inclusiveness. Duke University’s Integrative Medicine program proclaims: 
“with an emphasis on prevention and wellness, we offer an array of evidence-based treatment 
modalities that address the whole person – mind, body, spirit, and community” (University). In 
sum, the image of integrative medicine that endures across the various vision or mission statements 
shows an approach that does not make any disqualifications out of hand as to what care should 
consist of, seeking in many cases, as its name suggests, to integrate as much as possible into the 
health care approaches.  
 Though undoubtedly situating integrative medicine in a holistic vein, these mission 
statements offer little indication of what the holistic patient care attempted by integrative medicine 
actually looks like. The route to board certification by the ABIM proves more helpful in this regard. 
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A view of integrative medicine’s patient emerges with its board exam, of which there are nine 
content areas: 1) Nutrition; 2) Dietary supplements, botanicals and other natural products; 3) Mind-
body medicine and spirituality; 4) Complementary and Alternative Therapies; 5) Whole Medical 
Systems; 6) Lifestyle, prevention and Health promotion; 7) Integrative Approaches (including 
conventional medicine); 8) Foundations of Integrative Medicine; 9) Professional Practice of 
Integrative Medicine. With these content areas, a speculative sketch of an integrative medicine 
clinical encounter becomes possible: 
 A young woman presents with a persistent pain in her stomach that has, perhaps, 
confounded the many general practitioners or specialists with whom she has previously consulted. 
Working from a nutritional perspective (Content Area 1), the integrative medicine practitioner 
could take a strong look at her dietary habits from various perspectives – what food she eats, how 
much, when and what combinations – and advise different options that could or could not include 
interventions other than food (Content Area 2). The practitioner might also consider emotional 
factors (Content Area 3) while trying to situate them in relation to career, family, community 
(Content Area 6). For immediate relief from the pain, the practitioner might consider abdominal 
oil massage as practiced in Ayurvedic medicine (Content Area 5) along with prescriptions or drug 
combinations that previous practitioners may have overlooked (Content Area 7).  
 With this sketch, it is perhaps easier to imagine the working definition of holistic medicine 
given in the previous chapter as a partaking of infinite therapeutic targets. Whereas strict adherence 
to the biomedical model would seek to identify the physiological or biochemical defect in the 
patient’s stomach or surrounding organs, the integrative medical approach attends to far more than 
physiology or biochemistry and offers therapies that do not center on either.  
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 The sketch, of course, also raises the preeminent disciplinary challenge of holistic 
healthcare. Even a cursory glance of the content areas raises such clinical issues as the process by 
which an integrative medicine practitioner moves between conventional practices and 
complementary therapies or how he determines which of the six or so world medical systems tested 
in the fifth content category would best serve a patient. The answers to these crucial questions, 
which would indicate the means by which he could detect errors or omissions in his clinical 
judgment, would presumably be found in either Foundations or Integrative Approaches. The 
textbook listed as the primary reference material for exam preparation, David Rakel’s Integrative 
Medicine (2003) gives an impression of what constitutes integrative medicine’s integrative 
measures while providing one account of integrative medicine’s relationship to two terms with 
which it is often conflated: alternative medicine and complementary medicine.  
 In the first of three paragraphs on the “Integration” section of the textbook’s eleven-page 
Philosophy chapter, Rakel writes that integrative medicine’s integrative measures rest on “good 
science” and neither reject conventional medicine nor haphazardly accept alternative practices 
(Rakel 9). The second paragraph scrutinizes the reception of Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine (CAM), a collection of healing tools related to but not synonymous with Integrative 
Medicine. Presented as the evolutionary phase preceding the emergence of Integrative Medicine 
in the 1990s, CAM is regarded as a set of tools underutilized by mainstream practice but taken 
seriously in Integrative Medicine. The third and final paragraph emphasizes that “integration 
involves a larger mission that calls for a restoration of the focus on health and healing based on 
the provider-patient relationship” (Rakel 9). Though Rakel rightly emphasizes a larger mission, 
there is little in the textbook that further clarifies this mission in itself.  
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 The majority of the textbook instead consists of integrative approaches to numerous 
conditions, as defined or at least influenced by the diagnostic categories of biomedicine. Each 
condition receives its own chapter, written by an expert contributing author. An important feature 
of every chapter is the therapeutic review, a quick-reference summary of all the approaches 
recommended for the corresponding condition. Figure 3 shows an example of a therapeutic review 
for chronic kidney disease:  
 
Figure 3: Therapeutic review for chronic kidney disease from Integrative Medicine 
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The therapeutic review shows the operation of Integrative Medicine’s primary tool of disciplinary 
constraint: Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy, or SORT. The clock or dial-looking icon next 
to each intervention renders the information provided by SORT.  
 SORT functions as a five-tiered rating system that weighs the harm of a particular 
intervention against evidence for its benefit. Each tier corresponds to the strength of a particular 
recommendation. Figure 4 below shows the figures from the textbook that explain how to read the 
system: 
Figure 4: The Disciplinary Constraint of Integrative Medicine A) The figure from Integrative Medicine 
showing the literal weighing of evidence for benefit versus harm. A corresponds to a rating for the strongest 
evidence of benefit, C the lowest. 1 corresponds to the smallest potential risk, 3 the largest. B) The five-
tiers corresponding the five strengths of recommendation, which are based on where the balance between 
benefit and potential harm falls. The five strengths correspond to five “positions” that the balance of benefit 






 The textbook’s description of the evidence-harm weighing process illustrates how SORT 
provides a measure of disciplinary constraint for integrative medicine. The description concerns 
the use of the medication spironolactone in cases of severe heart failure. Following a study in the 
New England Journal of Medicine that demonstrated the benefits of spironolactone, physicians in 
Ontario, the textbook explains, Canada started prescribing the drug more often. However, the 
follow-up study that documented this trend also noted the increase in hyperkalemia-related deaths 
precipitated by adverse reactions between spironolactone and ACE inhibitors. Just as the study 
concludes that the increased incidence of fatal hyperkalemia outweighs the potential benefit, so 
too does SORT organize all the data surrounding a particular intervention to render a rating that 
helps the integrative physician quickly assess its potential use.  
 The explanation of SORT ends with the revelation that clinical decision-making “is 
grounded in the much broader insights obtained through relationship-centered care” (Rakel xxv). 
The appeal to the physician-patient relationship, while upholding a declared value of integrative 
medicine, nevertheless, defers the actual work of enhancing that relationship while highlighting 
SORT’s limited utility in the way of integrative theory that would further the work of integrated 
clinical decision-making that, as Rakel continually emphasizes, goes beyond the mere collection 
and creation of additional healing tools. As the critique in the second part of the chapter will 
attempt to show, the lack of integrating work is coupled to categorical disciplinarity.  
 
2.2.2 Holistic Research – General Systems Theory and Integral Physiology  
 
Amidst the incessant pace of disciplinary specialization in the twentieth century, one of the few 
intellectual endeavors that could reasonably claim the title of holistic research is General Systems 
Theory, which emerged in response to increasing concern with the hyper-specialization of the 
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sciences. It is for this reason that Engel likely had few other options in the way of theoretical 
foundations for his biopsychosocial model. Engel considered General Systems Theory the 
“conceptual approach” of the biopsychosocial model and spoke confidently that it would uncover 
“fundamental laws and principles that operate commonly at all levels of organization” (196). With 
General Systems Theory, its creator, the Austrian theoretical biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 
indeed envisioned something that could be taken as the means of cohering the biological, 
psychological and sociological:  
We are certainly able to establish scientific laws for the different levels or strata of reality. 
And here we find, speaking in the “formal mode”, a correspondence or isomorphy of laws 
and conceptual schemes in different fields, granting the Unity of Science. Speaking in 
“material” language, this means that the world (i.e., the total of observable phenomena) 
shows a structural uniformity, manifesting itself by isomorphic traces of order in its 
different levels of realms. (Bertalanffy 87)  
The Unity of Science postulated by Bertalanffy in turn constituted the basis for General System 
Theory’s central ambition: developing a language into which the problems of the disciplines could 
be translated for eventual solution. The language, had it come to fruition, would have, in the words 
of Bertalanffy’s collaborator, Kenneth Boulding, functioned as a “‘gestalt’ in theoretical 
construction” that would have in turn “direct[ed] research towards the gaps” (Boulding 198). An 
example of such a gestalt is the Periodic Table of Elements, which “directed research for many 
decades towards the discovery of unknown elements to fill gaps in the table until the table was 
completely filled” (Boulding 198). Whereas the Periodic Table only guided research in one field, 
chemistry, the language General Systems Theory sought to create would have extended to all 
fields, amounting to a “spectrum of theories, a system of systems” (Boulding 198) that researchers 
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from across the intellectual world could have consulted for guidance in filling holes or solving in 
their respective disciplines.  
 Fittingly, the most basic grammatical unit of this language was the system. The sixth and 
seventh theses of Fred Waelchli’s “Eleven Theses of General Systems Theory” explains that this 
basic unit occupies a “logically higher-order” position over “all the other scientific and social 
disciplines, and most particularly, of the so-called ‘Scientific Method’ itself” (Waelchli 6). From 
this logically elevated, which is to say, logically all-encompassing position, the system functions 
as a “searchlight to illuminate structural similarities in the laws of the divergent human ‘content’ 
disciplines” (Walechli 5). This searchlight capability consists of discovering and articulating 
isomorphisms and homomorphisms. Waelchli describes the former as a one-to-one mapping of a 
given system’s elements, attributes and element-attribute relationships on to another system, the 
latter a many-to-one mapping that preserves the same in another. Waelchli gives a familiar 
example of the homomorphism: The U.S. House of Representatives. The House, Waelchli writes, 
“was designed to be a homomorphic model of the U.S. body politic” (5). Bertalanffy gives  a six-
constituent example of isomorphism between disciplines when he writes that “the exponential law 
or law of compound interest, applies, with a negative exponent, to the decay of radium, the mono-
molecular reaction, the killing of bacteria by light or disinfectants, the loss of body substance in a 
starving animal, and to the decrease of population where the death rate is higher than the birth 
rate” (von Bertalanffy 136). Bertalanffy’s positing of isomorphism existing between laws from 
economics, physics, microbiology, animal physiology and demography helped to justify the 
projections of the wide reach that General Systems Theory would have.  
 Waelchli goes on to illustrate how the isomorphic nature of General System Theory’s meta-
system language would have solved disciplinary problems by considering the logically nonsensical 
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statement, “Washington is a city is a sentence.” The statement’s syntactical nonsense is, per 
Waelchli’s metaphor, the equivalent of a problem with which a discipline may be struggling. Since 
the unit “Washington is a city” bears structural similarity to a sentence system (i.e. a verb 
establishing a relationship between two nouns to render a complete thought), a sentence system 
can be grafted on to it, giving a statement that makes sense: ‘‘Washington is a city’ is a sentence.’ 
Likewise, a higher order language of systems would have offered statements about systems that 
could be morphically grafted on to the problem in order to either resolve a paradox or clarify the 
nature of what was missing so that research could proceed to fill the hole. 
 Since GST’s jurisdiction extended over all disciplines, it sought to cultivate limitless 
interdisciplinary systems grafting and thereby extend its problem-solving capabilities across 
physics, biology, chemistry as well as economics, sociology, political science, and every discipline 
in between. GST derived the guarantee that such grafting would resolve paradoxes and fill gaps 
from the theoretical belief in the unity of universe, which the disciplinary division of labor had 
distorted. Insofar as it sought to restore that unity through meta-systemic problem-solving, GST 
had the makings of the twentieth-century heir to Schiller’s “philosophical head,” which Schiller 
conceived as restoring the unity of knowledge broken by the fragmentary abstractions of the 
intellect. In this way, General Systems Theory sought to do what seemed impossible in a research 
landscape defined by specialization that resolved into increasingly smaller parts: create a means 
of working from a perspective of wholes rather than parts.   
 Just as Engel allied his biopsychosocial model to GST’s holistic research operation, so too 
does integrative physician Dr. Leonard A. Wisneski seek to ally his field to what is perhaps 
integrative medicine’s answer to General Systems Theory: integral physiology. In Wisneski’s The 
Scientific Basis of Integrative Medicine (2009), integral physiology has the makings of the holism-
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seeking generalizing interdisciplinarity of General Systems Theory. Wisneski evokes as much by 
comparing integral physiology to what his interlocuter, Dr. Jeff Levin, calls a “new generalist 
perspective,” which will be “based on something akin to a ‘unified field theory’ of the determinants 
of health and healing” (Levin 224, quoted in Wisneski xxix). Wisneski proposes that the major 
innovation of this unified field theory will be to bring “subtle-energy into the mix” (Wisneski and 
Anderson xxiv). Understood as the types of energy fields undetectable by the five senses and 
current scientific instrumentation, subtle energy’s entry into integral physiology would effect, in 
Wisneski’s view, a fusion of Western and Eastern healing traditions. Aside from its mention in 
Wisneski’s book, integral physiology as a “unified field theory” seems to have received little 
attention and development, greatly restricting the comparisons that can be made between it and 
General Systems Theory. In the event that the project of integral physiology as Wisneski envisions 
it was taken up under the same or different name, it would, however, risk falling into the same 
disciplinary traps that thwarted General Systems Theory.   
 
2.2.3 Holistic Medical Pedagogy – Narrative and schema-based medicine 
 
Patient care and research did not completely overshadow medical education in Engel’s mind as he 
contemplated the possibility of a biopsychosocial model. Having predicted that a “greater 
readiness to encompass a biopsychosocial perspective of disease” would follow the integration of 
a general systems approach into the “basic science and philosophic education of future physicians 
and medical scientists” (135). , Engel no doubt considered the formative role that education plays 
in any research or patient care success, let alone any major innovation in either domain. But while 
Engel may have heeded medical education’s importance, no General Systems Theory-oriented 
pedagogy was ever devised, let alone implemented in medical education. As for Integrative 
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Medicine’s contributions to medical education, the proliferation of integrative textbooks and 
training programs indicate a comparatively more established pedagogical effort, albeit one that 
only extends so far. As integrative medicine is a board-certified medical specialty, exposure to 
integrative principles mostly occurs after graduating from medical school, where adopting 
integrative approaches is entirely self-determined. Little change to earlier levels of medical 
training forecloses the presence of integrative principles in the foundations of an allopathic 
physician’s education.  
 To the extent that Integrative Medicine and the biopsychosocial model developed research 
and clinical goals to the detriment of developing holistic curricular recommendations for post-
baccalaureate medical education, they could not be said to have mounted a recognizable holistic 
intervention in the fundamentals of medical pedagogy. Instead, the holistic pedagogical 
intervention occurred by way of the many scattered efforts to introduce knowledge from outside 
the traditional basic science disciplines into the medical curriculum. These efforts gave much 
needed attention to medical education, the “most endangered” arm of the Flexnerian enterprise 
(Ludmerer xxv). So while not formally allied to and diverging in many crucial theoretical and 
methodological ways from the previously discussed efforts at holistic patient care and holistic 
research, these projects arguably do the equivalent of holistic work in the underprivileged domain 
of medical pedagogy.  
 Incidentally, the rise of various efforts to enrich the science-oriented medical curriculum 
in the 1970s coincided with the biopsychosocial model’s appearance in 1977. Together, these 
efforts made both direct and indirect cases for holism by attempting to challenge, in various ways 
and to various degrees, the same central biomedical assumption with which Engel took issue. 
Indeed, perhaps the sole common thread binding the now heterogeneous assortment of projects 
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striving to carve out space for the arts, humanities and social sciences in medical education is that 
they challenge the biological and the scientific as the final words on health and knowledge, 
respectively. The development of these efforts is messy and uneven, making the attempt to cohere 
them under a particular rubric perilous at best. Merely distinguishing them from other longstanding 
efforts such as bioethics indeed poses difficulties, as indicated by the genealogy of the periodical 
currently known as The Journal of Medical Humanities. At the time of its inaugural publication in 
September 1981, the journal was known Bioethics Quarterly. In March 1982, it became Journal 
of Bioethics. Three years later, medical humanities became a part of the title, giving Journal of 
Medical Humanities and Bioethics. Finally, in March 1989, bioethics was dropped, leaving what 
is still the publication’s current title.  
 Incidentally, the medical humanities is the name that has arguably been most used to 
signify the integration of material outside the basic sciences into the medical curriculum. Alan 
Bleakley speaks of a first wave medical humanities appearing in the 1970s whose disciplinary 
range consisted of ethics, history of medicine, narrative-based medicine and close noticing of 
visual artworks. The delivery of these courses through optional learning and supplementary 
modules was typical of the “non-compulsory” character of first-wave efforts to expose medical 
students to diverse perspectives from outside the basic sciences (Bleakley 47). What marks the 
distinction between the first and second waves was higher impact educational interventions. The 
term “medical humanities” has since fallen out of favor because of its exclusion of non-medical 
factors in health and has been replaced by the health humanities, as cemented by the 2014 
anthology Health Humanities Reader.  
 Some medical or health humanities projects have a more pronounced holistic medical 
pedagogy ambitions than others. One such project, narrative medicine, which “has followed 
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(indeed, often replaced) the biopsychosocial model,” looks to the narratives of literary art as both 
a means of effectively inculcating narrative competence (Solomon 195). Physician and English 
literature scholar Rita Charon, who coined narrative medicine, defines narrative competence as 
“the ability to acknowledge, absorb, interpret and act on the stories and plights of others” (Charon 
1897). Narrative competence has holistic aspirations insofar as it is presented as a manner by which 
“research proceeds, teaching succeeds, clinical colleagueship achieves its goals, and the profession 
of medicine remains grounded in its timeless, selfless commitment to health” (1899).  
 A close relative of narrative medicine is schema-based medicine, which looks to literary 
art to help both medical students and health professionals develop frameworks that allow them to 
extract aspects of a given situation or clinical case that an exclusively science-oriented schema 
would miss. Such frameworks, or schemas, “help habituate three sets of pragmatic skills: listening, 
interviewing and active, virtuous behavior with patients” (Schleifer and Vannatta 20-21). One core 
schema is the chief concern. Whereas the framework inherent to the traditional chief complaint 
narrows in on, perhaps even selects for, a biomedical description of disease, the chief concern 
schema broadens the clinical scope à the biopsychosocial model to situate the bodily complaint 
within and attune the physician to a broader picture of the patient’s life.    
 Whether classified under the second wave medical humanities rubric or health humanities 
rubric, narrative and schema-based medicine emerge nevertheless as high impact projects seeking 
to promote holistic medical pedagogy. Perhaps the strongest justification for this characterization 
is their fundamental goal of tying holism to a single humanistic skill: rigorous narrative knowledge. 
In the case of schema-based medicine, the capacity for empathy is grounded in a sense of 
wholeness, which can be cultivated through narrative study: “the imaginative understanding of the 
whole situation in empathy – the scene of narration in the patient-physician relationship – links it 
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powerfully to the goal of grasping the meaningful whole of narrative” (Schleifer and Vannatta 
160). Similarly, narrative medicine “has come to understand that patients and caregivers enter 
whole – with their bodies, lives, families, beliefs, values, histories, hopes for the future – into 
sickness and healing, and their efforts to get better cannot be fragmentated away from the deepest 
parts of their lives. In part, this wholeness is reflected in – if not produced by – the simple and 
complicated stories they tell to one another…” (Charon, The Principles and Practice of Narrative 
Medicine 13). Narrative competence, or the capacity to respond deeply to stories, can thus be 
understood as an engagement with the wholeness of the person and the medical situation. Thus, as 
high impact educational interventions, both narrative and schema-based medicine use literary 
techniques to advance holism in medical pedagogy and practice, amounting to a coordinating 
interdisciplinarity that works, broadly speaking, across the traditional boundaries separating the 
disciplines of literature and medicine.  
 Taking narrative and schema-based medicine and conventional biomedicine as the 
constituents of cooperative interdisciplinarity presupposes three factors: 1) a common goal, 2) 
complementary skills and knowledge and 3) the negotiation of that complementarity. Even a 
cursory understanding of narrative and schema-based medicine would reveal that these three 
factors clearly exist. The common goal is something akin to improving medical care and 
addressing long-standing inequities in healthcare systems. As for complementary skills and 
knowledge, narrative medicine regards the basis of complementarity as a function of narrative, 
writing that “medical practice unfolds in a series of complex narrative situations, including the 
situations between the physician and the patient, the physician and himself or herself, the physician 
and colleagues, and physicians and society […] between the physician and his or her family, 
between patients and their family members, and among patients” (Charon, “Narrative 
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Medicine,”1898). In short, the many assorted situations in clinical practice where narrative plays 
a central role justifies the complementary role narrative training can play in medical training.  
 As for how schema-based medicine justifies complementarity of skills and knowledge, the 
philosophical school of American pragmatism plays a major role: “the ideas, concepts, and laws 
produced by the instrumental vocabularies of natural science and by the cognitive apprehensions 
of narrative are real. Thinking with Charles Sanders Peirce, we treat these concepts not as 
ontological truths antecedent to the inquiries that produced them – truths that exist once and for all 
– but as real in their function and in the consequences of their appropriate enactment in the clinic” 
(Schleifer and Vanatta 37, italics mine). This pragmatic philosophical foundation informs schema-
based medicine’s three categories of knowledge: 1) “the nomological or law-governed 
understandings afforded by scientific experimentation” that proceed by deductive reasoning 2) 
“the human sciences” such as evolutionary biology and cognitive science that proceed by inductive 
reasoning; 3) “functional knowledge, or the “pragmatic achievement of goals in the systematic 
pursuit of understanding,” which proceed by a pragmatic kind of reasoning that Peirce calls 
abductive reasoning. It is this last category into which the narrative science of schema-based 
medicine falls (Schleifer and Vanatta viii). The authors specify the relation they propose between 
these three categories of knowledge: “the nomological sciences […] can be complemented by the 
human sciences, which depend on schematic understanding of forms and structures that govern 
experience, cognition and judgment more generally” (Schleifer and Vannatta viii, italics in 
original). In short, deduction, induction and abduction can all complement one another. Therefore, 
the basis of schema-based medicine’s vision of complementarity rests, perhaps controversially, on 
the proposition that neither science and human science nor literature and narrative have access to 
truths that are true for all places and times.   
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 The third factor of cooperative disciplinarity, the negotiation of complementarity, fully 
reveals narrative and schema-based medicine’s discipline-preserving holistic interventions. The 
crux of the negotiation for narrative and schema-based medicine is what forms of knowledge get 
to count as what truths. By requiring the existence of multiple kinds of truth, both holistic medical 
projects not only throw the very concept of truth into question but also asks challenging questions 
as to how these various concepts shape various deployments of art for educational purposes. These 
deployments in turn can be shown to proceed according to conserved institutional couplings of 
ideology and disciplinary frameworks.  
 
2.3 CRITIQUE – THE CATEGORICAL DISCIPLINARITY OF HOLISTIC INTERVENTIONS 
 
All six holistic healthcare interventions preserve their own versions of categorical disciplinarity. 
While the content and shapes of the categories may shift around, the maintenance of categorical 
disciplinary structures remains in place. The basic tasks with which each arm of the Flexnerian 
enterprise is entrusted influence the form that the six projects’ discipline-preserving holism take. 
The concerns of treating people cause the discipline-preserving holistic patient care to take the 
form of disciplinary supplementation, which is to say, the lumping together of disciplinary 
knowledge to create both fragmented pictures of health and arbitrary treatment strategies. The 
concerns of creating new knowledge about reality cause discipline-preserving holistic research to 
take the form of a meta-disciplinary mathesis universalis, which is to say, the pretensions of a 
universal science that seeks a logically superior position over all disciplines. Finally, the concerns 
of teaching medical students cause discipline-preserving holistic medical pedagogy to take the 
form of path dependent disciplinary coordination, which is to say, curricular approaches consisting 
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of skills from different disciplines that nevertheless relate these skills to one another across 
conserved patterns of disciplinarity and attending ideologies. Altogether, these three forms of 
discipline-preserving holism register an earnest desire to combine what categorical disciplinarity 
separated alongside an equally robust refusal to contest categorical disciplinarity itself.  
 
2.3.1 The Biopsychosocial Model and Integrative Medicine – Holistic patient care as infinite 
disciplinary supplementation 
 
Recalling that the biopsychosocial model’s professed innovation was to encompass both sides of 
the biomedical paradox, Engel’s 1977 article gives little any indication of what encompassment 
means or how it would solve this paradox. Absent additional development of this idea by Engel 
himself, it nevertheless bears the imprint of Engel’s professed conceptual approach, General 
Systems Theory. From GST’s elevated vantage point, the biopsychosocial model could obtain the 
perspective necessary to do the version of holistic patient care Engel sought: “evaluat[ing] all the 
factors contributing to both illness and patient-hood” and not “giv[ing] primacy to biological 
factors alone” (Engel 133). What Engel failed to realize was that the ability to rise above the 
disciplinary boundaries gives a false sense of having overcome the limitations of the biomedical 
model. Rising above the biomedical model and the disciplinary division of labor to which it is 
coupled meant leaving both intact.  
 The intactness of biomedically-associated disciplinary thinking appears in J.P. Bishop’s 
assessment of what the human being becomes under the biopsychosocial model: “man remains a 
biological being with the addition of a psychological and sociological overlay” (Bishop 20, italics 
mine). In view of the biopsychosocial model’s reliance on GST methodology, overlay becomes 
more than a figure of speech. The image of layering expressed by the verb ‘overlay’ corresponds 
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to GST’s proposal of laying or mapping of systems on to one another so as to illuminate gaps in 
theory or create theoretical systems that resolve paradoxes or problems. With respect to Engel’s 
patient care ambitions, the GST-facilitated overlaying of biological, psychological and 
sociological systems to create a more complete theory of health that could in turn guide holistic 
patient care. Engel notes with optimism the possibility for systems approaches to uncover 
“isomorphies across different levels of organization,” from the molecule to the biosphere (196). 
“From such isomorphies,” Engel reasoned, “can be developed fundamental laws and principles 
that operate commonly at all levels of organization” (196). In the absence of such laws, however, 
the picture of the human, or human health, nevertheless exists across a traditional pattern of 
disciplinary segmentation, with the biological segment still retaining preeminent status that 
biomedicine accords it.  
 Engel’s intervention thus falls somewhere between leaving the biomedical in place and 
supplanting it. While Engel did take the crucial step of dislodging physiological factors as the 
ultimate criteria defining disease, or conversely, health, he lacked a satisfying answer for what 
constitutes health in biology’s stead. His less than satisfying answer was to merely supplement 
additional knowledge to the understanding of health as the biological, again not realizing that in 
doing so, he relied on the same categorical disciplinary in which biomedicine operates. Engel 
sought to discover disease or health itself and while he may have removed one crucial obstacle to 
making that discovery in form of the mistaken belief that biological factors are the ultimate criteria 
of either, his answer initiated a process of serial supplementation that could only promise transitory 
satisfaction, before giving way to disappointment. That is, the promise of adding more disciplinary 
layers to a conception of health gives a temporary sense of having discovered it, which, after 
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providing a measure of satisfaction, eventually fades, opening up the next to attempt to do the 
same all over again.  
 Integrative medicine represents a subsequent stage in this process of serial 
supplementation. Though by all indications dropping the alliance that the biopsychosocial model 
shared with General System Theory along with the shared hope of discovering common laws 
operating at different levels of organization, Integrative Medicine nevertheless relies on 
supplementarity as a means of achieving holistic patient care. The creation of Optimal Healing 
Environments (OHE), one of integrative medicine’s central holistic concepts, shows why. Defined 
by Rakel as an “expansion of Engel’s biopsychosocial model,” the OHE functions as “an 
environment in which the social, psychological, spiritual, physical and behavioral components of 
health care are oriented toward support and stimulation of innate healing capacities and the 
achievement of wholeness” (Rakel 12, italics mine). Whereas Engel’s model discovers health by 
attempting to encompass biology, psychology and sociology, the Optimal Healing Environment 
discovers wholeness by attempting to encompass two additional factors, spirituality and behavior. 
 That this serial supplementation proceeds within a particular, if unspecified, disciplinary 
framework becomes clear in a later discussion in the chapter on creating OHE. In this discussion, 
Rakel mentions discipline explicitly, writing that “when professionals from varied disciplines 
come together, shared knowledge allows insight from different perspectives that can stimulate an 
‘ah ha!’ moment in which new ideas allow them to transcend old models of care” (Rakel 17). 
Whatever the extent to which such disciplinary transcendence is tantamount to Engel’s GST-
facilitated encompassment of all health factors, the “ah ha” moments that underlies it do nothing 
to change the old, yet now “transcended” models of care. Ultimately, such disciplinary “ah-ha” 
moments signal the co-operative disciplinarity under which integrative medicine no doubt 
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operates. It should come as little surprise that the image of many disciplines with complementary 
knowledge working together for a common goal is a cardinal feature of a holistic healthcare 
approach that began from complementary and alternative medicine, or CAM movement of the 
1990’s. Such coordination no doubt brings disciplinary differences into sharper focus, along with 
facilitating beneficial patient care in the process, as Rakel’s discussion suggests.  
 The less redeeming side of this cooperative interdisciplinarity is that as long as it serves as 
the sole disciplinary work in which Integrative Medicine engages, Integrative medicine comes no 
closer to escaping the fundamental criticism leveled at the biopsychosocial model for combining 
knowledge without first articulating a comprehensive way to unify that knowledge:   
Unless there is an integrating theory already in place gathering biological, psychological 
and sociological data about people will not only yield scattered lumps of information that 
do not relate to each other in any coherent sense. Without an overarching theory to integrate 
the fields from which the data derive, associations between differing classes of information 
are meaningless. (McLaren 91, italics mine)  
The image of scattered lumps of information – whether biological, psychological, sociological, 
spiritual, physical or behavioral – not only supplies a clear image of disciplinary supplementation 
as holistic patient care but also the devastating effect of foregoing a unifying theory of health. 
While providing a tool for clinical decision-making and thereby functioning as a protective 
measure for patients, the Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy (SORT) by no means takes the 
place of a unifying theory. The importance of such a theory for Integrative Medicine lies in in how 
its disciplinary constraint helps to prevent haphazard jumping between world healing systems, 
mind-body medicine, conventional and alternative therapies and all other techniques of which 
integrative medicine partakes. SORT stands as a provisional measure to prevent gross clinical 
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errors, satisfying a criticism dogging unifying theories of health that argues holistic health care 
should not have to wait for a unified theory in order to treat patients holistically. SORT, however, 
becomes less defensible if it represents an abandonment of hope to one day develop such a theory.  
 For in the meantime, integrative medicine, like the biopsychosocial model, uses 
disciplinary knowledge as supplements to achieve holistic healthcare. At any time, the 
supplements could be put away, hastening a rapid return to strictly biomedical tools. On the other 
hand, the jumping between disciplinary approaches for which disciplinary supplementarity allows 
could, under extreme circumstances, amount to anarchy and a regression to the days of medical 
quackery. Granted, extreme circumstances may be rare and a degree of medical pluralism already 
exists. Physicians trained in the biomedical model can and do, for example, recommend Ayurvedic 
practices or yoga without it constituting anarchy. Moreover, the search for unifying theories 
proceeds. Though epigenetics research, for example, continues to derive associations between 
social and biological factors,7 and the connections between the chakras of Ayurvedic medicine and 
the glandular system have been posited, these and other research efforts have not yet resulted in 
an integrative theory that elevates the meeting of sociality and biology, Ayurvedic medicine and 
immunology, above the condition of mere lumping.  Without ongoing research to forge meaningful 
connections between the dimensions of health, the cooperative nature of Integrative Medicine in 
which various traditions and practices work together could never aspire to more than a 
fragmentary, treatment-lumping pluralism that, at best, confers some health benefits that 
biomedicine never could or, at worst, permits an anything-goes, free-for-all approach under the 
veneer of well-rounded, compassionate care.  
 
7 See, for example, Kuzawa and Sweet .  
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2.3.2 General Systems Theory and Integrative Physiology – Holistic research as meta-
disciplinary mathesis 
 
In “The Skeleton of a Science,” an early proponent of systems thinking, Boulding defines General 
Systems Theory as a “a level of theoretical model-building which lies somewhere between the 
highly generalized constructions of pure mathematics and the specific theories of the specialized 
disciplines” (197). Whereas pure mathematics have no commitment to the real world, the theories 
of the specialized disciplines do. Boulding understands this connection to be derived from the 
disciplinary segmentation of reality:   
Each discipline corresponds to a certain segment of the empirical world, and each develops 
theories which have particular applicability to its own empirical segment. Physics, 
Chemistry, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Economics and so on all carve out for 
themselves certain elements of the experience of man and develop theories and patterns of 
activity (research) which yield satisfaction in understanding, and which are appropriate to 
their special segments. (197)  
In its intermediary position between the austerity of pure mathematics and the disciplines, General 
System Theory serves as the “skeleton of science in the sense that it aims to provide a framework 
or structure of systems on which to hang the flesh and blood of particular disciplines and particular 
subject matters in an orderly and coherent corpus of knowledge” (208). Together, the descriptions 
Boulding uses to develop the notion of General System Theory’s holistic research project invoke 
the philosophical dream of a mathesis universalis.  
 Ludwig von Bertalanffy himself conceived of General Systems Theory as such, publishing 
an article in the 1957 German University Journal [Deutsche Universitätszeitung] with the striking 
title, “General Systems Theory: Way to a New Mathesis Universalis” [Allgemeine Systemtheorie: 
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Wege zu einer neuen Mathesis Universalis]. Despite its title, the essay gives little indication of 
how Bertalanffy conceived of mathesis universalis, a term that by itself engenders a range of 
understandings, let alone when considered alongside terms with which it could easily be conflated, 
including universal science, universal calculus or universal symbolism. The only explicit reference 
to the term in fact appears in the final paragraph of the essay and gives little indication about how 
Bertalanffy understood the term (Bertalanffy). Two understandings of mathesis universalis are “a 
general theory of quantities or proportions” or the “mathematization of method” (Mittelstrass 593). 
Neither seems to quite match the description Bertalanffy gives of General Systems Theory as a 
mathematical project. Bertalanffy establishes the axiomatic nature of this “logico-mathematical 
field” by envisioning the generation of “propositions expressing system properties and principles” 
from “the notion of ‘system’ and a suitable set of axioms” (Bertalanffy 55). Bertalanffy assigned 
it the central task of “formulat[ing] and deriv[ing] […] those general principles that are applicable 
to ‘systems’ in general” (Bertalanffy 411). These characteristics amount to a formal system, 
summarized in lay terms as “a collection of rules for churning out an endless series of mathematical 
truths solely by mechanical symbol-shunting without any regard to meanings or ideas hidden in 
the shapes being manipulated” (Hofstadter 3). Disregarding such meanings or ideas, in turn, 
purchases the rigor and exactness that only mathematics enjoys and which General Systems 
Theorists clearly appreciated. Thus, in view of the mathematical dimensions of the project, General 
Systems Theory’s claim to the status of mathesis universalis rests on its ambition to develop a 
rigorous, exact formal system of systems.  
 To the extent that Bertalanffy sought to build a complete formal system of systems worthy 
of being called a mathesis universalis, the epoch-making findings of Austrian logician Kurt Gödel 
ensured that such an achievement would never come to pass. In his Incompleteness Theorems, 
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Gödel proved that once a formal system had achieved a sufficient level of complexity, its 
completeness – which is to say its ability to derive all true mathematical statements, or, theorems 
becomes impossible. However, thesis five of Waelchli’s Eleven Theses of General Systems 
Theory downplays, confoundingly, the implications of Gödel’s findings for the systems language 
that Waelchli himself, Bertalanffy, Boulding and other early general system theorists imagined. 
Even as Waelchli admits that modeling nature by logico-mathematical means is “fundamentally 
flawed” and “structurally limited” by the “incompleteness of all languages,” the systems approach 
gets around these problems by creating a metalanguage, which is to say, a language of a logically 
higher order language (6). What is left unspecified is what happens when paradoxes emerge at the 
meta-language level. The need to create a meta-meta systemic level to resolve the paradox at the 
meta level is analogous to the disturbing import of Gödel’s findings. Yet there was no such thing, 
Gödel showed, as getting around incompleteness once a formal system attained a sufficient level 
of complexity. The seeming contradiction of Gödel’s findings seen in Waelchli’s fifth GST thesis 
raises disconcerting questions of what sort of language would GST’s notion of the system have to 
be to qualify as a metalanguage.  
 Michel Foucault’s thoughts on the seventeenth century mathesis helps to clarify the 
confusing relationship between mathesis and language that Waelchli’s thesis inadvertently raises. 
For Foucault, a mathesis refers to a “universal science of measurement and order” and he considers 
it to be the “gravitational center” of Classical or Enlightenment thought (56). Despite the presence 
of ‘math’ in the term, the universal method connoted by the mathesis is “system of signs” that 
seeks to establish order based on identity and difference (Foucault 57). The clarification provided 
by defining the mathesis as a system of signs explains Foucault’s point that “the relation of 
mathesis to a general science of order does not signify that knowledge is absorbed into 
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mathematics, or that the latter becomes the foundation for all possible knowledge” (Foucault 57). 
The system of signs of which a mathesis was comprised, Foucault indicates, was “pure function, 
a totality of mechanisms, a great autonomous play of signs” (80). The sole function of this totality 
was to represent, which is to say, represent “thought as thought represents itself” (Foucault 78). 
Signs and thought, in other words, are one in the same. It is perhaps a perverse extension of this 
same alleged relation between thought and signs that underlies Bertalanffy’s confidence in General 
Systems Theory’s logico-mathematical language to give the very conception of wholeness the 
“unambiguous and exact expression which is possible only in mathematical language” (Bertalanffy 
143). It is the dream of submitting wholeness itself to an “exact language” of systems that perhaps 
explains how Waelchli can postulate system as the basic unit of a metalanguage that gets around 
the incompleteness of all other languages.  
Moreover, Bertalanffy’s twentieth-century resurrection of the mathesis universalis 
attempts something akin to what Foucault flatly denies for the seventeenth-century mathesis, 
namely, an absorption of all knowledge into mathematics. Consistent with this sense of knowledge 
absorption, Boulding’s contention that mathematics “studies all thinkable relationships abstracted 
from any concrete situation or body of empirical knowledge” betrays how the mathesis he was 
trying to help build substituted mere functionality for imagination about the world (197). So busy 
were early General Systems theorists trying to build a meta-level systems language on the strength 
of structural similarities between disciplines that they did not bother to question the picture of the 
world that that disciplinary structure presented.  
Such an assessment of General Systems Theory is consistent with Sheldon Wolin’s critique 
of the political science application of system theory in “Political Theory as a Vocation” (1969). 
As a whole, Wolin’s essay challenges the preeminent concern with methods in the field of political 
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science. Decrying the impoverishment of a technique-oriented political science education, Wolin 
heads off one convenient assumption on which such educational models stake their validity, 
namely, that methods constitute a “kit” of ideologically neutral “tools” (1064). Wolin’s thesis 
asserts the contrary, namely, that all tools incorporate philosophical presuppositions. In other 
words, theory always prefigures methods, such that only methodologies – tools to which theories 
are inextricably connected – exist. As such, ‘theory-less method’ is an impossible statement. One 
corollary for which this prefiguring allows is that theory seamlessly becomes a methodology as 
soon as it used to select or make decisions. As Wolin explains, the readiness “to acknowledge that 
facts depend upon some criteria of selection or significance” does not frequently translate into an 
acknowledgment that “such criteria usually turn out to be fragments of some almost-forgotten 
‘normative’ or ‘traditional’ theory” (1073). Thus, theory and the criteria of selection or 
significance that constitute method are inextricable.  
 Another way to understand this inextricableness is to appreciate how methods present their 
own pictures of reality. When Wolin asks, “what must the world be like for the methodist’s 
knowledge to be possible?” (1069),  he broaches the eminently serious question of how methods 
order the world or what picture of the world emerges from methods by their implicit guarantee that 
the research practices they entail will reveal truth about that world in the form of knowledge. 
Broaching the subject of how system theory orders the world, Wolin considers what was, at the 
time he wrote his article, recent textbook in his field: A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1964). 
The textbook’s author, Wolin indicates, posits in another textbook formal regularities, or 
discoverable uniformities in political behavior, as one major assumption for the movement of 
political behavior. As such, formal regularities constitute the preference of the systems theorist 
and thus comprise the center of the system theorist’s tool-box (1069). The decisive criticism Wolin 
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lodges at GST’s political science application is that a systems approach does not merely exclude 
important elements of the political world by inadvertent means, as even the textbook’s author 
admits, but that a systems approach “may require” their exclusion (1065). Because systems 
methodology seeks uniformities, the political world – according to the systems theorist –is, nay, 
must be nothing but uniformities.  
 Extending Wolin’s critique of systems theory for understanding political life to General 
System Theory’s ambition to build a meta-disciplinary mathesis forces the question of what picture 
of the world, nature or reality would emerge if General System Theory’s ambition worked. The 
picture of the world that must be true in order for the iso- or homomorphic traces posited by 
General Systems Theory to produce new knowledge would at least rely to some extent on picture 
of the world given by the centuries-old disciplinary configuration that medical anthropologist 
Annemarie Mol describes and which also informs the Flexnerian enterprise:  
Since the nineteenth century the various branches of science (physics, chemistry, biology, 
psychology, sociology) have been understood as differing not primarily in method (as was 
earlier the case), but in their objects of study. These were given by nature. They hung 
together in reality and ontology was the branch of philosophy that made this coherence 
explicit – often using the image of the pyramid. Each object domain was like a layer in a 
pyramid of objects ordered from the small and relatively simple to the largest and most 
complex. And each science had the task of studying the entities in one such layer. Thus, at 
the bottom of the pyramid the smallest particles and the force fields between them formed 
the object domain of physics, and at the apex the complex social relations between groups 
of people were to be studied by sociology. One of the dreams that went with this ontological 
monism was that, in the end, full knowledge about behavior of the smallest particles would 
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explain everything else. Physics would explain chemical laws; chemistry would predict 
what happens to living bodies; biology would be able to explain psychological makeup and 
social relations. (Mol 153)  
General Systems Theory could not be said share the same convenient dream of a bottom-up 
explanatory ‘cascade.’ It does, however, rely on the same disciplinary structure and thus the 
pyramidal, which is to say, hierarchical picture of the universe that results from it to advance what 
is an even more convenient dream picture of common laws operating at all levels of the hierarchy. 
In this way, General Systems Theory requires the same thing of the entire world that, per Wolin’s 
critique, systems theory required of political life: to be nothing but uniformities. In view of how 
Engel remarks on this very dimension of General Systems Theory, the convenience of this 
uniformity-across-levels-of-reality dream that may have convinced, or seduced, Engel into 
attaching General Systems Theory so strongly to his conception of holistic patient care. For indeed, 
knowledge of laws operating at a hierarchical reality would present numerous points of therapeutic 
intervention.   
 Yet this very picture of nature’s hierarchical organization points to the explanation of why 
General Systems Theory could not deliver what Engel hoped it could. Leaving no doubt as to the 
prominence and importance of hierarchical organization for General Systems Theory, the second 
of Waelchli’s GST theses is that “natural systems are hierarchically arranged; each system is 
composed of subsystem and contained within a supra-system” (Waelchli 5). These systems in turn 
exhibited the structural similarities between one another that GST sought to articulate as iso- and 
homomorphisms under the exact and unambiguous expressions of mathematics. One of the 
fundamental methodological challenges that such work presents is to define the boundaries 
distinguishing sub-system from system from supra-system. Departing from the pyramidal theory 
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on which the nineteenth century allegedly segmented the world into the disciplines, General 
Systems Theory denies that these levels of systems are given by nature. The second thesis makes 
it clear that “systems are not objective realities of nature; they are subjectively defined by human 
observers” (7). Yet General Systems Theory cannot dispense with objective givenness completely 
as its reliance on boundaries makes clear: “General Systems Theorists seem to agree that to qualify 
as a system any entity must have a boundary that allows the observer to distinguish, at least 
conceptually, the system from its environment” (Waelchli 7). Thus, the fundamental 
methodological challenge of defining the hierarchical organization of systems was to reconcile the 
givenness of a boundary with the necessity of the observer.  
 It is the perhaps the failure to properly appreciate, let alone solve this challenge that 
underlies Engel’s characterization of GST in his 1977 article as the biopsychosocial model’s 
“conceptual approach.” The ambiguous term is perhaps an ambivalent confession on Engel’s part 
that GST fell short of or at least had not yet reached the status of a viable biopsychosocial 
methodology. Indeed, no GST methodology could have existed without a way of defining systems 
and how they relate to one another in a hierarchical arrangement. Without a methodology, the 
crucial integrating research that the biopsychosocial model required could not proceed. As fellow 
psychiatrist McLaren describes it, “researchers who gather data from a variety of theoretically 
unrelated fields will not be able to test the basic assumptions which led them to collect just those 
data and not others. They may be able to detect associations but, critically, not errors in their own 
basic assumptions” (McLaren 91). GST was responsible for providing the methodology that would 
have had to, among other tasks, combine biological, psychological and sociological data.  
 As his observations show, McLaren shares in the concerns as methodological exclusion of 
fellow GST critic, Sheldon Wolin, but approaching the topic with respect to the biopsychosocial 
 69 
model’s interdisciplinarity leads him to emphasize another set of pitfalls. Where Wolin is 
concerned with gross ontological exclusions concomitant with the adoption of a theoretical 
framework that posits nothing but uniformities, McLaren is concerned with the possible 
epistemological exclusions (“not collecting some data”) committed by not adopting a theoretical 
framework. The way out of this ontological-epistemological double bind arguably lies in what 
Wolin celebrates as the richness of theories. Only rich theories can produce the methodological 
tools that at once make useful epistemological exclusions (e.g. filter out noise) without excluding 
important ontological considerations. By attempting to find structural uniformities across levels 
defined by the so-called human “content disciplines” that had been in place for over a century, 
General Systems Theory ultimately declined to present novel theories about the human, nature or 
the universe. In the absence of a new story by which to not only reorganize the academic division 
of labor but also to understand the human, the holistic patient care Engel proposed in turn had little 
recourse but to practice the superficial methodology of disciplinary supplementation. The mere 
overlay of additional disciplinary layers on the biological registers the perpetual dissatisfaction 
with the story told by the ordering of disciplines on which GST’s holistic mathesis relied. GST 
sacrificed the opportunity for novel theory-making upon assuming that the division of labor 
established by categorical disciplinarity adopted a suitable theory of the world.  
 To the extent that Engel added no additional theoretical considerations other than that given 
by GST, his biopsychosocial model would have represented the empirically testable form of 
General Systems Theory, had either come to fruition. The very fact that neither did owes to 
theoretical impoverishment. A successful biopsychosocial model would have represented proof of 
General System Theory, or conversely, the biopsychosocial model would have been the 
empirically testable status of General Systems Theory. McLaren argues as much in his criticism 
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of the biopsychosocial model. Looking to philosopher Daniel Dennett’s notion of model qua 
experience generator that “act[s] rapidly to generate (an approximation of) the material 
consequences which flow from the application of a theory,” McLaren argues that the 
biopsychosocial model cannot be called a model because it was not even testing a theory. Indeed, 
there was no theory in GST’s meta-disciplinary mathesis for the Engel’s model to test (88). 
Moreover, GST’s mathesis lacked the theoretical richness to even generate new tools to bring a 
new conception of nature to testable status, had it been there in the first place. It is for this reason 
that McLaren, in his criticism of the biopsychosocial model, describes GST as “utterly banal” (89). 
General Systems Theory was no more or less than a mathematization of wholeness.  
 Due to its nascent status, it is next to impossible to determine the extent to which integral 
physiology mentioned by Integrative medicine practitioner Dr. Leonard Wisneski shares GST’s 
ambitions for the mathematizing totalization of a meta-disciplinary mathesis. Wisneski’s 
description of integral physiology that justifies at least a superficial comparison to General 
Systems Theory – that is, “a unified field theory for the health and wellbeing” – does not evoke 
the relationship between disciplinarity and mathematics in the same way that GST does. Instead, 
integral physiology evokes the segmentation of Eastern and Western healing traditions by 
proposing that it is the science that finally unifies them under a single theory of energy, energy 
being the common denominator between the mainstream theories of Western physics and the 
“subtle energy” of Eastern medicine. Without a disciplinary intervention that attempts the 
imaginative theorizing that Wolin emphasizes, it is hard to imagine a new story of the universe 
emerging from integrative physiology, thereby foreclosing the integration of Eastern and Western 
healing approaches proposed under integral physiology.  
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2.3.3 Narrative and schema-based medicine – Holistic Medical Pedagogy as Path-dependent 
Disciplinary Coordination  
 
In Making Medical Knowledge (2015), Mariam Solomon declares “much of” narrative medicine 
to be “politically disengaged” (203). Solomon understands politics to mean “political structures, 
such as class,” which can become “causal players in the health of patients” (203). She goes on to 
declare that “narrative medicine, with its insistence on individual narratives, often misses more 
general structures, including political dimensions. For example, if social class is not part of the 
patient’s or physician’s narrative, it is left out altogether” (203). Solomon’s charge of political 
disengagement might come as a puzzling surprise given narrative medicine’s professed 
commitment to achieving social justice in health care,8 along with its sustained deployment of 
politically charged thought from the pens of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida, and 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, among many others. This charge perhaps more readily fits more with 
schema-based medicine’s reliance on Aristotelianism, American pragmatism and various 
cognitive theories for its theoretical foundations, not to mention its seeming unwillingness to make 
political commitments of any sort. Whatever the extent to which narrative and schema-based 
medicine practice political disengagement in regard to overtly medical matters, there is little doubt 
that they refuse to mount any sort of political challenge to disciplinary structures.  
 That narrative and schema-based medicine would refuse to engage in disciplinary politics 
seems just as puzzling and even counter-intuitive as Solomon’s claim, given how the two projects 
are themselves interdisciplinary efforts working to integrate rigorous narrative competence into 
medical practice. A picture of how advocating for interdisciplinarity and refusing to engage 
 
8 See (Charon et al. 8)  
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disciplinary politics could coexist nevertheless emerges through “Apologia for a Medical Truant” 
(2008), an essay by Edmund Pellegrino, one of the major early influences on medical or health 
humanities rubrics and a voice with whom both narrative and schema-based medicine 
acknowledge foundational ties. In his apologia, Pellegrino owns up to “transgressing the 
perimeters of [his] clinical expertise” and thereby becoming a so-called medical truant (Pellegrino 
xiii). The space for which he leaves medicine is philosophy, raising the question of whether 
Pellegrino’s crime is not so much disciplinary truancy as disciplinary trespassing. Ultimately, 
however, the two are one in the same: if he is playing hooky from the medical profession as a 
medical truant, he is, coextensively, an unauthorized trespasser in whatever alternate disciplinary 
space he may find himself. In other words, the discipline he plays the truant for is immaterial: if 
he is not doing medicine, he is invariably trespassing.  
 In view of Pellegrino’s overt concern with trespassing, it is hard to know whether to 
interpret his titular apologia in the rhetorical or the emotional sense: does Pellegrino’s essay issue 
a formal statement of justification or own up to having done a bad thing? Officially, of course, it 
can only be the former, but absent the political will to at least examine disciplinary boundaries as 
boundaries, it would also function as the latter. In the midst of apologizing, however conceived, 
for trespassing into philosophy, Pellegrino points to such luminaries as Berlioz, Chekhov, Keats 
and Somerset Maugham so as to illustrate that the disciplinary range of medical truancy further 
extends across music, drama, poetry and belles lettres. Pellegrino defends the value of medical 
truants like himself and these figures by pointing the need for physicians to engage in critical 
reflection and the Hippocratic notion that good medical care extends beyond scientific 
competence. 
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 For all his defense of the value of medical truancy to the clinical practice, to medicine, to 
healthcare and to the humanistic disciplines, however, Pellegrino in no way contests the perimeters 
or bounds themselves – those that, when crossed, become the fundamental basis for the serious 
and political charges of truancy or transgression. A charge of truancy is, among other things, a 
charge of fraudulence. The “medical truant” Pellegrino admits, “is often discredited on grounds 
that physicians are technicians not intellectuals” (xvi). The technician-intellectual distinction 
easily evokes the sort of difference of cognitive style that Biglan might say the applied-pure 
dimension distinguishes between. Though Pellegrino might in all likelihood find the cognitive 
styles along such lines distasteful, so long as he defends medical truancy, he all but submits to the 
very disciplinary frameworks allied to the technician-intellectual binary, those frameworks 
supplying the very basis of the truancy he defends.  
 Pellegrino’s wrestling with medical truancy illuminates the frustrating paradox of 
attempting bold interdisciplinary initiatives that, by their very existence, seem to call into question 
conventional disciplinary structures but do nothing to actually contest those same structures. A 
promising explanation of this paradox can be found in path dependency, a central concern of a 
school of political science called new institutionalism that seeks to understand how institutions 
affect agency. According to the new institutionalists, accounting for path dependency is to consider 
how the logic of institutions constrain action in ways that political actors neither see nor plan for. 
Moreover, the new institutionalists suggest that even with awareness, there is little probability of 
reversal. For the notion of path dependency also posits a high cost of changing direction that 
renders mere knowledge of a need to change direction insufficient. In short, path dependency 
explains why seemingly innovative interdisciplinary ventures would do little to actually change 
disciplinary structures themselves. Forging new institutional structures, which is to say, getting off 
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a given disciplinary path, requires both a knowledge of the path, which can be invisible, as well as 
a robust commitment to answering for the high costs of doing so.  
 By broadening their definition of institution to include not only formal material structures 
(constitutions, parliaments, departments) but also norms and values, the new institutionalists also 
posit in path dependency a highly durable link between ideology and material organization 
(Lecours 9). This image of institution surfaces in cultural critic Jonathon Dollimore’s critique of 
the basic premise that art acts as a humanizing force. When Dollimore observes that “our culture 
industry and our humanities education system still depend on premise,” he invokes the very same 
broad understanding of institution posited by path dependency – that is, a combination of material 
structures (“humanities education system”) and the norm of an ideology (“art is a humanizing 
force”) (40 italics mine). While neither narrative nor schema-based medicine could be said to 
promote this premise verbatim or advocate for a particular humanities education system, they both 
do have ideas about who the human is alongside ideas about how the scientific and humanistic 
disciplines should relate to one another in medical practice. The interdependence of ideologies of 
the human and disciplinary structures would in turn constitute the sort of institution that constrains 
action necessary for the development of holistic medical pedagogy.  
 One indication of the stifling force exerted by the institutional union of disciplinary 
structures and ideologies of the human emerges in Literature and the American College, a 1905 
treatise Irving Babbitt. As one of Edmund Pellegrino’s explicit interlocuters, Babbitt is one among 
many thinkers constituting a woefully unacknowledged intellectual pre-history of the medical and 
health humanities in general and narrative and schema-based medicine in particular. More 
importantly, Babbitt would thus also stand as part of the path on which the latter are dependent. In 
Literature and the American College, Babbitt seeks to establish the necessity for the humanistic 
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tradition in higher education while outlining the dangers it faces. In one section, Babbitt identifies 
“encroachment of other disciplines into the humanities” as one such danger, emphasizing “the 
humanities need to be defended to-day against the encroachments of physical science, as they once 
needed to be against the encroachments of theology” (30). Babbitt strives to keep the human more 
than a function of material things and thus not “entirely subject to the methods that have won for 
science such triumph over phenomenal nature” (30). Babbitt’s concern with things is informed by 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s dichotomy between law of thing and law of man, one pair of 
irreconcilable opposites that Emerson says man must move between in the quest for the spiritual 
fulfillment that Babbitt regards as the central task of humanism. It is the fear of entirely reducing 
the human to things and thereby extinguishing his ability to transcend material reality that Babbitt 
also decries the encroachment of anthropology into humanism:  
The president of a congress of anthropologists recently chose as a motto for his annual 
address the humanistic maxim: ‘The proper study of mankind is man;’ and no one, 
probably, was conscious of any incongruity. At this rate, we may soon see set up as a type 
of true humanist the Chicago professor who recently spent a year in collecting cats’-cradles 
in the Congo. (30)  
Conveniently overlooking the etymology of anthropology, Babbitt chortles over the notion of an 
anthropologist fulfilling the role of a humanist. The humanist, Babbitt believes, elevates man 
beyond the law of things – his “cats’-cradles,” so to speak – to ascertain the so-called law of man. 
Hence any discipline that studies things cannot be called humanistic. Babbitt’s anxieties betray the 
possibility that the borders between disciplines, those that distinguish theology, the physical 
sciences, the social sciences and the humanities from one another, serve a particular understanding 
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of the human, namely, an understanding that posits laws for the human to discover and understand 
through the work of humanism.  
 The work of humanism, which firm disciplinary borders help secure, not only privileges 
but, according to Babbitt, relies on the relationship between art and universal truth. It is for this 
reason that Babbitt decries the rise of originality in modern art and speaks approvingly of past 
attempts to apply Aristotle’s “profound” doctrine that “the final test of art is not its originality, but 
its truth to the universal” (219). Art’s access to the universal in turn explains why Babbitt promotes 
literature more specifically as central to the work of humanism:  
In short, the most practical way of promoting humanism is to work for a revival of the lost 
art of reading. As a general rule, the humane man will be the one who has a memory richly 
stores with what is best in literature, which the sound sense perfectly expressed that is 
found only in the masters (244).  
It is Babbitt’s confident linking of humane to “what is best in literature” that constitutes the 
ideology of art as a humanizing force on which, in Dollimore’s estimation, humanities education 
systems rely. Babbitt’s comments about the boundaries that protect humanism from the 
encroachments of anthropology, natural science and even theology means that this ideology helps 
to lay nothing less than the disciplinary boundaries themselves.  
 Together, the observations of Dollimore and Babbitt on humanism and the humanities 
education system help pinpoint art as an important constituent of the path on which narrative and 
schema-based medicine may be dependent as they negotiate the relations between narrative and 
science in their holistic medical pedagogies. By seeking to introduce artistic accounts of illness, 
disease or the practice of medicine into medical pedagogy, medical professionalism and possibly 
even clinical decision-making, narrative and schema-based medicine not only codify a sort of 
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truancy into medical education, but also invariably stoke conversation over the position that 
scientific accounts of disease in those same pedagogical processes. To the extent that medical 
education takes the hardline biomedical position of biological or scientific accounts as the ultimate 
truth of disease, introducing narrative competence into medical pedagogy amounts to nothing less 
than negotiating the crucial relation between art, truth and education.  
 In his aesthetic theory, the philosopher Alain Badiou outlines three conserved relations of 
art, truth and education. He calls these configurations the didactic, the romantic and the classical 
schemas. Looking retrospectively, the twentieth century failed in Badiou’s estimation to produce 
a novel relation, earning it the distinction of being at once “eclectic and conservative” 
[conservateur et éclectique] (Badiou 15). Instead, Badiou envisions the reproduction of three 
schemas to the point of saturation. Though Badiou does pair what he sees as the three singular 
thought systems of the twentieth century – Marxism, German hermeneutics and psychoanalysis – 
with the didactic, romantic and classical schemes, respectively, he does not explain how they 
endured. Badiou’s pairing does not provide a satisfying historical, cultural, social and political 
reason for the perpetuation itself, if for no other reason than the pairing merely defers the question 
by begging the answer to why these three thought systems endured. With the linkage of ideology 
and material structures posited by path dependency, however, it becomes possible to imagine how 
the didactic, romantic and classical arrangements could have the staying power that Badiou 
hypothesizes.  
 Badiou articulates the three art-truth-education schemas by first setting aside the question 
of what the second of these parameters – truth – actually is, i.e. ontological questions and then 
drawing them along the lines of two aesthetic considerations: 1) singularity, the characteristic of 
whether art has access to truths unavailable to other forms of thought and 2) immanence, the 
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characteristic of whether the discovery of truth occurs through the workings of art itself. The 
combinations obtained by variously denying and affirming art’s singularity and immanence 
generate the three relations of art, truth and education:  
1) The first art-truth-education arrangement, the didactic arrangement, affirms art’s 
singularity but denies its immanence. Art’s pedagogical role of instilling courage in the 
face of truth gives it a singular relation to truth: only art can sufficiently rouse courage in 
the face of truth, but other realms of thought determine what truth is. The property of art is 
the charm of the effect of truth, which leads away from the careful work of deliberating 
about truth. As such, this charm is dangerous and thus under the strict surveillance of truth-
determining procedures (4). 
2) The romantic scheme is the complete inverse of the didactic: it affirms immanence but 
denies singularity. Though it asserts that art is the domain of absolute truth, the romantic 
schema nevertheless allows glimpses of that truth to circulate through other realms of 
thought. Art’s absolute truth makes it the salvation of society and the source of 
revitalization, giving it the preeminent pedagogical role.  
3) Finally, the classical scheme denies art both immanence and singularity, which amounts to 
declaring that truth and art have nothing to do with each other. Art performs public services 
that include but are not limited to therapy and entertainment. For this reason, art could 
never serve a proper educational role, which is to say, with truth. 
As if to render a concrete, empirical picture of these three art-truth-education abstractions that 
Badiou articulates, narrative medicine perpetuates a didactico-romantic configuration whereas 
schema-based medicine perpetuates a classical configuration. In both configurations, there exists 
a negotiation of art, truth and education – a negotiation which the cooperative interdisciplinarity 
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of both projects invariably forces them to undertake – that proceeds under the auspices of a relation 
in which disciplinary structure and an ideology of the human are bound to one another. These 
relations of disciplinary structure and ideology constitute the institution on which narrative and 
schema-based medicine’s disciplinary coordination is path dependent.  
2.3.3.1 Narrative Medicine’s didactico-romantic relation of art, truth and education 
 
Narrative medicine’s decision to distinguish narrative and scientific reasoning as “completely 
different kinds of reasoning” is the fundamental prerequisite for its perpetuation of didactico-
romanticism (Solomon 179). The ever-shifting relations between these two types of reasoning, that 
narrative medicine generates the “mediating schema” [schème médiateur] that Badiou posits for 
didactico-romanticism (Badiou 8). Narrative medicine indeed makes distinctions between the 
universality of science and the irreducible particularity of narrative, stipulating that “what 
distinguishes narrative knowledge from universal or scientific knowledge is its ability to capture 
the singular, irreplicable, or incommensurable” (Charon, Narrative Medicine 45). Access to the 
incommensurable or irreducible in exchange for creating generalizable claims would in turn 
disqualify narrative from truth when truth is conceived as the universal. Disqualifying narrative 
from access to the universality of truth in turn amounts to a denial of art’s immanence – one of the 
two hallmarks of didacticism.  
 Narrative’s irreducible particularity instead constitutes a singular relation to truth – the 
other didactic hallmark. The role that narrative medicine envisions for art’s incommensurability –  
or whatever disqualifies it from universal truth science enjoys – with respect to the truth of 
contingency reproduces the singular relation to truth posited by didacticism: “narrative practices 
enable the observer or the participant to live in the face of contingency without trying to eradicate 
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it” (Charon, Narrative Medicine 50, italics mine). While the task of actually determining that 
contingency is indeed the truth would only belong to truth-determining realms of thought – e.g. 
science, philosophy, mathematics – only narrative singularity makes it possible to live with 
contingency and not seek to eradicate that truth, or so didacticism would have it. It is the fact that 
narrative enables a living-with – but does not supply proof of – contingency that reproduces 
didacticism’s affirmation of art’s singularity. In so doing, narrative constitutes didacticism’s 
singular function for art: courage in the face of truth.  
 And yet narrative medicine explicitly disputes the logic on which a didactic denial of 
immanence might rest. The assertion that “the creative acts of representation – in writing or telling 
or painting or composing – do not merely reflect something real but create something real” triggers 
the romantic affirmation of immanence (Charon, Principles 166). Immanence, under the romantic 
schema, posits art itself as having access to truth. Just as the romanticism grants non-artistic 
thinkers access to truth, albeit not absolute truth, so too are the practicing physicians who 
developed narrative medicine obviously obliged to create a pedagogical frame in which truth can 
circulate through science as well, a necessary provision for a successful collaboration with 
scientific medicine. The romantic framework’s denial of art’s singular relation to truth would allow 
narrative medicine to grant truth-determining capacities to both science and art.  
 Only art, however, contains revitalizing possibilities. Monica Greco extracts a revitalizing 
function for narrative in narrative medicine from a story that the founder of narrative medicine, 
Rita Charon, relates from her residency in which she felt hopeless in the face of a patient’s 
declining state of health as well as the grief she felt from the patient’s wife. For Charon, the 
experience recounted in her story eventually helped to occasion the revelation that there is no limit 
to what physicians can offer their patients. What Charon means is that with the sort of skills of 
 81 
empathy, reflection and communication by narrative competence, the possibilities for what 
physicians can do for their patients become endless, even in the instances where biomedical 
interventions have run their course. Extrapolating further on the question of limitlessness, Greco 
writes that, “‘There is no limit’ here signals an acknowledgment, and an opening towards, 
indeterminacy” (26). Greco goes on to link indeterminacy to “a surplus of vital possibilities 
available to an organism” (28). To the extent that narrative medicine’s program of systematic 
narrative study affords limitless care, which is to say, care made open to indeterminacy by the 
practice of narrative competence, it perpetuates the romantic discovery of vitalism in the immanent 
encounter with absolute truth.  
 Narrative medicine’s didactico-romanticism is a way of bypassing crucial decisions about 
truth that the co-operative disciplinarity inevitably forces it to make. Faced with the decision of 
whether absolute truth is found in the removed austerity of the universal or in the urgent immediacy 
of the particular, didactico-romanticism is narrative medicine’s way of saying truth is both, without 
reconciling such troubling gaps as those between the universal and particular itself, or between 
science and art, objectivity and subjectivity. To be sure, there is some attempt at such a 
reconciliation in narrative medicine, as in Charon’s contention that “logicoscientific knowledge 
attempts to illuminate the universally true by transcending the particular; narrative knowledge 
attempts to illuminate the universally true by revealing the particular” (1898, italics mine). Thus, 
science-facilitated transcendence and narrative-facilitated revelation are narrative medicine’s two 
means of apprehending the universally true, thus obliging the practitioner to vacillate incessantly 
between the two.  
 
 82 
2.3.3.2 Schema-based medicine’s classical relation of art, truth and education 
 
In contrast to narrative medicine’s ever vacillating didactico-romanticism, schema-based medicine 
perhaps reproduces a comparatively more settled classical scheme by adopting a definition of truth 
that houses both scientific and narrative knowledge comfortably. Relieved of any connection to 
ontological truth under the terms of its pragmatist foundations, art in turn provides a “public 
service” [service publique], which in schema-based medicine takes the form of facilitating 
recognition and effecting sensitization (Badiou 13). If schema-based medicine’s stated goal is to 
construct frameworks that enable medical students and healthcare professionals to first recognize, 
extract and be sensitized to certain features of complex clinical situation, the Aristotelian 
unification of katharsis and tragedy would serve that goal.  
 Indeed, schema-based medicine finds in Aristotle’s third definition of katharsis a 
recognition-facilitating function of tragedy: “tragic narratives allow the audience to recognize 
‘pitiable and fearful’ incidents that are part and parcel of every person’s life” (Schleifer and 
Vannatta 6, italics mine). In this way, tragedy “shares medicine’s central concern with human 
suffering,” a concern that is instrumental, or functional (259). Just as biomedicine does not take 
up the question of the truth of suffering and only seeks to instrumentally relieve it, so too the 
classical arrangement reproduced by schema-based medicine require that tragedy not reveal any 
universal law or truth about suffering. Tragedy only supports the recognition of suffering. 
Subsequently, the better and more efficiently that physicians recognize the depths of suffering, the 
more efficacious or more humanely they can apply the tools of biomedicine to relieve it. Thus, by 
virtue of its knowledge classifications and the adaptation of Aristotelian concepts, schema-based 
medicine confers art classical status, designating it an important functional enhancement of clinical 
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practice while ensuring that it can never question the efficacy of clinical practice or the claims of 
the science underlying it.  
2.3.3.4 The human, according to didacticism, romanticism and classicism 
 
Though Badiou does not specify them, each of the three art-truth-education schemas invariably 
advance philosophical claims about the human. If indeed narrative and schema-based medicine 
perpetuate the three relations, then it would be expected that the associated claims would surface 
in their work. Indeed, hints of these claims of the human appear almost as axioms in both narrative 
and schema-based medicine. The didactic schema’s human-defining claim would be that the 
human is capable of courage in the face of truth but needs further cultivation. Along with 
recognizing the plights of patients and extending empathy towards those who suffer, the ability to 
join “honestly and courageously with patients in their struggles” is included among the list of 
“human capacities” that narrative medicine believes is required of physicians (Charon 3). To the 
extent that humans need supplementation in courage and narrative competence serves as this 
cultivation, narrative based medicine furthers the understanding of the human as needing courage.  
 If didacticism uses art to rectify a single human problem or trait, then romanticism 
ministers to an entire state of being. Indeed, the romantic schema invokes an eminently traditional 
human predicament: the state of needing salvation. Badiou gives this impression when, in his 
explication of the romantic schema, he makes a Christian analogy that likens philosophy to the 
“detached, impenetrable Father” [le Père retiré et impénétrable] and art to the “suffering Son who 
saves and redeems” [le Fils souffrant qui sauve et relève]. Philosophy, like God, is unknowable 
and utterly removed from human life. Art, on the other hand, is the ‘Word made flesh,’ the same 
absolute truth from on high, but in human form, so that it may be closer to human suffering. Art’s 
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potential for Christ-like salvation manifests in narrative medicine as the desire to “join, with the 
patient, as a whole presence, deploying all one’s human gifts of intuition, empathy and the ability 
to bear witness” (Charon 133). Just as the romantic schema posits God the philosopher appointing 
Christ the artist to join fully in the human experience for the purpose of teaching the totality of His 
Word, so too does narrative competence appoint its practitioner to a complete descent from the 
austere heights of clinical science for the enter wholly – holistically – into the plight of illness, 
both for the sake of the patient and the sake of physician. This descent by itself, not to mention 
whatever equivalent of crucifixion – scorn from colleagues or hospital administrators, patient 
skepticism to narrative techniques or the of self-discovery itself – of course demands the utmost 
courage. Hence the ingenuity of the didactico-romantic reconciliation of didactic and romantic 
schema’s human claims:   
 The human-defining claim made by the classical schema sits at the intersection of emotion, 
imagination, empathy and action, positing something to the effect that the vicarious experience 
provided by tragedy-induced katharsis can favorably interact with the human’s innate emotional 
nature to stimulate empathetic or otherwise virtuous behavior. An image of the human consistent 
with this emerges through schema-based medicine’s complex theoretical framework, which 
consists of a combination of cognitive theory, evolutionary theory, schema theory and a host of 
other theories that have very explicit ideas about what basic capacities humans enjoy. Schema-
based medicine in turn exploits these capacities to justify the sort of public service that classicism 
posits for art: 
There is neurophysiological evidence – the “mirror neurons” we mentioned (see Iacoboni 
2009) – that most humans are built to respond to other people’s pain and suffering and that 
reading stories that contain pain and suffering sensitizes readers, lowering the threshold for 
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recognizing, and, if you will, experiencing empathy for that pain. (Schleifer and Vanatta 
235)  
The public service that schema-based medicine’s classicism posits for art thus requires the 
existence of neurophysiologically-grounded emotional capacities. Without these capacities, the 
katharsis of tragic narratives have nothing on which to exert their influence over behavior.  
 Altogether, the human that emerges from narrative and schema-based medicine’s 
perpetuation of didactico-romanticism and classicism is conditionally courageous, in need of 
salvation and programmed to emotionally react to others’ pain. These constitute universal human 
traits that, under the proper circumstances, art narratives can cultivate among medical students and 
other healthcare, or so narrative and schema-based medicine would have it.  
2.3.3.5: A Politically Disengaged Humanism  
 
Though both narrative and schema-based medicine took the crucial step of attempting to cultivate 
a humanistic skill like narrative competence as crucial part of medical professionalism, something 
that Babbitt mentions could be considered an affront to humanism, neither wanted to imagine a 
radically different view of the human than his own. Babbitt, narrative medicine practitioners and 
schema-based medicine practitioners want a human who can be made humane by what is best in 
literature and art, even if they disagree on what traits count as the universally human and, by 
extension, as the basis of humane behavior. And just as Babbitt insists on firm disciplinary 
boundaries that protect the sacred work of humanism, so too do narrative medicine and schema-
based medicine, by their respective perpetuations of didactico-romantic and classical relations of 
art, truth and education, posit relations between science and art allied to ideas about the human 
that serve their pedagogical agendas. Though neither narrative nor schema-based medicine 
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necessarily uphold these disciplinary arrangements on behalf of their beliefs about the human and 
humanism quite as explicitly as Babbitt, the path dependency to which their co-operative 
disciplinarity is subject has the same effect.  
 Perhaps the most crucial ideological aspect of shared humanism, which categorical 
disciplinary boundaries protect, is the insistence that the human be apolitical. Babbitt implies as 
much when he complains of the emphasis on originality in modern art, which, as a result of a 
concomitant “loss of standards,” has the effect of “inbreeding personal and national peculiarities 
and getting farther and farther away from what is universally human” (220). National, which is to 
say, political peculiarities, do not belong to the list of universal human traits. Though narrative 
medicine and schema-based medicine do not speak of art and politics as Babbitt does, if they speak 
of the subject at all, and certainly celebrate the personal in art and narrative in a way that he does 
not, their humanism is just as politically disengaged as his. Schema-based medicine’s authors 
reveal their allegiance to an apolitical universal human upon admitting that they find it “odd” that 
“the contestation of basic human similarities should have taken on such a political edge in the 
humanities in the recent years” (Schleifer and Vannatta 401). Such a response is entirely consistent 
with and expected of a humanism that sees universal human traits as beyond or above political 
matters.  
 The image of narrative medicine’s politically insulated humanism begins in the what is 
perhaps the most politically charged essay associated with narrative medicine: “The Politics of 
Pedagogy: Cripping, Queering and Un-homing the Health Humanities” by Sayatani DasGaupta. 
In this essay, the sixth of those that comprise The Principles and Practices of Narrative Medicine 
(2017), DasGupta reflects on her experiences in teaching health humanities material and 
facilitating discussions about non-dominant identities. Recognizing the power and privilege 
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operating in even well-intentioned efforts like narrative medicine, DasGupta advocates for an ethos 
of humility. She proceeds to demonstrate her own humility in a candid reflection on the first course 
she ever taught in the health humanities, Illness Narratives: Understanding the Experience of 
Illness, admitting that she dropped the sub-title on the grounds that it seemed “particularly 
totalizing” (DasGupta 142).  
 Yet totalizing endures through the goal of the narrative medicine classroom she gives. In 
seeking to unify “subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the concrete, the real and the 
imagined, disciplined and transdisciplinary, everyday life and unending history” (Soja 5, quoted 
in DasGupta 51), the narrative medicine classroom reproduces the coming-together of traditionally 
hostile categories that is the defining feature of German philologist Ernst Robert Curtius’ definition 
of total humanism. Along with Babbitt, Curtius ranks among the influences on Pellegrino, author 
of “Apologia for a Medical Truant” and an acknowledged influence on narrative and schema-based 
medicine. Curtius’ total humanism ambition to be “sensual and spiritual, philological and touched 
by the muses, philosophical and artistic, pious and political, all in one” (Englehardt and Jotterand 
4-5). When viewed together, the narrative medicine classroom cannot help but assume all of the 
unwanted baggage of Curtius’ total humanism. Though unifications may be desired and even 
warranted, there is not enough attention paid to the risk of totalitarian or totalizing oneness that 
such unifications pose.      
 Yet despite the declared ambition to unify such intractable oppositions, narrative medicine 
declines to do so on behalf of emotion and its many hostile others – such as professionalism or fact 
– by promulgating the parallel chart. The parallel chart – perhaps one of narrative medicine’s most 
celebrated original innovations – is where practitioners write their emotions. “If your patient dying 
of prostate cancer reminds you of your grandfather […] and each time you go into the patient’s 
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room, you weep for your grandfather” Charon tells her students, “you cannot write that in the 
hospital chart. We will not let you. And yet is has to be written somewhere. You write it in the 
parallel chart” (156). Schema-based medicine speaks approvingly of the parallel chart, writing that 
it “encourages students and physicians to pursue the very narrative organization and 
understanding of experience that, as we argued in Part I, is part of our human cognitive and 
affective inheritance. Such encouragement, as Charon demonstrates, develops narrative 
knowledge” (Schleifer and Vannatta 279).  
 As long as the standard medical outline remains intact, however, even the most 
sophisticated narrative organization and understanding of experience will do little in the way of 
holistic patient care. Even as Charon wishes to cultivate a form of medical education and patient 
care that is sensitive to affect and escapes rote subservience to traditional doctor outline, she does 
not challenge the formal constraints of that outline that make subservience to it the most convenient 
and therefore, likely option in the first place. Confoundingly, she demonstrates awareness of these 
formal constraints:  
You will hear a doctor saying to a patient who has just disclosed the death of a parent, 
‘We’ll get to that in Family History.’ Because many health professionals are uncomfortable 
around emotion and uneasy when the medical interview is not crisply and evidently focused 
on the physical problem at hand, they structure the conversation as it unfolds by 
interrupting the patient and redirecting him or her to furnish only medically relevant 
information in the order dictated by the doctor’s outline. (98)  
After ascribing this interrupting and redirecting behavior to all doctors, particularly younger 
doctors, Charon rightly discourages such a straightforward running through the doctor’s outline. 
Moreover, she ascribes the force behind the interferences and redirections that sustain this running 
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through may be the imperative not only to enter the data but also discomfort with emotion. 
However, Charon creates a false dichotomy when she opposes discomfort with emotion against 
data-collecting along the lines of the medical interview categories. By virtue of the outline’s 
structure, bypassing a patient’s emotion and doing a proper medical interview is the same action, 
“medically relevant” standing for admissible evidence. Emotion does not, per biomedical 
assumptions, constitute admissible evidence and the categories by which the basic medical 
interview is structured to uphold that standard. Increasing physician awareness of their or other 
patient’s emotions through narrative knowledge or writing in parallel charts thus will not only 
mean little to physician-patient interactions but the divorce of emotion from the work by the 
parallel chart upholds it.  
 Thus, the ambition for opposition-unifying total humanism does not extend to where it 
could perhaps make the most impact. Instead, the opposites between emotion and fact, affect and 
professionalism endure with the parallel chart and the unchanged official structure of the medical 
interview. The parallel chart perpetuates the sort of politically insulated humanism that extends at 
least as far back as Babbitt’s writings on the role of literature at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the isolation being a function of strict disciplinary boundaries that preserve, among other 
things, the apolitical view of the human around which such humanism revolved. This combination 
of ideology and disciplinary boundaries comprises the institution on which narrative and schema-
based medicine’s holistic medical pedagogy is path dependent and by which it is thus constrained. 
The constraints of path dependency are formidable enough to dissuade even the most politically 
astute and active endeavors, let alone those with ideologies that actively resist political awareness 
in the first place. Ultimately, changing disciplinary boundaries would threaten the apolitical human 
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on which narrative and schema-based medicine rely, leaving them little recourse but to mediate 
knowledge through such devices as narrative competence or narrative-derived schemas.  
 
2.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR DISCIPLINARY INTERVENTIONS  
 
Together, the critiques of the biopsychosocial model, integrative medicine, General System 
Theory, integral physiology, narrative medicine and schema-based medicine reveal six 
disciplinary habits that contribute to dissatisfying, un-disciplined holistic healthcare. These six 
habits furnish six areas for disciplinary intervention in the ongoing pursuit of more satisfying, 
disciplined holistic healthcare:  
1) Overlooking institutional constraints: Insofar as relying on categorical disciplinary and 
its attending ideologies, including those determining nothing less than what nature and the 
human is, all the projects of holistic health care are constrained by path dependency. As 
formidable as these institutional forces are, they only constitute one among many with such 
hallowed, seemingly untouchable entities as the outline of a medical interview constituting 
additional institutional forces unto themselves. Narrative and schema-based medicine’s 
unwillingness to engage these entities, even as they decry their impacts on patient care and 
address them through narrative knowledge-developing techniques like the parallel chart, 
constitutes perhaps the most devastating weakness of the apolitical humanism on which 
they are path dependent.  
2) Reliance on object givenness: While General Systems Theory took a crucial step out of 
categorical disciplinarity by proposing that systems were not given by nature, they 
nevertheless relied on boundaries to conceptualize them. The puzzle of how to use 
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boundaries to create systems to study and between which to find isomorphic traces 
constituted perhaps GST’s most debilitating methodological weakness. It is this same 
adherence to object givenness that perhaps figures in narrative and schema-based 
medicine’s refusal to contest medical interview outlines.  
3) Lack of high impact theorizing: The very endeavor of holistic healthcare challenges 
prevailing answers to big questions, including those pertaining to how the world works and 
who the human is. That it should make such a challenge comes as no surprise considering 
healthcare itself proceeds as answers to these questions, among others. Dissatisfied with 
biomedicine’s answers to these questions and what sort of healthcare they helped form, 
Engel sought a “heretical” answer, but did not actually produce one. To be sure, he thought 
he found one in General Systems Theory, but with its sole ambition to identify structural 
similarities between the disciplines as they had long existed, it ultimately gave the same 
answers about the nature of the world and the human as the biomedical model. Finally, 
under narrative and schema-based medicine’s negotiations of art, truth and education, the 
universally true human remains a being who is conditionally courageous, salvation-
needing and made virtuous by innate emotional programming. Neither project of holistic 
medical pedagogy advanced new ideas about what the human is.  
4) Representationalist function for language: General System Theory’s twentieth-century 
meta-disciplinary mathesis relied on roughly the same understanding of language that 
Foucault posits for the seventeenth-century mathesis, namely, as a totality of signs that can 
“represent thought as thought represents itself” (78).  Many challenges have since been 
advanced against this view of language. Though narrative and schema-based medicine 
could be said to recognize the challenges raised against this view, the apolitical humanism 
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that both perpetuate would diminish the possibility for taking the politically controversial, 
steps of developing a pedagogical framework that does not rely on representationalism.  
5) Oscillation between totalization and fragmentary accumulation: Under categorical 
disciplinarity, holism is only achievable via the surrogates of fragmentation and 
totalization. The disciplinary supplementation of the biopsychosocial model and 
integrative medicine constitute the fragmentation surrogate insofar as they put multiple 
facets of what constitutes health together without advancing new ideas about how they go 
together. Both rely on the holistic research operations to which they are allied to do this 
work. General System Theory’s meta-disciplinary mathesis attempts to relate disciplinary 
findings together under a view of the universe as one wherein different levels of reality 
share isomorphic traces of one another, amounting to something of a mathematizing 
totalization. Finally, narrative medicine’s attempt to unify traditionally hostile categories 
resurrects the notion of a total humanism lurking in its complex intellectual lineage.  
6) Superficial reconstitutions of categorical disciplinarity: Though confronting the 
limitations of disciplinary boundaries head on, all of the holistic projects only superficially 
reconstitute or even question disciplinary categories. Perhaps the most immediately 
obvious manifestation of this reconstitution is the title of Engel’s attempt at holistic patient 
care: the bio-psycho-social model. General Systems Theory and integral physiology also 
invoke, without actually doing much to change, categorical disciplinary in their holistic 
research operations, the former invoking the familiar disciplinary segmentations of reality, 
the latter invoking Eastern and Western healing traditions. Narrative medicine mediates 
the divide between art and science by merely asserting the former as revealing the particular 
and the latter as transcending the particular. Finally, schema-based medicine’s three 
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categories of knowledge informed by American pragmatism – nomological sciences, 
human sciences and functional knowledge – could be said to outfit the natural sciences, 
social sciences and humanities with different names. Together, these projects paint a 
picture of the many decades-long search for holistic healthcare as a wrestling with 












The previous chapter’s critique of the biopsychosocial model, Integrative Medicine, General 
Systems Theory, integrative physiology, narrative medicine and schema-based medicine should 
leave little doubt as to the necessity of making a disciplinary intervention to achieve holistic 
healthcare. This chapter seeks to answer the crucial question of how to actually achieve it. Each 
challenge uncovered by the critiques of the six attempts at holistic healthcare corresponds to a 
target that a disciplinary intervention would need to hit. Although tempting to match each target 
to its own discipline-specific solution, the endeavor of which these disciplinary interventions work 
on behalf – holistic healthcare – would call for a single integrated approach to dealing with all of 
them. To that end, this chapter seeks to develop that one approach, and it hinges on the broadest 
possible deployment of formalist reasoning. The promise of any sort of formalism to achieve this 
feat lies in the disciplinary ubiquity of form itself: “in disciplinary terms, form can point us to 
visual art, music and literature, but it belongs equally to philosophy, law, mathematics, military 
science, and crystallography” (Levine 2). The reach of form becomes even wider when taken to 
mean “an arrangement of elements – an ordering, patterning or shaping” (3). It is this broadest 
possible understanding of form that defines the formalism on which the disciplinary intervention 
attempted in chapter four is grounded.  
 This broadened formalism synthesizes the work of four theorists: Caroline Levine, 
Annemarie Mol, Karen Barad, and Elizabeth Grosz. With the exception of Levine, none of the 
other theorists would self-identity as formalists. Nevertheless, the ideas each puts forth reinforce 
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one another to such an extent that they could be said to amount collectively to a radical, yet 
productive formalism that could animate a disciplinary intervention on behalf of holistic 
healthcare. To show how, the four sections of this chapter correspond to a discussion of the key 
formalist idea of each major theorist: nesting, enactment, intra-action and torsion. Each section has 
three components, consisting of: 1) a description of how each theorist does essentially qualify as 
formalist through an explication of the corresponding key formalist idea; 2) an explanation of how 
the theorist’s formalism intersects with the challenges identified in chapter two; and, finally 3) 
which aspects of the disciplinary intervention the key formalist idea helps to justify 
methodologically. Altogether, these sections begin to demonstrate the full capability of broad 




Caroline Levine posits in Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network (2015) a new formalism 
that casts both politics, broadly conceived as social arrangements, and art as functions of form and, 
hence, of one another. As such, politics and aesthetics are “nested inside one another” such that 
“each is capable of disturbing the other’s organizing power” (16-17; emphasis added). Positing 
form as having both political and aesthetic dimensions in turn “dissolves” the “traditionally 
troubling gap between the form of the literary text and its content and context” (Levine 2). While 
it is hardly a stretch – indeed, it is eminently fitting – to think of aesthetics in formal terms, doing 
so with politics is a harder sell. Levine develops a formalist account of politics from three thinkers: 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger (1947-), Michel Foucault (1926 - 1984), and Jacques Rancière (1940 
-). Unger, a legal theorist, promotes an understanding of politics that rejects any overarching deep 
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causal structures, preferring a vision of political systems as a patchwork affair lacking any sort of 
overarching coherence. Unger’s political world is one where forms sometimes reinforce or cancel 
out one another, but always collide. Unger’s vision contrasts with that of Michel Foucault who 
argues in Discipline and Punish (1975) for a central organization that recruits forms from diverse 
sources to impose order. Though Levine appreciates Foucault’s attention to the intricacies and 
unexpected developments of this formal recruitment, she reaches the opposite conclusion about it, 
namely, that it results not in a centralized order but rather in the patchwork, highly disorganized 
vision that Unger favors. Finally, Levine looks to Rancière’s reading of Rosa Parks in his Hatred 
of Democracy (2005) to envision political action as nothing more or less than formal 
rearrangement.  
 In total, Levine’s formalism presents nothing less than a picture of reality as a single plane 
on which any given form can travel, perform contradictory functions and interact with other forms. 
The term recruited to talk about the complex behavior of forms on a single plane is affordance. 
Borrowing affordance from design theory, where the term is used to describe the “potential uses 
or actions latent in materials and designs,” Levine defines it for formalist purposes as “the limited 
range of potentialities” to which a form lays claim. These ranges can reroute, reinforce or 
contradict one another. One of the affordances Levine claims for fictional works is the rendering 
of theory. While acknowledging, the seeming “pervers[ity]” of discovering theory in fiction, 
Levine nevertheless makes an etymological justification for the proposition by pointing out that 
the Greek word theoria connotes a “looking at,” “spectacle,” or “contemplation” (134). Such an 
understanding of theoria in relation to fictional works becomes even more plausible when 
considered alongside the phenomenon of nesting political forms. The nesting creates the theory-
rendering spectacle.  
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A comparison of two works of drama shows how. Arthur Schnitzler’s Professor Bernhardi 
(1912) and Henrik Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People (1883) may be said to nest political forms that 
collide with the forms of medicine practiced by the respective protagonists. In so doing, they render 
theories about the inherently political nature of medical practice. In the case of Professor 
Bernhardi, a play both published and set in early twentieth-century Vienna, the nested political 
form is the distribution of duties between two institutions: the hospital and the Catholic church. 
This distribution appears in the first act of Schnitzler’s play when the titular Professor Bernhardi 
cares for a young woman with a case of septicemia, the result, the doctors confirm, of “an illegal 
procedure” (Schnitzler 293). The infection has advanced too far to be cleared up and the woman 
faces certain death. Surprisingly, Dr. Bernhardi notes she is in a state of euphoria, supposing 
herself cured. To protect her cheerful mood on the brink of her imminent death, Professor 
Bernhardi intervenes when a priest comes to administer last rights, asserting that because she does 
not expect to die, the sight of a clergyman would induce needless panic. To Bernhardi’s professed 
duty of “ensur[ing] that as a far as possible [his] patients are allowed to die happily,” the priest 
counters with, “we probably mean quite different things by [die happily], Professor” (307). Where 
Bernhardi sees dying happily as a panic-free death, the priest grounds a happy death in the 
knowledge of absolution from sin, which, in the woman’s case, she has incurred from her abortion.  
The two definitions of dying happy are formally incompatible. For the priest, this 
incompatibility poses no issues as the two conflicting forms exist in separate realms: medicine, he 
reasons, has jurisdiction over life, the church has jurisdiction over the after-life. Indeed, having 
offered to withdraw only in the event the young woman could still be cured, the priest establishes 
that presiding over death is a duty that does not fall under a physician’s professional jurisdiction, 
in which case the Catholic Church’s understanding of “dying happily” would supersede 
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Bernhardi’s. Both priest and physician remain firm in their convictions, but ultimately Bernhardi 
is overruled and the young woman dies the panicked death Bernhardi hoped to spare her. The 
instance of Bernhardi, a Jew, interfering with the sacred rites of the official religion of the state is 
compounded by the fact that the patient’s death resulted from a procedure outlawed by that 
religion. Bernhardi’s actions set off a firestorm of scandal that first removes him from his post as 
head of the hospital and culminates with the humiliation of a public trial and, finally, 
imprisonment. In the fulfillment of what he understands as his professional duties, Bernhardi 
becomes nothing less than a political prisoner.  
The most prominent political forms nested in Ibsen’s 1883 play An Enemy of the People 
include the board of the municipal baths of a small, northern Norwegian village as well as the 
spatial relations generated by the bath’s geographic location in the town. Though there is perhaps 
little doubt about the political nature of the former, the political nature of the latter might be harder 
to grasp. With an understanding of political struggles that includes “ongoing contests over the 
proper places for bodies, goods, and capacities,” the physical placement of the baths is entirely 
political (Levine 3). In the play, the bath is located near a tannery, making the former vulnerable 
to the toxic waste produced by the latter. As a question of arrangement, it is also, of course, 
inherently formal. The bath’s physical location sets off a collision between the board of the 
municipal baths and the play’s protagonist and the baths’ staff physician, Dr. Tomas Stockmann, 
who identifies bacterial contamination in the waters, the result of toxic waste from the tannery. Dr. 
Stockmann approaches the board with his findings, only to be coerced into suppressing them by 
its managerial front, his brother, the mayor, Peter Stockmann. Peter urges his brother to suppress 
it on the grounds that the bad publicity would sink the baths. Moreover, the cost to re-lay the water 
system would be so prohibitively expensive as to destroy the town’s fragile economic upswing. 
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Unmoved, Dr. Stockmann persists in his campaign, only to find his former allies in the press and 
in various other town institutions vanish. At the explosive public meeting that comprises the fourth 
act, the townspeople vote unanimously in favor of a motion to identify Dr. Stockmann as the enemy 
of the people for his efforts to stem a public health catastrophe.  
By their nesting of political forms, both Enemy and Bernhardi theorize the steep political 
consequences of fulfilling two duties that fall outside a strictly biomedical understanding of 
medicine: assuring a happy or peaceful death and advocating for hygienic infrastructure. In so 
doing, both plays may be said to disturb the biomedical, or any ideology of the medical profession 
for that matter, that would deny the necessity or even the presence of political action or social 
justice work in medicine. To the contrary, a medicine that would include, at the very minimum, 
these two duties would already be inescapably and inherently political. Such is the theory that the 
plays’ respective nesting of political forms can be said to put forth.  
The role of imaginative works can play in theorizing in turn intersects with one of the major 
challenges identified in the previous chapter: lack of high impact theorizing. General Systems 
Theory registers perhaps the strongest indicator of this lack by having declined to imagine a new 
vision of reality than that laid out by reality’s segmentation into the conventional disciplines. 
Sheldon Wolin, alongside his critique of systems thinking for understanding political life, 
emphasizes the crucial role that imagination plays in theorizing. This role is a function of the 
multiple interpretations that facts can admit. “[For] [n]othing,” Wolin stresses, “is more necessary 
as a condition of theorizing than that facts not be univocal. If they were, creativity and imagination 
would play a small role and it would be appropriate to speak of theorizing as a banal activity, as 
‘theory-construction.’” (1073). Wolin’s emphasis on the creativity of theorizing would seem not 
only to not only justify the role that imaginative works play in theorizing but also to confirm why 
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nesting in a literary text is so important to that theorizing. The nesting of seemingly brute facts like 
social arrangements reveals their polyvocality.  
It is for this reason that in the pursuit of theoretical understanding of disciplinary 
fragmentation in the Flexnerian enterprise, Chapter Four considers Arrowsmith – Sinclair Lewis’ 
1926 novel about the enterprise – alongside the forms that govern the three arms of the Flexnerian 
enterprise. Just as Professor Bernhardi and Enemy respectively nest a distribution of duties and 
geographic location of a municipal bath, so does Arrowsmith nest numerous forms, including the 
bureaucratic written forms of the Flexnerian enterprise. Their nesting in Arrowsmith helps to 
release their polyvocality, which in turn makes it less plausible to distinguish them from aesthetic 
forms, the polyvocality of which has long been celebrated. Regarding bureaucratic forms and 
aesthetic forms as differently the same is no doubt disorienting. Nevertheless, Levine points out 
that the bureaucratic form “haunts – and is haunted by – its aesthetic other” (98). One possible 
corollary of this mutual haunting is that bureaucratic forms would deserve the same critical 
scrutiny as that reserved for the aesthetic forms of a novel or poem. Allan Peterkin's critique of a 
medical intake form in A Health Humanities Reader (2014) given in Figure 5 gives an impression 
of what might said about one of medicine’s many bureaucratic forms and how it might be critiqued. 











While the criticism of this fabricated intake form verges on the silly by identifying their blood type 
as “red” and by suggesting that patients be given the option to use their “drag name” or “porn 
name,” other aspects of it point about the very serious political theorizing that the forms 
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accomplish. The form makes both positive discriminatory assumptions (marital status and the 
corresponding legal issues such as insurance coverage and medical power of attorney) and equally 
hurtful negative omissions related to identity and comfort with revealing that identity to a medical 
practitioner. The positive insertion of questions about identity and the coming out process makes 
these parts – the form’s negative space – visible. In total, the forms theorize about gender politics 
even as they perform the perfunctory functions that justified their creation. The Flexnerian forms 
likewise theorize about discipline, which is to say, the categories of applied and pure, hard and 
soft, life and nonlife, even as they perform their respective functions. Their theorizing about 
discipline only goes far, however, justifying the need for the theorizing that Arrowsmith 
accomplishes by nesting them.  
 
3.3 ENACTMENT  
 
Annemarie Mol’s The Body Multiple (2002) is an ethnography made uncommon by what it seeks 
to observe: atherosclerosis. Where ethnographies have traditionally examined groups of people, 
Body Multiple shifts attention away from people to a common disease. People do not disappear, 
however, and in fact they figure more prominently than might be expected in the ethnography’s 
answer to the deceptively simple central question it raises: what is atherosclerosis? To arrive at an 
answer, Body Multiple alternates between research spaces and patient care spaces, traversing 
between the exam room, the operating room and the pathology laboratory, among others. In the 
exam room, atherosclerosis is the recounting of pain while walking or, more generally, its 
interruption of any daily activity. In the laboratory, however, atherosclerosis appears to be 
something markedly different. Since there are no patients to be found in the laboratory, 
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atherosclerosis cannot be what it is in the exam room. Instead, it is the image of a thickened 
vascular intimas under the microscope. Yet despite their stark differences, both are a function of 
various practices. It is in tracing these practices that Mol’s uncommon ethnography of a common 
disease is more properly understood as a praxiography.  
 The sense of practice evoked in the altered root – praxia – must be distinguished from 
clinical practice. Whereas clinical practice can refer but is not limited to assessing, diagnosing and 
prescribing, the praxia in which Mol is interested veers more toward the meaning imparted by the 
original Greek, namely, a more general doing. It is a general notion of doing that leads to the 
conception of practice in formalist terms. If, as Levine indicates, affordance is what a form is 
“capable of doing,” any praxis – which is to say, any doing – must, conversely, exist among the 
range of possibilities given to any given pattern or arrangement. Counter-intuitively, one such 
praxis is the disease at the center of Mol’s ethnography: atherosclerosis. If Mol’s ethnography 
seeks to study the practicalities of doing disease, which is to say, to all of the behaviors, statements, 
implements, spaces, timings and data that afford the disease, then disease can never stand alone as 
a discrete object or state. Against the biomedical picture of disease as a localizable, material 
somatic defect, atherosclerosis is instead an affordance of complex arrangements involving but in 
no way limited to physicians, blood pressure cuffs, arterial plaque, technicians, data, patients, 
complaints, exam rooms, microscopes, dyes, and glass slides. Mol’s unbracketing of an ostensibly 
discrete element – the disease of atherosclerosis – only begins to reveal the complex arrangements 
– the form – of which that disease is an affordance. Considering disease as an affordance 
necessarily formalizes medical practice, which is to say, makes medical practice a question of 
form.  
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Out of this praxiographic, which is to say formal inquiry into atherosclerosis, arises a need 
for a term that relates the doings Mol seeks to describe and the ontological issues she wants to 
explore through these descriptions. In short, do these practices, say, perform or construct disease? 
Mol chooses neither, instead opting for enact. Rejecting “construct” on the grounds that its 
workshop connotation would clumsily confer a sense of assemblage on atherosclerosis, along with 
“perform” on the grounds that its theatrical connotation invokes a more real reality of 
atherosclerosis hiding backstage, Mol chooses “enact” because it “suggests that in the act, and 
only then and there, something is” (33). The etymology of enact, the combination of “in” and “act,” 
supports Mol’s deployment of it for her purposes. Bolstering her argument about enacting disease 
by gesturing to work on gender identity, Mol emphasizes the many things that, according to such 
work, require the practice of gender identity as well as how “the pervasive and the mundane acts 
in which [identity is practiced] make people what they are” (37 italics mine). Likewise, 
atherosclerosis, or any other disease for that matter, consists of many things and acts that together 
make the disease what it is. But while Mol’s ethnography no doubt demonstrates the myriad of 
things involved in atherosclerosis, what is conspicuously missing from her praxiography are the 
pervasive and mundane bureaucratic forms that, for Levine, are haunted by an aesthetic other. This 
form-mediated governance would not emerge in Mol’s ethnography that, by definition, strives to 
engage non-written documents any more than behaviors would figure in Levine’s new formalism. 
Therefore, putting Mol and Levine together under the heading of a radical formalism helps to fill 
in the gaps missing in each.  
 Further bringing the two together, Mol situates what I suggest is her formalist idea of 
medical practice in a landscape akin to Levine’s flat plane of formal disorganization when she 
cites Bruno Latour’s idea of chains of associations – network-forming chains whose “coherence 
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is a material and practical matter, not a question of logic” (64). The text from which she adapts the 
term – Latour’s The Pasteurization of France (1984) – describes how Pasteur’s invention of the 
vaccine did not unilaterally impose itself on medical practitioners but rather spread through 
associations. Though farmers readily allied themselves to vaccination for the simple reason they 
had something to gain (vaccination protected livestock), doctors resisted it until a vaccine market 
was established and they could use vaccines in privacy. Latour’s findings move Mol to conclude 
that science does not have the power to unilaterally impose itself on medicine. Actors outside the 
laboratory or other spaces in which scientific knowledge is produced, be they farmers or 
physicians, “do not get overwhelmed by a massive structure or a coherent episteme” (64). Rather, 
chains of associations take the place of these massive structures of coherent bodies of thought.  
Considering the forms from all three arms of the Flexnerian enterprise attempts to 
understand the possible institutional constraints that bind the activities of research, medical 
education and patient care. Putting all of forms together also attempts to honor Mol’s contention 
that “in practice, such diverse phenomena [as atherosclerotic plaque, blood or flesh, forms or 
conversations, work hours, or insurance schemes] do not belong to different orders. It makes no 
sense to delegate them to separate layers of reality” (155). Likewise, the three arms of the 
Flexnerian enterprise do not exist in layers: research is not the foundation of medical education, 
which is not the foundation of clinical practice. Instead, the three activities exist on a single plane 
on which their respective forms collide and reroute one another.  
Where Mol conducted an ethnography on non-textual practices comprising the medical 
care and handling of a single disease, Chapter Four of this dissertation engages in a text-centered 
analysis that broadens out from patient care to include the institutionally interconnected activities 
of medical research and medical education. Where Mol does anthropology philosophically, the 
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disciplinary intervention of chapter four does literary analysis anthropologically and 
philosophically. The anthropological aspect of this work derives from the fact that the Flexnerian 
forms were culled primarily from my experiences in each of the three arms of the Flexnerian 
enterprise. My role as an MD/PhD student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
College of Medicine constitutes the experience in the medical education arm. My role as a clinic 
manager of a nearby medical facility, Avicenna Community Health Center, constitutes the 
experience in the patient care arm. Finally, my role as a participant in the undergraduate research 
fellowship offered by the University of Kansas Medical Center’s Pharmacology and Toxicology 
department constitutes the experience in the research arm. The philosophical aspect derives from 
the work of considering the role of these forms in enacting disciplinary fragmentation throughout 
the Flexnerian enterprise.  
 
3.4 INTRA-ACTION  
 
Karen Barad develops her notion of intra-action on the basis of an important experiment in physics: 
the double-slit experiment. The experiment is attributed to both Thomas Young, who, in 1801, 
first performed the experiment on light under the theoretical assumptions of classical optics, as 
well as to Clinton Davisson and Lester Germer, whose adaption of the experiment for electrons 
helped establish the experiment as a bedrock of quantum physics. In both experiments, the basic 
physical phenomenon in question is diffraction. A standard physics definition identifies diffraction 
as the bending of waves as they pass through barriers. Many experiments in physics in fact deal 
with diffraction. What is notable about the double-slit experiment performed on electrons is that it 
establishes diffraction where, per the understanding of classical physics, it should not be. The 
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double-slit experiment indeed proves that electrons exhibit wave-like properties despite the 
longstanding classical assumption that they were particles. The double-slit experiment thus gives 
evidence for the wave-particle duality of electrons, a contradiction forbidden by classical physics. 
An equally disconcerting and interlocking revelation of the double slit-experiment is that the 
apparatuses of which it consists had a role in shaping the nature of the object – electrons – that it 
purported to study objectively.  
One of the figures that first proposed this and other novel conceptions of the apparatuses 
of experimentation was Niels Bohr, the early twentieth-century physicist responsible for a quantum 
understanding of matter. Bohr practiced an inextricably linked physics-philosophy, that is, a 
rigorous philosophical understanding of the significant para- or meta-scientific implications of his 
physics research. In the course of his philosophy-physics, Bohr generated insights that counter-
intuitively unseated the conceptual basis of scientific experimentation: “according to Bohr, 
theoretical concepts (e.g., “position” and “momentum”) are not ideational in character but rather 
are specific physical arrangements” (Barad 814, italics in original). That is, the central importance 
of the experimental devices by which, say, position and momentum are measured does not allow 
for either to be pre-existing properties of objectives, which is to say, objective referents to which 
ideational concepts refer. In this way, Bohr’s reflections confer a formal, perhaps even aesthetic 
character on a scientific process that, by the name given to it, already seems prepared to accept 
these characterizations. Indeed, experimental design signals nothing if not a very carefully 
considered, very strategically planned arrangement of elements. In the case of the double-slit 
experiment that Barad takes as emblematic of intra-action, the principal design element of the 
experiment – the grating – has a say in what form the experiment’s object – light – will take. Far 
from light possessing pre-existing, determinate properties that would justify its characterization by 
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the equally pre-existing, determinate concept “wave,” the double-slit experiment is instead an 
intra-action, a “mutual constitution of objects and agencies of observation” (Barad 197).   
This mutual constitution bears significantly on one of the challenges with which General 
Systems Theory (GST) admits it had long wrestled: distinguishing or defining the object of its 
research, the system. In the second thesis from the eleven GST theses given by Waelchli, it is the 
human observer who conceptually distinguishes a system based on some boundary that allows it 
to be distinguished, at least conceptually, from its environment. The problem of distinguishing 
research objects from everything surrounding them is one of the oldest in all of scientific 
experimentation. Anne Fausto-Sterling evokes as much in her reflections on the difficulties of 
isolating the corpus callosum, a tract of the brain that is notoriously hard to distinguish from its 
surrounding brain structures. On the practice of creating isolatable, objects for scientific 
experimentation, Fausto-Sterling writes that “this challenge itself is nothing new. Pasteur had to 
bring his microbes into the laboratory before he could study them. Morgan had to domesticate the 
fruit fly before he could create modern Mendelian genetics” (Fausto-Sterling 121). The nature of 
this challenge raises a perennial, seemingly inescapable anxiety about the extent to which a system, 
a corpus callosum, a microbe or a fruit fly has a real existence in the world, or more precisely, 
whether their discreteness has a real existence.  
The formalism of intra-action would say that this discreteness is only real upon its relation 
with an experimental apparatus or agency of observation. This view resonates with Mol’s 
contention that “in practices objects are enacted” (32-33). With respect to the question of what an 
object is in its hypothetical state before the intra-actions of practice, the first key formalist term of 
this chapter – affordance – proves helpful. A hypothetical, pre-relational object is nothing more or 
less than the range of potentialities and latent possibilities specified under the term affordance. 
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This understanding of affordance helps to answer a crucial question raised by the forthcoming 
discussion of chapter four, namely, the question of how that chapter’s objects – Flexnerian forms 
– afford disciplinary fragmentation. Disciplinary fragmentation can, as it were, only be one of 
many possibilities available to the Flexnerian forms. It can never be a fixed property of them. 
Chapter Four’s discussion about them in relation to the Biglan categories only serves to elucidate 
disciplinary fragmentation as a latent possibility of these forms. It is the intra-action of the forms 
and the Biglan categories that produces evidence that disciplinary fragmentation figures among 
the Flexnerian form’s affordances.  
 
3.5 TORSION  
 
The justification of Elizabeth Grosz as a formalist rests on the conceptual means by which she 
avoids dualism in her articulation of the relationship between mind and body in her 1994 Volatile 
Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. To pull off this feat, Grosz draws inspiration from an 
intriguing mathematical form called the Möbius strip (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: The Möbius Strip by M.C. Escher 
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Discovered by German mathematician August Ferdinand Möbius in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the form that bears his name has many important geometrical properties, including one-sidedness 
when embedded in Euclidean three-dimensional space. The idea of a strip having not two but one 
side violates basic notions of inside and outside, or for that matter, front and back. Equally counter-
intuitive, the Möbius strip has the property of being unorientable. Understood in the mathematical 
sense, orientability refers to the possibility of consistently constructing a perpendicular line at 
every point along the surface of a geometrical figure. Understood another way, the Möbius strip’s 
non-orientability allows for a rotation of a two-dimensional image along its surface such that a 
complete cycle, which is to say, a full course along its surface, renders both the two-dimensional 
image and its non-superimposable mirror image, as Figure 7 illustrates:  




Finally, the Möbius strip – a three-dimensional form – has the property of having only one 
boundary, such that the boundary is the topological equivalent of a two-dimensional form – a 
circle. That the Möbius strip inscribes a two-dimensional form in three-dimensional space no doubt 
constitutes a part of its deeply paradoxical implications.  
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Together, these three properties – a circular boundary, non-orientability and one-sidedness 
– have dissolving implications for back and front, inside and outside, image and non-
superimposable mirror image. It is for this reason that the Möbius strip serves as a powerful, if 
startling conceptual tool to invert the primacy of mind over body in accounts of subjectivity. The 
strip, Grosz writes, indeed facilitates a “rethinking [of] the relations between the inside and outside 
of the subject, its psychical interior and its corporeal exterior, by showing not their fundamental 
identity or reducibility but the torsion of the one into the other, the passage, vector, or 
uncontrollable drift of the inside into the outside and the outside into the inside” (Grosz xii, italics 
mine). In one passage, Grosz invokes the Möbius strip in her description of what she calls double 
sensation. Indeed, the phenomenon of double sensation represents, for Grosz, a site where a 
Möbius-like mind-body torsion occurs. Defined as sensations “in which the subject utilizes one 
part of the body to touch another,” double sensation occurs at cutaneous openings at the bodily 
surface (35). It is on the basis of the double sensation that these openings permit, Grosz speculates, 
that cutaneous openings figure “disproportionately” in Freud’s psychosexual stages of maturation 
(35). Conceiving of maturation as the increasing recognition of a distinction between an external 
state and an internal state, orifices are the “pivot points” around which that distinction turns (36).   
  The torsion of the Möbius strip helps to resolve the troubling questions of how to relate a 
subject’s internal knowing and object’s external boundaries: subject and object are bound by the 
Möbius strip’s torsion-like dynamic. It is this dynamic that perhaps underlies their mutual 
constitution. Moreover, the notion of torsion helps balance Mol’s praxiographic account of 
knowledge: “the ethnographic study of practices does not search for knowledge in subjects who 
have it in their minds and may talk about it. Instead, it locates knowledge primarily in activities, 
events, buildings, instruments, procedures and so on” (Mol 32). Möbius-like torsion helps to 
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reconcile the externality that Mol posits for knowledge with the cognitive internality that the 
learning of knowledge implies. That is, torsion describes the manner by which external entities 
like activities, events, buildings, instruments and procedures interact with the ostensibly internal 
processes of mind to form knowledge. In this way, the patterns of the Flexnerian forms could be 
seen as mind-forming and thereby could be understood to afford the cognitive styles that Biglan 









4.1 THE CONSOLIDATION OF BIGLAN COGNITIVE STYLES 
 
In the effort to make an intervention in disciplinary politics on behalf of holistic healthcare, this 
chapter seeks to understand how disciplinary fragmentation might operate in the Flexnerian 
enterprise. If disciplinary fragmentation refers to the categorical separation of cognitive styles 
along the lines of the applied-pure, hard-soft and life-nonlife distinctions, then the various forms 
that govern the activities of research, patient care and medical education help consolidate this 
splitting in the Flexnerian enterprise. Suspending notions of deep causality, the three Biglan 
dimensions do not act on behalf of some all-encompassing, all-powerful structure that dictates the 
configuration of the forms and insidiously inserts fragmenting gaps into them. Rather the forms 
simply do the work of creating disciplinary fragmentation by manifesting patterns of the Biglan 
categories. Put another way, one of these forms’ affordances – affordance being the range of 
capabilities to which a form lays claim – is fragmentation along Biglan lines.  
To be sure, disciplinary fragmentation is not all that these nine basic forms do or afford. 
Written medical school exams, electronic medical records, peer-reviewed journals, medical school 
learning objectives, evidence hierarchies, medical textbooks, objective-structured clinical 
examinations (OSCEs), cultural competence materials and institutional review board (IRB) 
guidelines in fact afford a lot. Written exams hierarchize by distinguishing unlicensed student from 
licensed physician; electronic medical records sort by organizing vast quantities of personal 
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information into pre-fabricated categories; IRB guidelines select by determining what research 
projects proceed and which ones do not. Few would argue these affordances satisfy the purposes 
that the anonymous authors of these forms had in mind when they wrote them. Yet as the concept 
of affordance makes clear, a form is by no means limited to its intended uses as it possesses a range 
of capabilities, some of which are quite unexpected.  
Like forms in the bureaucratic sense of the world – tax forms, immigration forms, 
registration forms – the set of nine Flexnerian forms discussed in chapter four are both pervasive 
and mundane. As such, they have traditionally existed as the opposites of the aesthetic forms 
encountered in novels, poetry, drama and other literary texts. Yet by furnishing a discussion that 
considers the pervasive and mundane forms governing the Flexnerian enterprise alongside Sinclair 
Lewis’ Arrowsmith, a novel written just at the Flexnerian enterprise’s completion in the 1920’s, 
this chapter elucidates the mutual nesting of aesthetic forms, the binary forms of the Biglan 
oppositions and pervasive, mundane forms of the Flexnerian enterprise. The counterintuitive 
nature of mutual nesting is fully appreciated upon realizing that if Arrowsmith nests the Biglan 
categories as well as the pervasive and the mundane forms of the Flexnerian enterprise, then 
Flexnerian forms also nest what could be called the aesthetic.  
The purposive deployment of language being a necessary precondition of aesthetic literary 
production, each mundane form’s use of language to achieve certain purposes qualifies them for 
the critical interpretations traditionally reserved for literary texts. Though such interpretations of 
non-fictional texts might conventionally fall under the purview of rhetorical analysis, framing a 
discussion that moves between Arrowsmith and these Flexnerian forms as commentary that 
articulates mutual nesting rather than as some hybrid rhetorico-literary criticism helps dispel any 
essential difference between the texts while moving them toward a more recursive relation. In the 
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recursive domain, fiction and nonfiction, literary analysis and rhetorical analysis would not be 
distinguished by a categorical difference but rather exist together in a state of difference-in-
sameness. It is in this recursive domain that the theoretical affordances of the Flexnerian forms 
and Arrowsmith can work together to elucidate something as elusive as disciplinary fragmentation 
in the Flexnerian enterprise.  
  
4.2 CONSOLIDATING APPLIED-PURE COGNITIVE STYLES: WRITTEN MEDICAL 
SCHOOL EXAMINATIONS AND MNEMONICS, THE ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORD 
AND PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL ARTICLES 
 
The applied-pure dimension of the Biglan Model corresponds to the subject matter characteristic 
of use. Written medical examinations, electronic medical records and peer-reviewed journals 
exhibit their own patterns of use and thereby demonstrate the conserved yet changing nature of the 
corresponding Biglan distinction. In the case of written examinations, the applied-pure pattern 
manifests as the distinction between immediate clinical use and lifelong learning, a pattern that 
also carries over into the forms that become necessary for exam preparation: mnemonics. 
Similarly, the manifestation in Electronic Medical Records (EMR’s) is the organization of 
information relevant to rendering a diagnosis versus information that could possibly only help 
render the diagnosis. Finally, peer-reviewed journal articles enact the Biglan distinction in 
deference to the exigencies of use-inspired basic research. Together, these forms help consolidate 




4.2:1 Written Medical School Examinations – The Applied-Pure in Medical Education 
 
 
Written examinations are at once the most pervasive and consequential forms governing medical 
education, at least for medical students. Most of the exams a medical student will take are in-house, 
which is to say, written and developed by the faculty at their respective medical schools. All in-
house exams may be regarded as cumulative preparation for the national, standardized licensing 
exams. Since the Flexnerian revolution of the early twentieth century, licensing exams have taken 
several forms, the most recent of which being the United States Medical Licensing Examination 
(USMLE). The USMLE is administered in three stages, known as Steps 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
Adopted in 1992, the USMLE Step 1 replaced both the National Medical Board Examination 
(NMBE) Part I, “a battery of end-of-course examinations in seven basic science disciplines” 
(Swanson et al. 553) as well as the Federation Licensing Examination (FLEX), a three-day 
assessment of basic science, clinical science, and clinical competence first made available to states 
on a voluntary basis in June 1968 (Heywood 2). Upon the phase out of NBME Part I and FLEX in 
1994, the USMLE became the sole avenue of licensure available to allopathic physicians.  
Writing in September 1992 in anticipation of the imminent USMLE launch, a panel of 
expert USMLE writer-coordinators describes how it navigates the complex relationship between 
the board exams and medical school curricula. An illustration of the anxieties surrounding this 
relationship, one of the most common questions they receive revolves around whether licensing 
exams reflect what is taught versus what should be taught. The question is “awkward” insofar as 
the former would incur accusations of “preventing educational innovation”; the latter, accusations 
of “driving the curriculum” (554). Noting in 1992 that the dilemma raised by this question has 
“worsened over the past few years,” the intervening decades since the USMLE launch have 
probably made consensus seem even more remote given the calls to integrate the knowledge of 
 117 
non-scientific disciplines, including the social sciences and humanities, have only increased in 
both quantity and volume (554). That the dilemma was as awkward as it was in 1992 becomes all 
the more remarkable given the exam’s scope was limited to the basic sciences. Indeed, basic 
science dominates the stated purpose of Step 1, which is to “assess whether an examinee 
understands and can apply key concepts of basic biomedical science, with an emphasis on 
principles and mechanisms of health, disease, and modes of therapy” (555). Encouraging “broad” 
interpretation of these words, the authors specify that the material assessed by Step 1 includes but 
may not be limited to topics with “immediate clinical application” as well as scientific concepts 
and principles “necessary for lifelong learning” (555). The authors justify the latter’s importance 
by generally conceiving such knowledge as “long-term investments.” Upon the distinction 
between questions that test concepts for the immediacy of clinical application and the remoteness 
of lifelong learning, the licensing exam enacts applied and pure cognitive styles  
In order to appreciate the questions properly, a view of the scope and structure of the STEP 
1 exam is necessary. The NBME furnishes such a view through a description of the exam, which 
is best visualized as a grid (see Table 2 below). The horizontal axis of this grid includes the 
following twelve organ systems: 1) immune system; 2) blood and lymphoreticular system; 3) 
behavioral health, nervous system, and special senses; 4) skin and subcutaneous tissue; 5) 
musculoskeletal system; 6) cardiovascular system; 7) respiratory system; 8) gastrointestinal 
system; 9) renal and urinary system; 10) pregnancy, childbirth, and the puerperium; 10) female 
reproductive and breast; 11) male reproductive and 12) the endocrine system. Joining the organ 
systems along the horizontal axis are 1) general principles of foundational science, 2) multisystem 
(i.e. multi-organ) disorders, 3) topics in biostatics and epidemiology/public health, and finally, 4) 
topics in the social sciences. The vertical axis relates to processes, including normal processes, 
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abnormal processes and principles of therapeutics, or the process of therapeutic interventions. The 
two axes cut across each other to render a complex network of scenarios students must navigate in 
order to pass the exam. Students must be prepared to answer questions related to the normal 
functioning, abnormal functioning and associated treatment for any of the thirteen organ systems 
of the body. They must also learn to see these processes, albeit to a much lesser extent, on the 
levels of the total person (multi-system), interpersonal or group interactions (social sciences), and 
entire populations (biostatistics and epidemiology). The grid generated by these two axes is 
populated with knowledge from both the traditionally defined disciplines and interdisciplinary 
areas that the NBME lists in its description of exam content. The traditionally defined disciplines 
include anatomy, behavioral sciences, biochemistry, biostatistics and epidemiology, microbiology, 
pathology, pharmacology and physiology whereas the “interdisciplinary areas” aging, genetics, 
immunology, molecular and cell biology, and nutrition.  
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Therapeutics  
 














  Axis 1: Levels 
 
 Absent the direct look at an actual USMLE STEP 1 exam, which exam security prohibits, 
the sample questions released by the NBME to help medical students prepare for the real thing 
serve as a suitable surrogate to understand the form’s patterns of use. The February 2018 booklet 
of sample questions features 117 multiple choice questions. Most of the questions consist of five 
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possible responses, but some will occasionally give six and others four. An example of a question 
that can be taken as one testing knowledge of immediate clinical application is given by Figure 8. 
The question tasks the student with rendering a diagnosis by synthesizing both textual data and 
visual data in the form of a pathology slide:  
Figure 8: Example of an immediate clinical application question 
 
In the eight-sentence question stem, the information necessary to answer the question constitutes 
a small narrative. The first sentence indicates the patient’s age, sex and the fact of his hospital 
admittance. Though officially given as information by which to arrive at a correct diagnosis, 
information regarding the age and sex of the patient nevertheless situates patient-hood in a 
temporal and gendered space. The hospital stay, on the other hand, creates the institutional 
conditions of possibility for the photomicrographs. The fact that the patient will die in the hospital 
immediately places him in a network whereby his cadaver will be dissected by pathologists to 
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produce the slides. The next two sentences provide additional temporal details – a six-week period 
of pain and diarrhea as well as complications three days into his hospital stay – both of which 
strengthen a sense of temporal situatedness. The next sentence introduces the crucial turn that, 
under the given institutional conditions of possibility, create the question: the patient must die in 
the question-stem’s “plot” in order for pathologists to analyze his internal organs and thereby 
produce the photomicrographs. The stipulation that he received “appropriate care” rhetorically 
protects the legitimacy of biomedicine in face of the patient’s death, necessary as it is for the 
question. These details make the remaining sentences describing the pathology results legible: 
following this narrative, the results can be easily followed.  
 An example of a lifelong learning question is given in Figure 9. The question tests the 
student’s knowledge of a basic research technique – the Southern blot – in accordance with the 
expectation that she will remain familiar with emerging biomedical research, which could require 
some understanding of this and other advanced research techniques.  
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Figure 9: Example of a lifelong learning question 
 
Compared to the question stem of the immediate clinical application question, the lifelong learning 
question is a-temporal, institution-less, and disembodied. The first sentence uses passive voice to 
make the technique the central focus of the question and yet in so doing removes the body 
performing the analysis. Though a human form – “the investigator” – does appear in the subsequent 
sentence, it lacks body, gender, age or any other attribute, save for the implied ability to decide 
how to probe the digestion products. There is also no sense of the institutional conditions in which 
the experiment unfolds. There is however one salient common feature between it and the 
immediate applicability question. Just as the clinical application question includes a stipulation 
that “appropriate care” preceded the patient’s death, so too does the final sentence of the lifelong 
learning question stipulate that “there were no technical errors.” Both statements shore up the 
legitimacy of biomedicine, particularly in the instance where the outcome following medical 
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treatment was death. The similarity ends there for in the application question the stipulation is a 
positive – “there was appropriate care” – whereas in the lifelong learning question it is a negative 
– “there were no technical errors.”  
 This and the other aesthetic differences between the two questions enact or afford the 
applied-pure cognitive styles. The two questions do not just highlight mere material differences 
between the “purity” of the basic research disciplines – biology, biochemistry, microbiology – and 
the “applicability” of medicine: the applied-pure opposition is more than just a function of the 
latter dealing with Southern blots, the former with bodies in pain, bloody diarrhea and pathology 
slides. In these questions, the difference is every bit as stark as that between urgent immediacy and 
abstract deferral. The applicability question has temporality, embodiment, an institution and 
positive assertion; the lifelong learning question is a-temporal, unembodied, a-spatial and features 
a negative denial. The question is also concrete yet teleological: the details that make it concrete 
are only there to build toward the objective of the question, which includes the ability to read and 
interpret photomicrographs so as to arrive at a diagnosis, a much if not the most sought-after payoff 
in medicine, as the next section on the electronic medical record will demonstrate. The lifelong 
learning question, while still teleological, does not payoff as a diagnosis does. The payoff of a 
lifelong learning question is, by definition, deferred when payoff is narrowly defined as a benefit 
to human health. The stark contrast between the immediate payoff of a diagnosis and the deferment 
of a basic research technique affords applied and pure cognitive styles, respectively.  
The gap between immediate application and lifelong learning extends to the practice of 
learning and preparing for exams by mnemonics. While hardly associated with exams in any 
official capacity, mnemonics nevertheless surrounds medical school exams in the practice of 
studying. Indeed, the preferred review book for the USMLE STEP 1, known colloquially as “First-
 123 
Aid,” abounds with them. As memory devices – or cognitive forms – that allow for rapid 
consolidation of varying quantities of related information at once fragmentarily distinct yet easy 
to confuse and difficult to recall, mnemonics proliferate in medical school where tremendous 
quantities of such material are tested in short periods of time. Lewis uses a scene about the 
voluminous anatomical knowledge expected of medical students to nest in Arrowsmith the formal 
interplay of exam and mnemonic. Anatomical knowledge takes the form of “lists of names” – that 
is to say, names of innumerable muscles, nerves, bones – and it is these lists “which enable a man 
to crawl through exams and become an Educated person” (Lewis 20). Yet these lists must be 
memorized, a necessity that “unknown sages” addressed by “invent[ing] rimes.” The mnemonic’s 
mysterious origin, along with their characterization as rime, an archaic spelling of rhyme, outfits 
them with an ancient gravitas.  
The eponymous protagonist of Lewis’ novel, Martin Arrowsmith, uses one such received 
rime – “On old Olympus’ topmost top, a fat-eared German viewed a hop” – to retain the names of 
the twelve cranial nerves. The first letter of each word is associated with each of the twelve cranial 
nerves: olfactory, optic, oculomotor, trochlear, trigeminal, abducens, facial, vestibulocochlear (the 
“ear” cranial nerve), glossopharyngeal, vagus, accessory, and hypoglossal. Viewed with respect to 
the mnemonic, the figurative “crawling through exams” and the figure of the “Educated person” 
that emerges from them assume devastating meanings. It is less the mere fact of exam difficulty 
that makes the students crawl through the exams: it is the combination of difficult task and 
woefully insufficient tools by which to complete it – lists memorized by mnemonics – that make 
for the crawling. What emerges from the other side of the crawling is not a professional with a 
solid grasp of the structural complexity of the cranial nerves, but rather something bordering on a 
charlatan who can put on a bombastic air by virtue of having persevered through a trial both 
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difficult and stupid. Hence, the bombast of the capital-E in “Educated person,” the education of 
whom amounts to the mastery of cognitive tchotchkes.  
Referring in everyday language to cheap baubles, tchotchke in the context of mnemonics 
for medical school exam preparation emphasizes the sort of vulgarity that Pasteur describes when 
he discusses the distinction between applied and theoretical sciences. In terms of the tree-apple 
metaphor Pasteur uses to explain the inextricable, non-categorical interconnectedness of the two 
sciences, the mnemonic is akin to an apple not only completely cut off from the tree but fetishized 
for its momentary usefulness. Yet for Martin Arrowsmith’s medical school compatriots, the hyper-
usefulness of tchotchke becomes the more lingering, long-lasting uselessness of art, unexpectedly 
leaving a lasting impression that extends beyond medical school. The students “remembered it for 
years after they had become practicing physicians and altogether forgotten the names of the nerves 
themselves” (Lewis 20). The mnemonic’s anatomical association – the object of its immediate 
applicability – vanishes yet its pure shell endures, the rime being, to the ears of the students, the 
“world's noblest poem.” Whereas the mnemonic silliness affords memorability leading up to and 
during the exam, long after the exam, it is beautiful, yet apparently useless. Considered across a 
temporal span divided into ‘pre-exam’ and ‘post-exam,’ the mnemonic serves as a veritable 
archetype of the pure and applied pattern: leading up to and during the exam, the mnemonic is 
applicability; following the exam, it is pure.  
A more recent version of the mnemonic given in pares down poetic beauty and in so doing 
shifts the balance across applied-pure lines toward immediate use:  
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Figure 10: A recent version of the cranial nerve mnemonic indicated by the blue arrow  
 
 
Taken from a lecture Slide from learning Session 22 of the Spring 2016 Neuroanatomy Course, 
one of twelve courses that comprised the M1 curriculum at University of Illinois College of 
Medicine at Urbana-Champaign, the updated mnemonic reads: “Ooh, Ooh, Ooh, to touch and feel 
very good velvet. Such heaven!” Together, the two cranial nerve mnemonics – Arrowmsith’s “On 
old Olympus’ topmost top, a fat-eared German viewed a hop” and the University of Illinois 
neuroanatomy course’s “Ooh, Ooh, Ooh, to touch and feel very good velvet. Such heaven!” – 
furnish a rather simple exposition of a form’s historical and cultural specificity as well as its lasting 
transposable generality.  
Both versions are twelve-word sentences with words that begin with the letter of the 
corresponding cranial nerve. Yet the words selected to fill this general template create two 
distributions of attention across applied-pure lines. The Arrowsmith mnemonic lavishes 
comparatively more attention on the pure, crafting a ‘rime’ that includes an allusion to Greek 













• [Spinal] accessory (XI)
• Hypoglossal (XII) Mnemonic: “Ooh, Ooh, Ooh, to touch and feel very good velvet. 
Such heaven!”





mnemonic ventures a rule-breaking pun (making “ear” instead a word starting with ‘v’ to stand for 
vestibulocochlear, the ear-cranial nerve). Such choices make it a better candidate for poetry than 
the later version, which makes little, if any, attempt at literary inventiveness. The opportunity for 
inventiveness afforded by the challenge of three consecutive O’s is sacrificed to a repetitive 
onomatopoeia – “Ooh, ooh, ooh” – that is supposed to express the sounds of pleasure elicited by 
touching “very fine velvet.” In this sense, the mnemonic achieves an internal logic that could be 
said to achieve cohesion. Moreover, ‘touch’ standing for the trigeminal nerve – the nerve of facial 
sensation – invites comparison with the rule-breaking pun in the Arrowsmith mnemonic. In 
adhering strictly to the rule of the mnemonic form that stresses perfect equivalency between the 
name of the scientific material and the letter of the first work, the University of Illinois mnemonic 
perhaps promises more straight-forward retrieval and thus decreases the likelihood of 
misremembering on an exam. The later mnemonic affords transparency and clarity; the latter, 
whimsicality and play. As whimsicality and play are not formally compatible with exam questions, 
they are not useful for arriving at correct responses, making the University of Illinois mnemonic 
the more ‘applicable’ mnemonic.  
Taking a closer look at the post-exam fate of this tchotchke, their comparatively longer 
shelf-life than scientific knowledge may help explain the malaise medical epistemologist Kathryn 
Montgomery observes in a student after his first year: “’I’m not learning science,’ he said dully. 
“I’m not even learning facts anymore; I’m just learning things’” (Montgomery 7). Given neither 
the student nor Montgomery specify what exactly distinguishes ‘science’ from ‘facts’ from 
‘things,’ it may be that mnemonics are the ‘things’ of which they speak. If this is the case, then it 
becomes possible to say that what occasionally, or often, passes for learning in medical school 
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may be called thingification as the medical student races against the clock to hold the necessary 
knowledge in their heads to pass exams.  
 
4.2.2 Electronic Medical Record: The Applied-Pure in Patient Care 
 
Tracing the patterns of use to the realm of patient care leads to the Electronic Medical Record 
(EMR), a form that exerts at least as considerable an influence over patient care as the examination 
and mnemonics do with medical education. The EMR began to overtake more traditional paper 
medical records after 2009 when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
incentivized EMR adoption. Another major force driving the adoption of EMR’s is the financial 
one, EMR’s supporting the needs of both insurance claims and billing. There are many EMR 
platforms that private practices and hospitals may elect to use. For the purposes of this discussion, 
the EMR platform under consideration is AthenaNet, the property of the health technology 
company athenahealth and the EMR used by Avicenna Community Healthcare Center of 
Champaign, Illinois. Though the advent of health technology has introduced numerous changes, 
AthenaNet, like most EMR’s, nevertheless preserves the standard structure of the medical history, 
which is organized into six sections: chief complaint (CC), history of present illness (HPI), past 
medical history (PMH), family history (FH), social history (SH), review of systems (ROS). The 
total information collected in the interview comprises the medical history section in the patient 
chart.9 Under the condition where physical diagnosis is the desired payoff of patient care, in every 
sense of the word, the six parts of the medical history together with the applied-pure cognitive 
styles, of the CC, FH, ROS affording the applicability of arriving at or managing a diagnosis, with 
 
9 Rounding out the chart for any given visit is the physical examination, laboratory test results, and clinical notes 
which include the assessment of the overall clinical situation and the plan for clinical interventions. 
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the SH affording the purity of possibly helping to arrive at a diagnosis and the HPI and PMH an 
unstable hybrid of the two.  
In accordance with biomedicine’s insistence on physical, localizable causes of sickness, 
the first part of medical history – the chief complaint – beckons for a single physical ailment such 
as a cough, localized pain or fever. That this first part of the medical history is singular and not 
plural – complaint not complaints – helps to contain the clinical situation into a manageable whole. 
As such, the chief complaint is short, often less than a sentence. Moreover, it enacts use in that it 
directly and concisely captures verbal descriptions of the sought-after payoff: identification or 
management of diagnosis. Both the Review of Systems (ROS) and the Family History (FH) enact 
patterns of use to the extent that they also contribute additional material about physical 
examination from which the diagnosis is formed. In the AthenaNet EMR, the FH section provides 
a list of diagnoses to which family members of the patient can be added (see Figure 11). The 
physician can add as many as have been diagnosed with the given condition. Under each family 
member, only the age of onset and the date of death are listed. For more detail, there is the note 
section.  
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Figure 11: Family history section from AthenaNet 
 
The Review of Systems section, on the other hand, is more formally complex than the FH 
as there are numerous ROS templates to choose from. Some templates may afford clinical 
immediacy better (such as the Diabetes Follow Up template) and some of which may afford 
deferral better (such as the Comprehensive General Adult template). The same bodily systems that 
organize the USMLE Step 1 – e.g. cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, genitourinary – also determine 
the categories by which ROS templates are sorted. Incidentally, such categorization does not easily 
support a multi-system perspective for which STEP 1 also tests. Indeed, an ROS template 
separated into system categories makes integration across systems more difficult to record. In any 
case, each system category in turn consists of pertinent positives and pertinent negatives, with the 
constituents of each category varying across templates (see Figure 12).  
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Figure 12: A comparison of two ROS templates, diabetes follow up and comprehensive general adult 
ROS from AthenaNet 
Diabetes Follow Up ROS  
 
 
Comprehensive General Adult ROS 
 
 
To be sure, both the ROS, particularly the Comprehensive General Adult template, and FH 
may elicit topics that do not necessarily bear on the stated chief complaint and therefore would not 
necessarily contribute to its diagnosis. In this sense, both sections could also be said to enact 
deferral, demonstrating how affordance is less an essential quality unilaterally determining what a 
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form does and more a question of contingency. In the hands of two different physicians, the ROS 
and the FH might vary with respect to how closely they hew to the chief complaint. If a physician 
still chooses the Comprehensive General Adult template rather than Diabetes Follow Up template 
during an encounter with a patient whose chief complaint is related to diabetes, then the ROS 
affords clinical deferral. Yet the limits on the ROS and FH nevertheless demarcate a range of 
possibility that enables them do applicability better than social history, the part of the interview 
that best affords the theoretical or the pure in patient care. For unlike the ROS and FH, the SH 
need not be about physicality and thus has a much larger range of possibility.  
As such, the SH serves as the receptacle for all the information that, while not itself physical 
or bodily, nevertheless has the potential to make the management of the physical more effective 
or efficient. Smith’s Patient Centered Interviewing evokes as much by pointing out that “the list 
of potential topics of inquiry in the SH is extensive and may not seem relevant to the reason the 
patient is seeking health care. However, understanding these aspects of the patient’s life can aid 
you in diagnosing the chief concern, helping the patient recuperate after hospital discharge and 
keeping the patient healthy by addressing harmful behaviors” (Dwamena et al. 110, italics mine). 
In comparison to the rigidly circumscribed information elicited in the CC, FH and ROS, the SH is 
indeed comparatively vast and unsystematic. AthenaNet’s social history features approximately 
42 items, which vary widely as to how to record answers. The items come as either a pre-populated 
dropdown menu, a panel with three or four choices or a simple free response, as shown in Figure 
13.  
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Since the category of social history does not exhibit the uniformity that the exclusively bodily 
categories of FH and ROS do, it thus demands a more variable way of recording responses. Yet 
like the ROS and FH forms, these response recordings afford speed: only the free response could 
be said to afford a slower, more reflective response and yet the short space affords a quick 
response.  
Moreover, the 42 items that comprise the SH are not neatly categorized into bodily systems 
or diagnostic categories as with the ROS and FH, respectively. Rather, they are simply one long 
list, given in the following order: 
1. Smoking status  




5. Marital status 
6. Sexual orientation  
7. Exercise level 
8. Diet 
9. General stress level 
10. Smoking – how 
much  
11. Has smoked since 
age  
12. Alcohol intake  
13. Caffeine intake  
14. Chewing tobacco  
15. Illicit drugs  
16. Guns present in 
home  
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17. Seat belts used 
routinely  
18. Smoke alarm in 
home  
19. Advance directive 
20. Performs monthly 
self-breast exam 
21. Legally blind in 
one or both eyes 
22. Hard of hearing or 
deaf in one or both 
ears 
23. Use IV drugs  
24. Sexual partner has 
HIV 
25. History of 
inconsistent/no 
condom use  
26. High number of 
sexual partners  
27. Is the patient 
ambulatory 
28. Are you currently 
employed?  
29. Are you currently 
sexually active with 
anyone who has 
traveled (within the 
last 12 weeks) to a 
zika-affected area? 
30. Caregiver 
31. Changes in 
family/social 
situation  
32. Childcare  
33. Concerns about 
meeting basic 
needs (food, 
housing, heat, etc.)  
34. Do you feel stress – 
tense, restless, 
nervous, or 
anxious, or unable 
to sleep at night 
because your mind 
is troubled all the 
time – these days  
35. Does family ever 
have difficult 
making ends meet 
at the end of the 
month?  
36. Have you traveled 
out of the country 
in the past 30 days?  
37. Illicit drugs – years 
of use  
38. International travel  
39. Number of children  
40. Protected sex 
41. Sexual orientation 
*6 choices 
42. Substance abuse  
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A more thoughtful organization than a 42-item list is certainly possible, yet the FH section shows 
no attempt to do so: sexual health is scattered among items 6, 24-26, 29, 40 and 41; substance use 
is scattered among items 1, 2, 10-15, 23, 37; home life is scattered among items 5,7,8,9, 16, 17, 
18, 27, 30-35. In view of this scattering of items that presumably belong together, the FH is 
arbitrary and carelessly formulated. Sexual orientation, for example, appears twice, with the first 
instance in item 6 giving three fewer selections than the instance in item 41. Perhaps most 
irresponsibly, the presence of item 20 – “performs monthly breast examinations” – makes the 
absence of an equivalent question for testicular self-exams all the more deafening.  
In the History of Present Illness (HPI) and the Past Medical History (PMH) lies a possible 
bridge between the clinical immediacy of the physically-oriented diagnosis, ROS and FH and the 
pure remoteness of the social history. Of all the component parts of the medical history, the HPI 
and the PMH best affords narrative. Indeed, the HPI seeks to establish all of the pertinent details 
that both define and surround the chief complaint, sometimes necessitating a return to past medical 
history. The openness of and similarity between the two sections are demonstrated by what is 
ultimately their indistinguishability: “the distinctions [between HPI and PMH] are not always clear 
and there are no evidence-based guidelines to determine where you should obtain or record 
historical data” (Dwamena et al. 103). Yet the narrative affordance of the HPI and PMH often 
clashes with the one of the affordances of the electronic platform: a simple copy-pasting of the 
data from any of the other EMR sections. Where hand-written charts afford a slowing down long 
enough to write a general intuitive impression of the patient, the EMR affords the substitution of 
everything else in the chart for an HPI.  
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4.2.3: Peer-reviewed Journal Article: The Applied-pure in Research 
 
Unlike written medical school exams and EMR’s, peer-reviewed journals explicitly incorporate 
applied-pure language, as The Journal of Applied Toxicology would demonstrate. The differences 
between The Journal of Applied Toxicology and what would be a plausible candidate for its pure 
counterpart, Toxicology, do not, however, as their titles would suggest, themselves consolidate 
applied and pure cognitive styles. Squaring their titles with the type of research they seek to publish 
immediately shows why. On the one hand, the goal of Toxicology, as defined in its author 
guidelines, is “to advance current understanding of the mechanisms of toxicity” (Toxicology). Yet 
the journal nevertheless has its eyes toward practicalities that would enact use, seeking to advance 
toxicological understanding “as it relates to human health” and placing emphasis on “effects 
observed at or extrapolated to relevant human exposures that contribute to safety evaluations and 
risk assessment decisions.” In this way, Toxicology has more applied leanings than its name or 
primary goal might initially suggest.  
The aims and scopes of the Journal of Applied Toxicology, on the other hand, is to publish 
“peer-reviewed original reviews and hypothesis-driven research articles on mechanistic, 
fundamental and applied research relating to the toxicity of drugs and chemicals…” (Applied 
Toxicology). The importance the journal assigns to mechanistic and fundamental research indeed 
begs the question of what function the title serves. If the journal does publish “fundamental or 
mechanistic research,” which is to say, pure, theoretical or basic toxicological research, the 
necessity to specify that it is a journal of applied toxicology becomes curious. One explanation for 
the perhaps unwarranted prominence given to applied by its position in the title can be lifted from 
the last sentence of the ‘Aims and Scopes’ section: “emphasis is given to papers of clear application 
to human health and/or provide significant contributions and impact to their field.” If the nature of 
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the papers the journal seeks to publish is any indication, the titular applied means high-impact in 
the sphere of human health.  
Setting aside the potentially misleading nature of any applied-pure distinctions evoked in 
their titles, the attention that both Toxicology and Journal of Applied Toxicology give to questions 
of human health and contributions to basic knowledge adheres to the ideal of use-inspired basic 
research put forth by engineer Donald Stokes. Stokes offered use-inspired basic research as an 
alternative to an influential 1945 report to President Franklin Roosevelt by then-head of the U.S. 
Office of Scientific Research and Development, Vannevar Bush. Entitled Science, the Endless 
Frontier, Bush’s post-armistice report set the path for peacetime scientific research. To do so, it 
appropriated the so-called linear model of scientific research whereby pure research laid the 
foundations for innovation in applied research. The report went on to influence the scientific 
priorities of U.S. policy for generations and indeed became a fixture of governmental funding 
schemes. Hoping to move U.S. research policy away of the antiquated linear model, Stokes 
expanded the model by two dimensions, giving the quadrant model. 
First introduced by Stokes in his 1997 book Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and 
Technological Innovation, the eponymous quadrant – the Pasteur Quadrant – constitutes what 
Stokes considered the privileged space of his so-called Quadrant Model of Scientific Research (see 
Figure 14 below). Stokes pointed to this quadrant as the area in which to direct resources and 
research efforts, it being an intellectual domain in which researchers simultaneously produce 
knowledge about the world and develop technology to improve the human condition.  
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Figure 14: The Quadrant Model as Pictured in Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological 
Innovation by Thomas Stokes, pg. 73 
 
Yet in Cycles of Invention and Discovery (2016), Odumosu and Nayaranamurti rightly point out 
that Stokes’ “very nomenclature reinforce[s] the binaries of the linear model. Pasteur’s Quadrant 
be[comes] the quadrant of ‘use-inspired basic research’ - still compatible with the linear model 
binary of ‘basic’ and ‘applied’ research” (Narayanamurti and Odumosu 29). As such, the patterns 
of use-inspired basic research can still enact applied-pure cognitive styles.   
The topic of oxidative stress and free radical mechanisms clarify the nature of use-inspired 
basic research in toxicology and thereby provide one way of understanding the enactment of 
applied-pure cognitive styles in research. The special mention given to oxidative stress and free 
radical mechanisms in the guidelines of the Journal of Applied Toxicology is unsurprising given 
the topic’s prominence in not only toxicology but other fields as well. Oxidative stress refers to a 
state whereby highly reactive compounds known as reactive oxygen species (ROS) overwhelm 
bodily defenses and go on to react with and thereby cause damage to DNA, proteins and other 
important biological molecules. The anti-oxidants for which certain foods and supplements are 
celebrated refer to their action against ROS, which arise from the biochemical process of aerobic, 
which is to say, oxygen-using respiration that sustains millions of life forms on Earth. With the 
promise of elucidating a crucial aspect of a fundamental process for many lifeforms (aerobic 
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respiration) while addressing neurodegenerative disease, cancer, aging, cataracts, rheumatoid 
arthritis, cardiovascular disease, autoimmune disorders and other maladies in which oxygen 
toxicity has been implicated, research on reactive oxygen species and free radical mechanisms 
easily fits under the use-inspired basic research category, the so-called Pasteur Quadrant.  
Advising researchers hoping to publish research pertaining to free-radical mechanisms, the 
Journal of Applied Toxicology’s guidelines note that “biochemical endpoints alone of a single 
organ/tissue response are considered not to show sufficient scientific depth.” In order to achieve 
scientific depth, a mechanism has to not only articulate the biochemical endpoints of a response 
but must, presumably, give a coherent explanation of all biochemical interactions as well. This 
requirement anticipates a basic cognitive style. As for the applied cognitive style, the guidelines 
specify that “this journal is not the place to make health claims on natural food stuffs or botanical 
extracts particularly in association with amelioration of free radical/ROS type mechanisms.” Aside 
from effectively discouraging naturopathic-oriented research, this caveat makes a check on 
immediacy qua innovation in human health. In a clear instance of disciplinary boundary drawing, 
the journal does not consider research on the health effects of naturopathic substances as part of 
its mission to enhance human health through toxicological knowledge, even if, presumably, their 
association with ROS or other mechanisms could be established. In any case, this caveat is situated 
within a mission that calls for an applied cognitive style.  
Altogether, in order to clear the peer review process and be published in the Journal of 
Applied Toxicology, submissions must make impacts on human health while enacting scientific 
depth. The journal articles in turn demonstrate what a successful, which is to say, publishable 
enactments of health impact and scientific depth look like. Accordingly, the journal articles, as 
forms or formats in their own right, exhibit patterns of use-inspired basic research. As the 
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forthcoming analyses attempts to show, the research and the review article, in conjunction with 
the journal guidelines specifying what will and will not be published, both do use-inspired research 
differently.  
The author guidelines of Applied Toxicology declare that the journal publishes five article 
formats: research articles, short communications, reviews, mini-reviews, hypothesis reviews. By 
explicit recognition, the guidelines perhaps promote the experimental section as the preeminent 
formal feature of research articles, which “must be precise and give all details necessary for 
repeating the work.” The defining formal feature of short communications is length and an 
abstract. The guidelines define reviews of a current topic of interest against complete literature 
surveys and “assemblages of detailed information,” stipulating that they should instead render a 
“critically selected treatment of material” along with discussion of “unsolved problems” and 
“possible developments.” Minireviews are reviews under 10,000 words. Finally, hypothesis 
reviews are defined as “theoretical papers.” Toxicology, on the other hand, approaches the 
distinction between a research article and a review article with fewer stipulations, declining to 
further categorize review articles, save for a distinction made on the basis of length – reviews vs. 
mini-reviews.   
Though the review articles and research articles are most often framed, as they are in the 
Applied Toxicology guidelines, as the distinction between primary sources and secondary sources 
or between original research and synthesis, the distinction itself may also afford different patterns 
of the use-basic balance. Indeed, contrary to the Journal of Applied Toxicology’s label of 
Hypothesis Reviews as “theoretical papers,” it is perhaps the review article form that affords an 
emphasis of use over basic. The research articles, on the other hand, affords an emphasis of basic 
over use. By articulating these patterns of use across the review article and the research article 
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across two different journals – Journal of Applied Toxicology and Toxicology – it becomes clearer 
how their patterns afford applied-pure cognitive styles.  
4.2.3.1 Research Articles 
 
Research articles have a rigidly conserved structure that endures across journals. This structure 
consists of six basic features: 1) title, which is usually a terminology-dense sentence that lays out 
the major finding and its significance. Following the title is the 2) paper abstract, which 
compresses all the sections into one paragraph. The 3) introduction presents the problem under 
discussion, which integrates a literature review of all relevant factors; in the case of toxicology 
research, the introduction will cite relevant literature surrounding the compound under 
investigation as well as the pathological condition in which that compound is implicated. The 4) 
materials and methods section is the site of enacting scientific reproducibility. It is also the 
section that Mol singles out in her reflections on practice, finding that it “instantiates the 
recognition that the practices forcing an object to speak are crucial to what may be said about it” 
(158). 5) The results section states the research outcomes, or, to adopt Mol’s phrasing, what the 
object has said after having been forced to speak by the practices outlined in the preceding section. 
Finally, 6) the discussion speculates on these outcomes, often ending with directions for future 
research. By tracing these conserved features across the two journals, a picture of use-inspired 
basic research emerges.  
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Beginning with titles (see Figure 15 above), the research article from Toxicology – 
“Neuroprotective effect of zolpidem against glutamate-induced toxicity is mediated via the 
PI3k/Akt pathway and inhibited by PK11195” – presents a use-inspired patterning by way of its 
five most prominent words or phrases: 
1. a compound of interest (zolpidem)  
2. a pathological process (glutamate induced toxicity, a sub-category of oxygen toxicity) 
3. one of its possible salubrious effects (neuroprotection) 
4. an explanation for the effect (mediation via the PI3k/Akt pathway)  
5. and an inhibitory factor to the above effect (PK11195). 
The research article from Applied Toxicology – “Epigallocatechin-3-gallate partially restored 
redox homeostasis in arsenite-stressed keratinocytes” – exhibits many formal similarities to its 
‘pure’ counterpart, consisting of the following four words or phrases: 
1. a compound of interest (Epigallocatechin-3-gallate) 
2. a pathological process (arsenite-stress)  
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3. one of its possible salubrious effects (partial restoration) 
4. an explanation for the effect (redox homeostasis)  
Both titles show enactments of scientific depth and application to questions of health. The 
scientific depth is enacted in the explanation for the effects and the use of names given by 
systematic nomenclature. The presence of an explanation for the effect further enacts scientific 
depth. The arrangement of these elements to connect a compound which is not currently used in 
medicine to a pathological process encountered in medicine enacts applicability to health.  
 Turning toward the introduction of research articles, the introduction of the Applied 
Toxicology article consists of four paragraphs. The first paragraph establishes the relationship 
between arsenic toxicity and skin. The second paragraph introduces the compound of interest. The 
third paragraph, the longest of the four, introduces the pathway by establishing it as a point of 
intersection between the compound of interest and the pathological process. The final paragraph 
ends with the introduction of a mystery: whether the compound of interest and the pathological 
process interact with the given mechanism via the same biochemical channels or not. As for the 
Toxicology article, the introduction also consists of four paragraphs, with the first one establishing 
the pathological process under consideration – glutamate-induced toxicity – as a threat to neuronal 
homeostasis, or the process of maintaining a steady biological state in the brain’s basic functional 
unit. The second paragraph, following closely from the first paragraph, establishes that this 
pathological process occurs in numerous neurological diseases. The third paragraph situates the 
compound of interest with respect to the pathological process. The final paragraph, which consists 
of two sentences, restates the article’s title in the first and speculates on how the results might 
enhance the therapeutic strategies for a class of neuropathology in the second. In both journals, the 
paragraph structure demarcates a constant vacillation between use and basic.  
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 Turing toward the materials and methods section, the iteration in the research article from 
Applied Toxicology boasts fifteen sections in the following order (Sarkar and Sinha 1072 - 1074):  
1. Chemicals  
2. Cell culture  
3. Cytotoxicity assay 
4. Reactive oxygen 
species generation  
5. Comet assay 
6. Determination of 
oxidative DNA 
damage 
7. Lipid peroxidation  
8. Nuclear and 
cytosolic protein 
extraction  





quinone 1 activity  
12. Glutathione S 
transferase activity  
13. Superoxide 






15. Statistical analysis  
The order of the materials and methods section displays a chronology of the experimentation as 
well as an applied-pure patterning. The first two sections deal with procurement: both simply list 
all the materials used, including chemicals and cells, and where they were purchased from. 
Sections 3 through 8 deal with questions of use: the corresponding methods and materials help 
determine the nature of the possible contribution to human health that the given compound in 
question would help make. Sections 11 through 15, on the other hand, deal with the basic: the 
corresponding materials and methods related to establishing the underlying physiological 
processes for the applications.  
As for the article from Toxicology, the methodology has twelve sections, with one section 
having two sub-sections, all in the following order (Jembrek et al. 59-62):  
1. Chemicals  
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2. P19 cell culturing 













e staining  
4. Drug treatment  
5. Assessment of cell 
death  




on of ATP 
level  
c. MTT assay  




7. Detection of ROS 
levels  
8. Determination of 
reduced glutathione 
(GSH) levels  
9. Determination of 
caspase 3/7 activity  
10. Determination of 
mRNA levels by 
semi-quantitative 
RT-PCR method  
11. Western blot 
analysis of p53, 
Bax and pAkt 
expression  
12. Statistical analysis
Along with its Applied counterpart, the materials and methods of the Toxicology article begins 
with chemicals and cell culturing. Section 3, together with sections 6 through 12, help to determine 
the basic whereas sections 4 through 5 would help to determine the applications to health.  
The results section of the Applied Toxicology article consists of four sections, each of which 
states an experimental outcome: 
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1. Epigallocatechin-3-gallate increased 
the viability of arsenite-treated cells  
2. Pro-oxidant activity of 
epigallocatechin-3-gallate increased 
along with arsenite   
3. Epigallocatechin-3-gallate 
upregulated Keap1 and maintained a 
balanced status of Nrf2 in arsenite-
treated HaCaT cells  
4. Epigallocatechin-3-gallate 
modulated variable expression and 
activity of Nrf2 downstream targets 
in AsIII-stressed cells 
(1074-1077)
All four section headings deal with the primary compound of interest (epigallocatechin-3-gallate) 
with respect to questions of use and questions of basic science. The first two section headings are 
concerned with the viability and pro-oxidant activity whereas the second two headings deal with 
biochemical pathways.  
In the case of the Toxicology article, the results section consists of six sections, with the 
following titles (62 – 66): 
1. Protective effect of zolpidem against 
glutamate-induced toxicity in P19 
neurons  
2. Effect of zolpidem on intracellular 
ROS production and GSH content 
following glutamate treatment  
3. Increase in Akt activation mediates 
neuroprotective action of zolpidem  
4. Effects of glutamate and zolpidem on 
the activation of programmed cell 
death  
5. Effects of zolpidem on glutamate-
induced changes of NMDA receptor 
subunits  
6. Effects of zolpidem on neuronal 
survival are not mediated via GABAA 
receptors
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In contrast to the results section of the Applied article, the results of the Toxicology article is not a 
declarative sentence stating outcomes but rather a sentence that states a basic category of an 
outcome. Nevertheless, as with the results section of its Applied counterpart, the central compound 
of interest – zolpidem – is studied with respect to both application and basic physiology.  
 In sum, if the first few sections of the research articles are any indication, the author 
guidelines that stress both basic scientific understanding and applications to human health are 
adhered to, as the mere fact of being published in the journals would presuppose. However, the 
exigencies of the materials and methods as well as the results sections ensure that basic ultimately 
supersedes use in research articles.   
4.2.3.2 Review Articles 
 
In comparison to research articles, review articles exhibit comparatively more formal variety as 
they are not required to adhere to the introduction, materials and methods, results and discussion 
format. This formal freedom, which is to say, a greater range of possibilities, arguably creates the 
space for emphasis of use over basic. In the case of Applied Toxicology’s “Oxidative stress in 
organophosphate poisoning: role of standard antidotal therapy,” the relevance to human health is 
explicitly asserted in the second part of the title (see Figure 16 below). As for Toxicology’s 
“Advances in metal-induced oxidative stress and human disease,” the relevance to human health 
is again patently asserted. In this way, the review article form may shift the use-basic balance 
toward use.  
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Though the review articles lack the research rigidly defined structure of the research articles, they 
do attempt hierarchical arrangements of material. In the case of the review article from the Journal 
of Applied Toxicology, there are only two major sections, the first exhibiting two sub-sections and 
the second exhibiting three sub-sections (Vanova et al. 1058-1065): 
1. Oxidative stress  
a. Role of oxidative stress in 
acute organophosphate 
poisoning  
b. Role of oxidative stress in 
subacute and chronic 
organophosphate poisoning  
2. Oxidative stress in organophosphate 
antidotal therapy  




The first section “Oxidative stress” consists of two sub-sections that relate the basic idea of 
oxidative stress to two uses: acute and chronic organophosphate poisoning. The second section, 
“Oxidative stress in organophosphate antidotal therapy,” relates to drugs already in standard use 
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for antidotal therapy for the pathological process in question – organophosphate poisoning. 
Together these advance  
In contrast, the Journal of Toxicology review article consists of nine major sections, the 
first eight of which are devoted to a metal implicated in disease. The ninth and final section 
summarizes a type of metal-oriented therapy (Jomova and Valko 65-82): 
1. Iron  
a. Iron metabolism  
b. Oxidative stress and iron  
2. Copper  
a. Copper metabolism  
b. Oxidative stress and copper  
c. Copper and human disease  
i. Cancer  
Neurological 
disorders  





3. Chromium  
a. Oxidative stress and 
chromium  
b. Chromium and human 
disease  
4. Cobalt  
a. Cobalt and oxidative stress  
b. Cobalt and human disease  
5. Cadmium  
a. Cadmium, oxidative stress 
and human disease  
b. Cadmium and antioxidants  
6. Arsenic  
a. Arsenic, toxicity and free 
radicals  
b. Arsenic and human disease  
7. Zinc 
a. Zinc, metabolism and 
oxidative stress  
b. Zinc and human disease  
8. Lead  
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a. Lead and oxidative stress  
b. Lead toxicity and 
antioxidants  
9. Metal-chelation therapy in medicine  
a. Chelation of redox active iron 
and copper  
b. Chelation of toxic metals  
In every section, a connection is asserted between the metal in question, the basic physiological 
process of oxidative stress and disease.  
Moreover, the final sentences of each review article offer an action item that relates directly 
to human health. The final sentence of the Toxicology review article calls for a “design of dual 
functioning antioxidants, possessing both metal-chelating and ROS/RNS-scavenging properties” 
(82). The final sentence of the review article from Applied furnishes what could be called a more 
implicit call for action: “current therapeutic approaches in OP-induced oxidative stress via 
prevention of overstimulation of cholinergic nervous system (oximes and atropine) and central 
hyperexcitation (diazepam) do not seem to cover all possible mechanisms involved in this 
pathological process” (1066). The emphasis on use still remains insofar as the final sentence calls 
for new therapeutic approaches that take into account all the biochemical pathways involved in the 
pathological process in question. 
The considerable effort to achieve the ideal of use-inspired research in the four peer-
reviewed journal articles not only demonstrates that the difference between journal titles mean 
little – Applied Toxicology publishes research that is no more applicable than that published by 
Toxicology – but perhaps seeks to desperately overcome a problem that Arrowsmith predicted 
when it was published in 1926. Indeed, the novel anticipates, many of the “problems that torment 
the medical profession to this very day, including the competition of needs, goals and resources 
between those who identify themselves as clinicians and those who are scientists” (Markel 371).
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The applied-pure patterning enacted by Martin’s divided allegiance to patient care and research is 
what constitutes the novel’s anticipation of this problem.  
One patterning of Martin’s divided allegiance is function of his two mentors: Gottlieb, an 
isolated bacteriologist and Dean Silva, administer and clinician described as beloved by the 
narrative voice. nests the Biglan opposition between the pure and the applied, between basic 
research and human use. This patterning appears during a discussion between Martin and “Dad” 
Silva, dean of the medical faculty and professor of internal medicine. The two stumble on the topic 
of Professor Gottlieb, the immunological research of whom becomes the object of Martin’s fondest 
devotion early on in medical school. Overshadowed by Martin’s almost fanatical devotion to 
Professor Gottlieb, his considerable, if less fiery devotion to “Dad” Silva is easy to miss. 
Nevertheless, Martin displays great fondness for Silva, setting up a twin-devotion that, like the 
applied-pure gap, is not easily reconciled. Indeed, in a conversation between Martin and Dean 
Silva that turns to Dr. Gottlieb, Dean Silva observes:  
It’s all very fine, this business of pure research: seeking the truth, unhampered by 
commercialism or fame chasing. Getting to the bottom. Ignoring consequences and 
practical uses. But do you realize if you carry that idea far enough, a man could justify 
himself for doing nothing but count the cobblestones on Warehouse Avenue – yes and 
justify himself for torturing people just to see how they screamed – and then sneer at a man 
who was making millions of people well and happy! (120)  
To the extent that isolated retreat requires a turning away from one’s fellow human being – whether 
by studying non-human objects (cobblestones) or by turning away from human needs (ignoring 
extreme pain) – the pure is seen as an entirely selfish and inhumane. Of course, to follow counting 
a street’s cobblestones could lead back out to use, say, by facilitating the discovery of a novel way 
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of paving major thoroughfares that affords greater stability, traction or cleaning. In contrast to 
Dean Silva, Professor Gottlieb is rendered in a satirical characterization given by the narrative 
voice as one so “devoted to Pure Science, to art for art’s sake, that he would rather have people 
die by the right therapy than be cured by the wrong” (Lewis 123). The narrative voice’s 
characterization posits in Gottlieb a hope for the triumph of theory over salvation. This hope would 
lead its possessor, if given the choice, toward an intervention with a fatal effect, successfully 
predicted by a scientific theory and away from an intervention with curative properties that 
nevertheless escapes or even contradicts theory. Such is the most extreme statement of a rub that 
the various Flexnerian forms try to negotiate.  
 
4.3 CONSOLIDATING HARD-SOFT COGNITIVE STYLES: EVIDENCE HIERARCHIES, 
LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND MEDICAL TEXTBOOKS  
 
The Biglan model’s hard-soft dimension corresponds to the subject matter characteristic of 
systematicity. Evidence-hierarchies, learning objectives and textbooks display their own patterns 
of systematicity and as such demonstrate the paradoxically conserved, yet changing nature of hard-
soft cognitive styles. In the case of evidence hierarchies, the hard-soft manifests as a strict division 
between questions with answers that require evidence grading versus questions that do not. In 
contrast to evidence hierarchies, which show hard and soft interacting side-by-side, learning 
objectives contribute to the erasure of the soft by privileging only technical interactions with 
curriculum material. Likewise, textbooks erase softness through distortions that present a hard, 
teleological view of research rather than a contingently relational view. Together, these three forms 
help form hard and soft cognitive styles across the Flexnerian enterprise.  
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4.3.1 Evidence-Based Medicine: Hard and Soft in Patient Care 
 
The evidence hierarchy, the form that enacts a hard-soft patterning in patient care, is the chief 
innovation of evidence-based medicine, even if no evidence-based medicine discussions would 
describe it as such. Mariam Solomon’s assessment of evidence-based medicine in Making Medical 
Knowledge (2015) helps to explain why. In her assessment, Solomon introduces the evidence 
hierarchy as a way of clarifying evidence-based medicine’s somewhat baffling nature:   
Evidence of effectiveness has always been a basis (although not the only basis) for medical 
practice. The term “evidence-based medicine” evokes no surprise – indeed, it suggests 
business as usual – and is thus often baffling to newcomers. I think that it would have been 
more precise to have used a term such as “evidence-hierarchy medicine,” to signal that in 
evidence-based medicine evidence is evaluated for both its quantity and its quality, with 
some kinds of evidence and some quantities of evidence regarded as better than others 
(106).  
In a footnote, Solomon notes that the greater semantic precision of “evidence-hierarchy medicine” 
would have incurred more controversy. In any case, the primary work of evidence-based medicine 
is evidence grading. Indeed, evidence-based medicine’s evidence-grading character emerges 
through the description given by the inaugural article of evidence-based medicine’s fundamental 
aims: evidence-based medicine “de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and 
pathophysiological rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the 
examination of evidence from clinical research” (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 
2420). Therefore, evidence-based medicine declares that, when clinical decision making is 
concerned, the systematicity of clinical research is superior to the systematicity of 
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pathophysiological rationale and, of course, far superior to unsystematic clinical experience and 
most superior of all to that veritable systematicity-resisting phenomenon, intuition.  
To understand how evidence grading enacts hard, soft cognitive styles consider one of the 
most prominent evidence hierarches: that produced by GRADE working group. Founded in 2000 
by an informal group of collaborators interested in improving the evidence grading systems of the 
health care industry, GRADE has since become a leader in the development of evidence and 
strength of recommendation guidelines. GRADE has thirteen centers in eleven countries, several 
of which are housed in such research universities as McMaster University, Krakow University and 
Freiburg University. The titular acronym stands for Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, 
Development and Evaluation. The inaugural article for GRADE features a schematic given in 
Figure 17 below that explains how GRADE develops recommendations. The process begins with 
a healthcare question, followed by a systematic review of all the studies that bear on that question. 
The outcomes of each study are summed and their effects are estimated. Crucially, the evidence 
for each outcome is assessed on a number of criteria including “imprecision,” “inconsistency of 
results,” and “study limitations” (Guyatt et al. 385). Two of the forms that help constitute the 
evidence hierarchy are the evidence profile (EP) and the summary of finding (SoF). The evidence 
profile breaks down the evidence with respect to given parameters whereas the summary of finding 
consolidates what the evidence says into a meaningful recommendation. Figure 17 below outlines 
this complex process of evidence grading.  
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Figure 17: GRADE working group’s schematic for evidence grading 
 
It is not so much process of systematic review itself that enacts the hard-soft patterns in 
patient care but rather in the differential of healthcare questions to which the process is directed. 
The article does not provide examples of the healthcare questions with which GRADE is 
concerned. Instead, the nature of questions may be inferred from a table that gives examples of 
literature findings that would constitute the answers to these important patient care questions. 
Entitled “Examples of best practice statements and statements that could be confused with 
motherhood statements,” the table classifies various statements as having three different 
relationships to two parameters: helpfulness and need for evidence grading. A statement that is not 
helpful, i.e. the titular “motherhood statement,” does not require grading, but a sentence that is 
helpful may require grading or it may not. Examples of the two are given in Figure 18 below.  
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Figure 18: Statements in need of grading versus statements that do not need grading 
 
 
The hard-soft enactment occurs between statements that are helpful but do not need grading 
and those that do need grading. In the case of the example statement given for “recommendations 
that may be helpful but do not need grading,” the question might be “What resources should 
pregnant women receive in regards to managing their own care?” (390). The answer involves 
offering information and supporting informed decisions, all of which amounts to addressing health 
literacy. Yet the crucial issue of health literacy becomes exists outside of systematicity by virtue 
of not requiring grading. Though it might be argued that a basic standard of care suggests a pre-
existing system, this system is not given the same treatment as the system from which the example 
statement for “recommendations that need grading” emerges. The question to which this statement 
is the answer might be “How many diabetic patients can be tested using monofilaments in a single 
day and how long should the monofilaments be left to recover?” The use of monofilaments to test 
for diabetes, whatever the outcome of the systematic review process, nevertheless emerges from 
the standard paradigm of biomedical science, whereas the process by which to cultivate health 
literacy does not. Therefore, in distinguishing between what recommendations need grading and 
what recommendations do not, GRADE enacts the hard-soft cognitive styles.  
Though Arrowsmith, published in 1926, appeared long before the advent of evidence-based 
medicine in 1992, it nevertheless nests systematicity-grading evidence hierarchies. In fact, the idea 
of the evidence hierarchy itself generates the fundamental tension that propels the book to its 
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climax on a fictional tropical island, St. Hubert. Armed with his expertise in infectious disease, 
Martin ventures to St. Hubert to develop a vaccine and test its effectiveness. Before Martin’s 
departure, his mentor, Gottlieb, perhaps suspecting that his pupil will fail to achieve the rigor 
necessary to obtain definitive results on the vaccine’s effectiveness, impresses upon him the need 
for a control group against which to compare the effects of the vaccine. To that end, Martin remains 
firm in his resolve to “sternly deprive” the vaccine to half the population right up until the images 
of suffering wrought by the plague begin to undermine it (375). One such image – that of “the face 
of terror – sunken, bloody eyes, drawn face, open mouth” – recalls a vision of his mentor, 
Gottlieb’s own “sunken, demanding eyes,” occasioning in Martin the revelation that “Gottlieb, in 
his secluded innocence, had not realized what it meant to gain leave to experiment amid the 
hysteria of an epidemic” (375). Under the conditions of secluded innocence, the rigor demanded 
by pure science is feasible, but under the grim realities of plague and human suffering, Martin 
finds it is not. Eyes represent the point of intersection that catalyzes Martin’s decision. In what is 
perhaps the climactic decision of the novel, Martin abandons all plan of the control group and 
administers the experimental vaccine to anyone who needs it. Though the vaccine successfully 
stems further mortality, Martin leaves the island feeling like a fraud even as the rest of the world 
regards him as a hero.  
Indeed, from a rigorously evidence-based perspective, he is a fraud. Ultimately, the 
decision to forgo controls and administer the vaccine to all islanders amounts to a rejection of the 
evidence hierarchy that places controlled randomized clinical trials at the top and mere clinical 
observation of ‘symptom improvement’ at the bottom. One way of describing the feelings of 
fraudulence and disappointment Martin experiences is to say that his formidable pure science 
aspirations buckle under the pressure to apply his discoveries to the chaos of the St. Hubert 
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epidemic and to its spectacles of human suffering. The applied-pure opposition and the hard-soft 
opposition are thus superimposed on one another.  
To be sure, the St. Hubert episode does not represent the first and only evidence hierarchy 
nesting in the novel. The negotiation of evidence hierarchies appears as early as Martin’s time in 
medical school and indeed may anticipate the Martin’s rejection of them on St. Hubert. The most 
prominent negotiation occurs by way of a dialogue between Martin and one of his professors, Dr. 
Davidson: 
[Martin] inquired, and publicly, “Dr. Davidson, how do they know ichthyol is good for 
erysipelas? Isn’t it just rotten fossil fish – isn’t it like the mummy-dust and puppy-ear stuff 
they used to give in the olden days?”  
“How do they know? Why, my critical young friend, because thousands of physicians have 
used it for years and found their patients getting better, and that’s how they know!”  
“Honest, Doctor, wouldn’t the patients maybe have gotten better anyway? Wasn’t it maybe 
a post hoc, propter hoc? Have they ever experimented on a whole slew of patients together, 
with controls?”  
“Probably not – and until some genius like yourself, Arrowsmith, can herd together a few 
hundred people with exactly identical cases of erysipelas, it probably never will be tried! 
Meanwhile I trust that you other gentlemen, who perhaps lack Mr. Arrowsmith’s profound 
scientific attainments and the power to use such handy technical terms as ‘control,’ will, 
merely on my feeble advice, continue to use ichthyol!” (40)  
A conventional heroic reading of this sparring would set up Martin as the uncompromising seeker 
of truth, whose exacting standards clash with Dr. Davidson’s inferior, unsystematic clinical 
observations. As such, Martin would be, retrospectively speaking, an early defender of evidence-
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based medicine. Moreover, the satirical forms make it easy to make Dr. Davidson into the narrow-
minded antagonist that a heroic reading require. As a person who would have made an “illustrious 
shopkeeper” (39) and who boasts about his list of essential prescriptions having fifty more 
prescriptions more than his predecessor’s, Dr. Davidson indeed fits the bill of antagonist against 
whose ignorance the hero must guard and eventually overcome. Yet retrospective consideration of 
Dr. Davidson’s position in light of the later events of St. Hubert validates the general thrust of his 
reasoning. Martin forgoes the control group and administers his vaccine to all who need it on the 
wings of the hope that it will reduce the islanders’ suffering. In short, Martin seeks to make them 
better, just as Dr. Davidson advises him to do in the Ichthyol lecture.  
 
4.3.2 Learning Objectives: Hard-soft in Medical Education  
 
Ichthyol constitutes one item from a list of 150 prescriptions that Dr. Davidson requires his 
students to memorize. When Martin, continuing his protest during the Ichthyol lecture, exclaims, 
“Please Dr. Davidson, what’s the use of getting all these prescriptions by heart, anyway? We’ll 
forget most of ‘em, and besides, we can always look ‘em up in the book,” Dr. Davidson replies 
with a combination of humiliating infantilization and invocation of both his personal authority and 
that of the entire medical profession (Lewis 41):  
Arrowsmith, with a man of your age I hate to answer you as I would a three-year-old boy, 
but apparently I must. Therefore, you will learn the properties of drugs and the contents of 
prescriptions BECAUSE I TELL YOU TO! If I did not hesitate to waste the time of the 
other members of this class, I would try to convince you that these statements may be 
accepted, not only my humble authority, but because they are the conclusions of wise men 
– men wiser or certainly a little older than you, my friend – through many ages. But as I 
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have no desire to indulge in flights of rhetoric or eloquence, I shall merely say that you will 
accept, and you will study, and you will memorize, because I tell you to! (Lewis 41)  
Dr. Davidson’s comments nest a different systematicity of medicine, which is to say, its reliance 
on past successes to justify present and future decisions. Dr. Davidson indeed appeals to a 
paradigm of past use: because the prescriptions have been successfully used in the past, they create 
a system for the present and future. The mutual reliance of the applied-pure and the hard-soft 
dimensions again emerges: what has been applied – which is to say, what has been used – can 
become hard – which is to say, integrated into the system of a curriculum. One requirement of the 
use-oriented paradigm theorized by the confrontation of Martin and Dr. Davidson, the relentless 
memorization of everything that is and ever has been demonstrated to be useful, recalls the 
necessity for the mnemonics, which is to say, the intellectual tchotchke that, once it has paid off 
on exams, endures more readily in memory than the scientific content it was supposed to cement.  
The Flexnerian form that at once passes on and establishes the canon of knowledge while 
stoking the complex processes of thingification into tchotchke on behalf of systematicity is the 
learning objective. Learning objectives could be said to be the most minute unit of a medical 
curriculum. The first-year medical curriculum at the UICOM consists of twelve courses, each of 
which contains anywhere from 12 to 50 learning sessions. Each learning session, the most common 
format of which is the didactic lecture, must achieve anywhere from 5 to 12 learning objectives. 
The learning objectives ensure that students across UICOM’s four campuses receive comparable 
educations. In this way, learning objectives enact hardness in the form of consensus. As the product 
of a curriculum committee that met and decided what the medical students graduating from the 
University of Illinois College of Medicine must know, the learning objectives indeed constitute a 
testament of consensus – at least among that group.  
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More broadly, the learning objectives constitute the most local and particulate cross-decade 
transmission of a much larger consensus. The learning objectives in fact perpetuate the system of 
priorities established in 1919 with the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC)’s 
standardization of what may be considered the curricular corollary of the Flexnerian revolution: 
“3600-4400 prescribed hours in anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, pathology, pharmacology, 
medicine, surgery, and obstetrics and gynaecology” (Whitehead 27). The systematic adoption of 
these broad content categories inaugurated in the United States nothing less than a canon of 
medical knowledge, all canons being, in the end, consensus-bolstered systems. Like now heavily 
contested cultural canons (e.g. the Western canon), the price the medical knowledge canon pays 
for consensus is the exclusion of other knowledge. Nevertheless, as the body of scientific 
knowledge that a competent physician was and is still expected to master – the same content 
categories appearing in the NBME’s description of the STEP 1 content – this canon acts 
simultaneously and inextricably as an educational tool and a political entity. As tool, it prescribes 
the material necessary to learn and practice medicine. As entity, it exerts influence over institutions 
as well as the daily life of medical students. In this way, the learning objectives would serve as 
perhaps the most minute extension of a strategy aimed to produce competent physicians and 
thereby protect the public.  
An email from the instructor of UICOM’s 2015 medical biochemistry course demonstrates 
this dual function of learning objectives:  
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Figure 19: E-mail from UICOM educator regarding the first exam of the 2015 biochemistry course 
 
As exam study guides, learning objectives simultaneously shape both what material is emphasized 
and how medical students organize what is arguably the preeminent activity of medical school: 
studying. As such, learning objectives may be said to be more influential than exams with respect 
to how students learn. Though it may be tempting to assume that the necessity of passing licensing 
exams exercises more influence over medical school life than learning objectives, consider that 
the percentage of time spent actually sitting for exams, while not insignificant, is nevertheless 
dwarfed by the percentage of time studying for them.  
While the significance of passing exams will ensure that student will study for hours on 
end, the learning objectives step in and significantly shape how the student actually spends those 
hours. The resulting influence over the student’s study time – the most crucial opportunity for 
learning – thus raises the stakes of the learning objectives’ affordances. Among the learning 
objectives’ many affordances – consensus-perpetuation, systematicity-building and thingification 
– the latter merits particular attention, if for no other reason that it is the least understood of the 
three. How learning objectives afford thingification can be understood through comparison of a 
medical school learning objective and an elementary school exercise. The comparison of 
pedagogical forms from two vastly different levels of education is not unfounded as the success of 
the medical education reform effort, completed by the 1920’s, was contingent upon the strength of 
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primary and secondary education systems. Without a suitably well-prepared pool of applicants, 
the rigorous standards of the new medical education system could not be implemented. To the 
extent that the “new [medical education] system fostered a narrowing of medical schools’ interests 
to issues of technical concern,” a burden fell on primary and secondary school systems to devise 
similarly narrowing strategies (Ludmerer 25). A critique from Education, Modernity and 
Fractured Meaning by Donald W. Oliver and Kathleen Waldron Gershman emphasizes what such 
technical narrowing might look like at a primary school level in a typical second-grade level 
assignment (Figure 20):  
Figure 20: First grade assignment given in Education, Modernity and Fractured Meaning 
 
In their critique of this assignment, Oliver and Gershman write that the assignment’s 
purpose is “to teach the child to order temporal events” while pointing out that:  
The child has most likely never participated in these events (planting pumpkins, watching 
the flowers turn into pumpkins). The child is not encouraged to hold a pumpkin, to feel a 
pumpkin, to feel like a pumpkin. There is no effort to present the mystery of birth and life 
and death and rebirth involved in the five-line story. The story could be a drama; it could 
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be visual; it could have smell and taste. It could be a dance. The kinds of participation in 
‘pumpkinhood’ are even more plausible given its association with feasting (Thanksgiving) 
and the mystery of the spirit world (Halloween). Yet here it is used in a very isolated way 
to teach children how to order give events in an abstract series. The consequence of 
understanding this order has little to do with eating or celebrating. It has only to do with 
how a student tests on something called verbal comprehension, a ‘skill’ which will 
presumably allow him or her to interpret technical information and cope in a highly verbal 
abstract culture. (Oliver and Gershman 184)  
Isolated from the mysterious, evocative “it-ness” of pumpkins themselves, along with any 
engagement of the imaginative or mysterious potential to which pumpkins grant access, the five-
sentence story is fragmented into five cut-out pieces, altogether affording a clear test of 
chronological reasoning, a component of verbal comprehension. The content of the chronology is 
irrelevant as long as it does not interfere with assessment: pumpkins could be just easily swapped 
for watermelons provided the cultivation of verbal comprehension is not affected. The irrelevance 
of content helps foreclose participation in what the authors whimsically call pumpkin-hood, which 
falls under the category of what they call ontological knowledge, or a deep engagement with being.  
Many levels of education later, the UICOM learning objectives enact the same technical 
isolation that forecloses ontological knowledge and helps cultivate intellectual tchotchke. Most of 
the learning objectives are written as imperatives, always beginning with verb in the form of a 
command. Some exceptions include a more descriptive phrase wherein the verb is not conjugated 
as an imperative, but rather left in the infinitive, as in “the student will be able to…” Defining 
‘learning objective’ to be any material following either of these two verbal ‘stems,’ there are five 
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separate “sub”-learning objectives in following UICOM learning objective taken from cardiac 
physiology, which as a unit deals with blood pressure and the practical concerns of measuring it:  
Describe (implied direct) blood pressure measurement with a catheter and transducer and 
explain the components of blood pressure waveform. Contrast that with the indirect 
estimation of blood pressure with a sphygmomanometer. Explain how each approach 
provides estimates of systolic and diastolic pressures. Given systolic and diastolic blood 
pressures, calculate the pulse pressure and the mean arterial pressure.  
There are five instances of the imperative tense, but only four different infinitives: describe, 
explain (used twice), contrast and calculate. The imperatives call for action: the student must act 
in the way particular verb describes with regard to the material that follows in order to demonstrate 
competence and perform well on exams. In the case of three out of the four infinitives, however, 
there is an abundance of ways to do ‘description,’ ‘explanation and ‘contrasting.’ Description can 
be a list – (first, you take the blood pressure cuff; second, you…) – whereas explanation can be a 
narrative. Contrasting imposes a more circumscribed set of actions as it implies a balancing act 
between the two entities that follow. The multiplicity of ways to do description, explanation and 
contrasting notwithstanding, there is no accounting for the anxiety that the particular action the 
student chooses has not captured all that will enable her to successfully answer a question on an 
exam. In the case of the final verb – calculate – it is almost certain that it captures little. Like verbal 
comprehension, calculating pressures is a skill that will presumably enable medical students to 
interpret medical data and to cope in medicine’s complex numerical culture. However, unless the 
exam question provides the systolic and diastolic blood-pressures in the question stem and does 
not introduce any novelty to the situation, the student who merely follows the imperative to 
calculate in the course of his preparation will be more likely to answer the question incorrectly, or, 
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at the very least, will not learn all that he could about the equation. For merely focusing on the 
equation’s use in calculating numbers, which, to be sure requires skill, nevertheless enacts isolation 
from ‘equation-hood.’  
The ostensible given-ness of equations sets up the phrase ‘equation-hood’ to be met with 
scorn or a scoff. Nevertheless, Linda Costanzo’s Physiology textbook – both the unofficial 
textbook used in UICOM M1 physiology course and a canonical physiology textbook in its fourth 
edition –  rescues equation-hood from the learning objective’s technical isolationism by presenting 
the MAP equation as capable of being read and interpreted, which is to say, capable of being 
‘participated in’ as is possible with a novel or poem. Given Costanzo’s educational background, it 
is not unfitting to envision her work through a literary lens. During her undergraduate years at 
Duke University, Costanzo admits “her loyalty was torn between two of her best subjects, 
chemistry and English” (Robertson). To assume that the ‘hard, scientific’ path won out over the 
‘soft, humanities path’ would obscure her status as the author of a celebrated scientific textbook, 
one that affords a more rigorous and profound engagement of the material than that afforded by 
the learning objectives. In contrast to the learning objective’s emphasis on calculation, which 
narrows the MAP equation to number-producing thing, Costanzo’s treatment of the MAP equation 
given in Figure 21 presents it as a text that merits contemplation:  
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Figure 21: Close-reading of the MAP equation from Costanzo’s Physiology 
 
Costanzo’s chosen imperative – “notice” – initiates her close-reading of the equation. Moreover, 
her close reading is a formal one. It says that the equations does not simply adopt the form of the 
mathematical average, but produces a variation on it: by shifting more weight to one term than the 
other, the equation exists in formal compatibility with data from a basic physiological rhythm, 
namely, the pattern of the heart spending more time relaxing and filling with blood than contracting 
and pushing blood out. Reading the equation as Costanzo does arguably creates a deeper 
engagement with physiological concepts than the UICOM learning objective’s imperative to 
calculate mean arterial pressure with a set of systolic and diastolic data. Whereas the learning 
objective sets up a basic ‘plug and chug’ task whereby the student simply plugs the data to the 
equation qua number-crunching thing, the engagement with equation-hood afford by Costanzo’s 
noticing and reading the equation constitutes an intellectual task far superior to the exercise of 
elementary mathematical skills.  
Even more surprising than the revelation that engaging with equation-hood is a more 
efficacious way of studying than the task prescribed by the learning objective, Costanzo’s reading 
of a second version of the MAP equation (Figure 22) imbues it with two additional literary qualities 
that convention would say does not apply to mathematical expressions. To be sure, the second 
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MAP equation appears nowhere among in the learning objectives, which is to say, the second MAP 
equation lies outside the consensus reached by the UICOM curriculum committee that determined 
what constitutes the central material of a UICOM medical student’s education.  
Figure 22: Close reading of the second version of the MAP equation from Costanzo’s Physiology 
 
Like her reading of the first MAP equation, Costanzo uses the imperative, “notice,” to call attention 
to formal variation. Indeed, she seeks to underline how the second MAP equation is differently the 
same from the archetype equation for pressure: Pressure = Flow x Resistance. Mean arterial 
pressure serves as the ‘Pressure,’ whereas cardiac output serves as ‘Flow’ and Total Peripheral 
Resistance serves as ‘Resistance.’ By her call for further “inspection” of the equation, Costanzo 
elucidates a potentially disconcerting dimension of equation-hood: deception. The idea that 
mathematical forms would deceive flies in the face of any attempts to make it the bedrock of 
science. As Costanzo explains, however, the deception is generated by strict adherence to algebraic 
law: “be aware that this equation is deceptively simple, because cardiac output and TPR are not 
independent variables. In other words, changes in TPR can alter cardiac output and changes in 
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cardiac output can alter TPR” (Costanzo 159). In order to avoid misusing the equation, the equation 
has to be read in a way that the technical-oriented learning objective does not prescribe. The 
distinction between what the learning objective says and does not say corresponds to hard and soft 
cognitive styles, respectively.  
 
4.3.3 Textbooks: The Hard-soft in research 
 
Though textbooks are perhaps most readily regarded as texts that govern pedagogy, the influence 
of textbooks when conceived as a function of how much time medical students actually spend 
reading and engaging with them is surprisingly limited. The relentless pace of medical school 
makes the actual reading of textbooks, for better or worse, an inefficient way of learning 
information. The more impactful, if underappreciated role they serve is to consolidate the 
paradigms governing scientific research. In this way, medical textbooks could be said to say more 
about the state of the field from which they emerge than the student audience for whom they are 
written. If the ‘raw’ material from which textbooks are drawn derives from journal articles, then 
textbooks synthesize and consolidate what journal articles produce. The reference section of 
textbooks attests to the debt they owe to journal articles. The selection and synthesis of article-
presented research arguably enacts the relationship that Thomas Kuhn claims textbooks share with 
scientific paradigms. Textbooks, Kuhn declares, “address themselves to an already articulated 
body of problems, data, and theory, most often to the particular set of paradigms to which the 
scientific community is committed at the time they are written” (Kuhn 136).  
Kuhn goes on to describe one of the formal features of textbooks that holds particular 
paradigmatic relevance: short histories of the knowledge production to which the given textbook 
owes its existence. Often, these histories take the form of “scattered references to the great heroes 
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of an earlier age” (138). These historical sketches are relatively rare in textbooks and when they 
do appear, they cannot help but stick out from the disciplinary knowledge with which the textbook 
is concerned. As such, they will likely not rank highly on the student’s list of priorities seeing as 
there would be little chance of it appearing on an exam. The rarity and seeming irrelevance of 
historical sketches thus raises the question of why they even exist in the first place. Kuhn offers 
an explanation, writing, “partly by selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages 
are implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in accordance 
with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific theory and method 
has made seem scientific” (139). A situation in which a number of esteemed thinkers sets about to 
working out a common problem gives the impression of an enterprise that is “linear and 
cumulative,” a robust, satisfying narrative that helps consolidate the paradigm to which the 
textbook addresses itself (139).  
 Costanzo’s Physiology textbook includes a description of one such situation in the chapter 
on cardiac physiology. The section where it appears is entitled “Frank-Starling Relationship” and 
its overt pedagogical function is to situate a crucial concept of cardiac physiology – the length-
tension relationship – with respect to three cardiac parameters: stroke volume, ejection fraction 
and cardiac output. As an introduction, Costanzo explains the lineage of the titular Frank-Starling 
Relationship:  
The German physiologist Otto Frank first described the relationship between the pressure 
developed during systole in a frog ventricle and the volume present in the ventricle just 
prior to systole. Building on Frank’s observations, the British physiologist Ernest Starling 
demonstrated, in an isolated dog heart, that the volume the ventricle ejected in systole was 
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determined by the end-diastolic volume. […] The Frank-Starling law of the heart, or the 
Frank-Starling relationship, is based on these landmark experiments (146). 
If attaining the status of law is a veritable disciplinary apotheosis in research and beyond – law 
being the veritable epitome of hardness and hardness being the state to which all knowledge is 
supposed to aspire – then Costanzo’s description of these past scientific heroes makes the ascent 
to disciplinary greatness seem linear and cumulative. As Kuhn predicts, the linearity and 
cumulation of this ascent is the product of both selection and distortion. With the fullest 
appreciation for the pedagogical efficacy of Costanzo’s literary background, her textbook’s 
historical sketch of the Law of the Heart indeed commits the selective and distortive historical 
errors that Kuhn posits for textbooks. These errors include: 1) oversimplifying the network of 
intellectual exchange of which Starling and Frank were a part  2) omitting the linguistic obstacles 
that might have prevented the necessary intellectual connections that led to the formation of the 
Law of the Heart 3) underestimating the disciplinary differences between Frank and Starling 4) 
failing to register for the paradigmatic differences under which Starling conducted his research 
and under which she wrote her textbook.  
 Beginning with the first of these four errors, the emphasis on the work of merely two 
scientists Frank and Starling – consequential as both were in articulating the “Law of the Heart” –
nevertheless represents only a small sample from a large pool work that has epistemological 
connections to the law of the heart. A schematic from John Henderson’s A Life of Ernest Starling, 
part biography, part history of science, details the complex lineage of the law:  
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Figure 23: The lineage of the law of the heart given in A Life of Ernest Starling (pg. 81) 
 
Taking the schematic face value, no fewer than eleven figures made contributions to the Law of 
the heart. Perhaps more importantly, the law derives from no fewer than ten different relationships, 
(denoted by arrows), of which four were student-pupil (denoted by stars). But even as it 
complicates the lineage of Starling’s heart-lung preparation and forestalls the ludicrously simple 
proposition that Starling merely picked up where Frank left off on single strand of scientific 
experimentation, the schematic still exhibits the linearity and cumulation for which Kuhn 
specifically targets textbooks: the visual organization of the diagram shows the work of the various 
scientists converging on the Law of the Heart. In this way, Henderson’s philosophy of science still 
practices the retrospective teleology of which Kuhn accuses textbooks. The sense of inevitability 
afforded by converging arrows is just another form of distortion created by the selective reduction 
of a major law to the work of two scientists in Costanzo’s sketch.   
The second distortion-creating error of Costanzo’s historical sketch relates to language and 
the contingent flow of knowledge across linguistic boundaries. Indeed, Henderson’s biography of 
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Starling further undermines the linear inevitability of Starling taking up the work of Frank by 
pointing out the linguistic obstacles to fully appreciating and thus, to use Costanzo phrase, 
“building on” Frank’s work. Henderson writes, “Frank’s writings – especially his long 1895 paper 
on the dynamics of heart muscle [“Zur Dynamik des Herzmuskels”] – are in very difficult German, 
so it is not surprising that they had escaped many English-speaking readers” (95). Starling, 
however, spoke German well, putting him in a position to engage Frank’s work without translation. 
Yet the happy and productive coincidence of Starling’s competence in German is not what the 
nationalistic labeling in Costanzo’s historical sketch most readily suggests. Rather, what can all 
too easily emerge from these labels is the triumph of scientific discovery: national boundaries do 
not hinder the transcendence of national boundaries to which scientific progress is privy. Such 
thinking is very much in the tradition of Friedrich Schleiermacher, who posits the scientific process 
as the ideal to which states should strive.10 However, Henderson’s biography suggests that this 
sense of inevitability is undermined by the contingency of speaking a foreign language. To the 
extent that “the importance of Starling’s achievement lay in his ability to bring all the strands 
together,” it was of paramount of importance that Starling’s synthesizing mind also spoke the 
language by which he could access one such strand, which is to say, Frank’s work in the original 
(82).  
 Of course, the importance of Starling’s bilingualism could be discounted by pointing out 
how English translations of Frank’s work would render German language competence 
unnecessary. This position, however, fails to recognize that translations were not as readily 
available during the early twentieth century in which Starling was writing. Indeed, the benefits of 
engaging Frank’s work in the original language and, conversely, the loss associated with Starling 
 
10 See introduction to this dissertation  
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not having spoken German, is hinted at by a 1915 paper entitled “The Regulation of the Heart 
Beat.” Written by Starling in collaboration with two other scientists, S.W. Patterson and H. Piper, 
the paper features numerous references to Frank’s work, one of which refers to technical 
vocabulary in German:  
Although the conclusions to which we have arrived differ somewhat from those of Straub, 
we found the knowledge of his results of considerable value. In his paper he gives the same 
description of the reaction of the heart to increased arterial pressure as that given by Frank 
for the frog’s heart, namely, as a reaction to initial tension (Anfangsspannung), an 
explanation which we regard as true only in so far as the initial tension determines initial 
length (Patterson, Piper, & Starling 475).  
Though it is impossible to know the reason for the trouble presumably taken by Starling and his 
co-authors to include the German term for “initial tension,” the side-by-side placement of the two 
terms in the text nevertheless gestures to the consequential role that Starling’s competence in 
German played in the creation of the Law of the Heart.  
The third distortion-creating error arises Costanzo’s description of both Frank and Starling 
as physiologists, which distorts the subtle disciplinary differences between them. Henderson 
emphasizes Frank was not strictly a physiologist, but rather “a biophysicist: he measured 
everything – flows, pressures, volumes – that could be measured and recorded data in detail” (80, 
italics mine). Characterizing Frank as a biophysicist, rather than simply as a physiologist, raises 
the question of what distinguishes biophysics and physiology. If Henderson’s description is any 
indication, biophysics research constitutes incessant measurements. Starling, on the other hand, 
was interested less in measurements and more so in connections between physiological systems. 
It is this interest that led him to develop the heart-lung preparation, which, contrary to Costanzo’s 
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historical sketch, led Starling to derive the Law of the Heart. It is this disciplinary difference, 
highlighted by Frank and Starling’s respective experimental apparatuses, that is lost in Costanzo’s 
historical sketch in which Frank and Starling are characterized as both physiologists. In this way, 
Costanzo’s sketch overstates the linearity of the progress to the Law of the Heart by understating 
the disciplinary differences between Frank’s strict biophysics research and Starling’s more 
integrative physiological approach.  
Finally, the paradigmatic situation under which Frank and Starling carried out their 
respective research projects could not be identical to that under which Costanzo composed her 
Medical Physiology textbook. In the opening sentences of the preface, Costanzo declares in no 
uncertain terms that “physiology is the foundation of medical practice. A firm grasp of its 
principles is essential for the medical student and the practicing physician” (vii). It follows that the 
clinical relevance of everything in the following five-hundred pages is more than assured. Such is 
the paradigm to which the textbook addresses itself: all the forthcoming material, including and 
especially the Frank-Sterling Law of the Heart, comprises and fits within the framework that 
determines medical problems and establishes the range of admissible evidence. It goes without 
saying that the Law of the Heart had to first exist and then reach the medical community before it 
could become a part of this medical paradigm. Yet the probability of the latter occurring is much 
lower than would be expected in view of the Law of the Heart’s central place in the veritable 
foundation of medical practice. As Henderson points out, “Starling’s difficult papers in the Journal 
of Physiology would probably have had poor exposure among doctors” (93). Both the difficulty 
and disciplinary location of Starling’s research worked against its integration into medical practice. 
To be sure, the United States steps were taken to ensure that emerging scientific knowledge 
reached medical practice – this was indeed one of the central goals of the Flexnerian Revolution. 
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The entrenchment of the Law of the Heart in a physiology textbook, however, obscures the 
contingency of this knowledge becoming medically relevant by making it seem like it always 
belonged there. Indeed, Costanzo’s labeling of both Frank’s and Starling’s work as “landmark 
experiments” erases the reality that at the time of their creation, there was nothing landmark about 
them with respect to medical concerns. Much coordination and effort went into connecting 
Starling’s findings to medicine, a connection which was by no means made inevitable by a 
coherent theoretical framework.  
Perhaps the most startling indication of how Starling’s research was not, at the time of its 
creation, situated in a framework that made its connection to medicine inevitable was the fact that 
Starling faced great resistance to his research. In the 1915 Linacre Lecture, given annually at 
Cambridge, which Henderson identifies as a key moment that enabled Starling’s research to reach 
a medical audience, Starling chooses the conclusion to address a figure skeptical to his research: 
the “so-called practical man.” The practical man, Starling proclaims, “reproaches” the physiologist 
for lavishing attention “on things which can have little importance in medicine, for the 
maintenance of health or the cure of disease” (Starling 26-27). By this proclamation, Starling 
firmly situates pure research with questions of hardness and paradigm. Formally separated in the 
Biglan model by different dimensions, they become mutually constitutive when Starling points out 
that “in physiology, as in all other sciences, no discovery is useless, no curiosity misplaced or too 
ambitious, and we may be certain that every advance achieved in the quest of pure knowledge will 
sooner or later play its part in the service of man” (27).   
The enactment of the hard patterns by textbooks is in many respects more dangerous than 
the enactment of the applied-pure patterns in exam questions, EMR’s or peer-reviewed journal 
articles because the oppositions itself is more difficult to witness. Where the applied-pure 
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enactments allow for the two be next to one another, this is not the case for the hard-soft opposition. 
If the historical sketch from Costanzo’s physiology textbook is any indication, systematic hardness 
is all there is and ever was. As his biography shows, however, Starling had to work outside of 
dominant theoretical frameworks about, among other things, what is relevant to medical practice 
in order to articulate the Law of the Heart. This is not to say, of course, that the work itself is not 
systematic but that it is perhaps more idiosyncratic than the Biglan model prepared to acknowledge 
in a discipline it would consider hard. In this way, textbooks as well as learning objectives cultivate 
a dangerous sense of a distinction between hard cognitive styles and a soft cognitive style.  
 
4.4 CONSOLIDATING LIFE-NONLIFE COGNITIVE STYLES: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
BOARD GUIDELINES, OBJECTIVE STRUCTURED CLINICAL EXAMINATIONS 
(OSCE’S) AND CULTURAL COMPETENCY TRAININGS 
 
The life-nonlife dimension of the Biglan model relates to the subject matter characteristic of the 
sentience of the object of study. Institutional Review Board Guidelines, Objective Structured 
Clinical Examinations and Cultural Competency Trainings have their own patterns of doing life 
nonlife. In the case of the Institutional Review Board guideline, the patterning is explicitly 
rendered as questions of living and non-living research subjects. As for the Objective Structured 
Clinical Examination, the life-nonlife pattern arises by the rendering patients as automata. Finally, 
cultural competency trainings exhibit life-nonlife patterns insofar as they rely on stable, personal 




4.4.1 Institutional Review Board Guidelines: Life-nonlife in Research 
 
The enactment of a life-nonlife cognitive style occurs in a form that governs medical research: 
Institutional Review Boards (IRB). There are two IRB forms: one for the bio-medical and social-
behavioral, the two major categories of research that involve human subjects. The IRB concept 
extends as far back as the aftermath of World War II, when revelations over the scientific 
experimentation conducted in concentration camps of the Third Reich prompted the codification 
of concerning human experimentation. The subsequent importance of IRB system in governing 
medical research cannot be underestimated: besides granting ethical seal of approval from a 
researcher’s home institution, IRB status is bound up in funding, being a criteria of grant proposals, 
including that of the NIH.  
 The IRB equivalent at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, also known as the 
Office of Protection for Research Subjects, boasts numerous forms for its researchers to consult, 
including a glossary of terms. One of the terms, human subject, has three entries given below:  
Figure 24: Three definitions of the human subject given by the Office of Protection for Research Subjects 
 
For the first and third definitions, life is the crucial linchpin, “living” being the crucial participle 
modifying “individual” in both cases. As in the Biglan model, these forms take the meaning of 
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“living” to be self-evident, thereby seemingly absolving the matter from further consideration. 
There is indeed no entry in the glossary defining life or living, just as is the case with the Biglan 
model.  
 A slightly more indicative glimpse at what living means for IRB purposes instead occurs 
in another set of documents provided by the Illinois IRB: “decision-trees” that help researchers 
determine whether their research requires IRB approval. As a form, the decision tree can be taken 
as a visual algorithm, beginning with an initial query that branches into choices, which in turn lead 
to further queries and further choices. Eventually, the algorithm bottoms out, producing one of two 
results: IRB approval is required for the research or it is not required.  
Figure 25: Decision tree 1 from Illinois IRB Office 
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The initial query of the first decision tree given above in Figure 25 is “Will you, a member 
of your research team or a collaborator observe, interact with, or intervene with individuals to 
gather information that will be used in research?” Branching off from this query is a choice 
between ‘YES’ or ‘NO.’ The ‘YES’ pathway snakes around and will bottom out in one of two 
results: “Not human participation research. No application to the IRB office is needed” or “Project 
is research with human subjects. An application to the IRB office and written notice of approval 
required before the study can begin.” The ‘NO’ pathway, on the other hand, bottoms out with 
“Refer to IRB Decision tree #2 on Existing/Secondary data.” The division established by the 
necessity of IRB approval enacts a crucial patterning onto which the Biglan model’s life-nonlife 
distinction maps moderately well. Whether in an applied-hard discipline like medicine, a pure-soft 
discipline like anthropology or an applied-soft discipline like family studies, researchers in life 
disciplines must invest considerable time and effort to merely get permission to conduct their 
research, a burden with which researchers in nonlife disciplines are not often saddled. Of course, 
there are numerous exceptions on both sides of this ostensible divide: an ethnomusicologist, 
though working in the nonlife field of music, might need to obtain IRB approval to study urban 
street music whereas a political scientist avoids IRB approval by virtue of the theoretical nature of 
her work in a discipline nevertheless classified as a life field. With these complications in mind, 
the necessity of obtaining IRB approval mediates a crucial disciplinary difference by establishing 
a gap between research that requires approval and that which does not. Whether that gap is situated 
by a classic Biglan life-nonlife opposition is unclear.  
However, the disciplinary difference enacted by the first decision tree becomes classically 
life-nonlife in the second decision tree, which researchers will consult if they take the ‘NO’ 
pathway branching out from the first decision tree’s initial query:  
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Figure 26: Decision tree 2 from Illinois IRB Office 
 
The second decision-tree begins with the query: “Are the data/specimens about for from 
individuals who are or may be still living?” From this, there are the same two paths: YES or NO. 
That this mutually exclusive decision point rules on the question of life is indisputable considering 
that “materials are from cadavers or data is about deceased individuals” accompanies the ‘NO’ 
pathway (see Figure 26 above). The second decision tree thus does an undeniable life-nonlife 
opposition by making the question of life or living an either-or proposition: there are either corpses 




4.4.2 Objective-Structured Clinical Examination (OSCE): Life-nonlife in Medical Education 
 
The prominence of written medical school exams can overshadow the existence of exams that test 
clinical skills in real time. In these real time exams, the examinee interacts not with a series of test-
questions but with a person. Both exams formats punctuate medical education. STEP 2, the second 
round of USMLE board examinations, itself consists of both formats, exhibiting a clinical 
knowledge (CK) component and a clinical skills (CS) component. STEP 2 CK resembles STEP 1 
in that it is comprised of several hundred multiple choice questions, the key difference being that 
STEP 2 tests fewer basic science principles and more clinical questions. STEP 2 CS, on the other 
hand, consists of eight 60-minute blocks during which the examinee must complete all of the 
standard tasks of medical interviewing, including taking a history, conducting a physical 
examination and writing up a patient note. The individual blocks of which the STEP 2 CK is 
comprised each constitute an objective structured clinical examination (OSCE).   
The OSCE first appeared in the mid 1970’s and replaced traditional assessments of clinical 
competence, which possessed many perceived disadvantages. The seminal 1975 article that 
inaugurated the OSCE, “Assessment of Clinical Competence using Objective Structured 
Examination,” lists two: 
1) Confusion over what is being tested: As clinical competence includes but is not limited 
to eliciting and charting a history, performing a physical examination, ordering further 
testing, arriving at a diagnosis and forming a treatment plan, there can be considerable 
confusion over which combination of these tasks is being tested in an exam situation.  
2) Luck of the draw: Conducted in the hospital setting, the traditional clinical assessment 
was reliant on the patients who happened to walk through the door that day. As such, 
there was considerable variability over such factors as the complexity of the physical 
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complaint itself, to say nothing of the individual patient’s primary language, level of 
health literacy, or mood, among countless other factors. This multi-factorial situation 
flies in the face of the basic scientific value to rigorously control variables (Harden et 
al. 448).  
One of the ways the OSCE addresses the first problem is to break each encounter down into 
discrete tasks. When the task is to elicit and chart a history, the OSCE and the electronic medical 
record (EMR) participate in a formal cross-breeding whereby the EMR categories structure the 
rhythm of the medical encounter, as Figure 27 demonstrates below. The pictured schematic of 
integrated medical interviewing from Smith’s Patient Centered Interviewing – the official textbook 
of the UICOM Foundations in Clinical Medicine course and a noted medical interviewing textbook 
in its third edition – ideally consists of a linear beginning, middle and end during which patient-
centered skills (e.g. storytelling) and physician-centered skills (e.g. questioning) alternate:  
Figure 27: Schematic for integrated medical interviewing Given in Smith’s Patient Centered Interviewing 
CC= chief complaint, HPI= history of present illness, PMH = past medical history, SH = social history, 
FH = family history, ROS = review of systems: 
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The synthesis in an OSCE of a biopsychosocial story promised by the Smith integrated 
interviewing schematic, or any other clinical encounter, is unlikely. In view of how the EMR 
categories rigidly cordon off social history from the biologically-oriented categories of chief 
complaint, past medical history, review of systems and family history, not to mention the sloppy 
organization of AthenaNet’s FH described in the earlier discussion of EMR’s, the effort and time 
required to integrate the necessary information to arrive at a cohesive ‘biopsychosocial story’ is 
greater and hence integration is less likely. Moreover, the only real place for emotion and other 
psychological data in EMR is in the HPI and possibly a psychiatric section in the Review of 
Systems.  
At whichever point emotion emerges in the medical interview, if it emerges at all, a 
memory device given by Smith supports the process of responding to or managing the emotional 
content of clinical encounters. Compared to the twelve-word mnemonic for the names of the 
twelve cranial nerves, along with numerous other mnemonics for the content tested on written 
exams, the memory device for emotion – NURS – is considerably shorter and simpler, enough so 
to be distinguished as an acronym, being a single utterance with letters corresponding to proper 
words rather than an entire sentence. In the case of NURS, the words signified by the letters are 
actions that the physician can choose to exercise when emotion arises: naming, understanding, 
respecting, supporting. Moreover, if NURS affords a standardized and rigid approach to emotional 
context in the medical interview, it is an approach that nevertheless “fits with” the standardized 
and rigid emotional content that the medical student must elicit from their standardized patients in 
OSCE’s. 
 To understand how acronym and the emotional content of OSCE’s fit together, the 
standardized patient itself must be more clearly articulated. The image of what standardized 
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patients must be for the purposes of the OSCE emerges through a description of virtuality in 
medical education:  
virtuality not only replaces reality (a “reversal”), but we are seduced by it. Hyperreal 
television wildlife programs are more natural than nature; pornography is more sexual than 
sex […] Simulated medical education is more real than live learning – in resuscitation 
scenarios, Sim Man, Sim Woman, or Sim Baby must not be allowed to die. (Bleakley and 
Bligh 378) 
If virtuality is seductive replacement, the entity that does the replacing, or plays the role of 
replacement in OSCE’s is the standardized patient. In the effort to standardize the clinical 
conditions under which students are tested and thus eliminate the second major drawback with 
traditional clinical examinations, the standardized patients follow scripts, which, among other 
functions, seductively replace emotion.  
Glimpses of how the scripts do this seductive replacement emerge through the OSCE 
grading rubrics, the forms of written feedback given to students indicating their performance in 
meeting the sort of discrete clinical objectives that will be tested on STEP 2 Clinical Skills. 
Therefore, in preparation for STEP 2 CS, feedback may be administered from the very beginning 
of medical school, as was the case at the University of Illinois College of Medicine. OSCE’s in 
fact comprised the core grading component of the 2017 Foundations of Clinical Medicine (FCM) 
course, the sole clinical exposure in the M1 curriculum dominated by didactic lectures and other 
forms of book learning. The grading rubric for this case consisted of 14 items, some of which, like 
question item 1, contain as few as 5 sub-items (e.g. item 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e) or as many as 16 sub-
items, as with item 12 (e.g. 12a – 12p). Each item corresponds to a piece of information that the 
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student must record in his or her chart in order to receive full credit. Item 8, given in Figure 28 
below, involves the emotional context of the illness: 
Figure 28: Item 8 from an FCM grading rubric 
 
Unlike most of the other items of the grading rubric, this item features direct quotations, 
presumably lifted directly from the standardized patient scripts.  
 Thus, the acronym-reliant technique of managing emotion and what the OSCE requires 
emotion to be go together. There is a formal compatibility between them: a compact, emotion 
supporting acronym like NURS goes with a scripted expression of emotion. In this way, the OSCE 
exhibits a life-nonlife patterning wherein unpredictable events like emotional expression can be 
managed and contained by handy, yet lifeless mnemonics. The OSCE’s enactment of life-nonlife 
fragmentation is thus closer to the learning objective’s enactment of the hard-soft; just the 
hardening of thingification brings the soft into existence as its compulsory other while keeping the 
soft obscured, so too does the nonlife virtuality of the simulation bring life into existence as its 
compulsory other while indicating nothing about what life is.  
By virtue of these scripts, the OSCE forces the patient into an automaton that replaces 
reality: when student feeds questions, they invariably receive certain information from the patient, 
which nurtures the expectation that this will always be the case. This guarantee constitutes the 
seductive replacement of emotion. The exigencies of the OSCE demands that the standardized 
patient volunteer the information if the question is asked, for this information must be present in 
the written history in order to receive credit. In the event that the standardized patient was to 
purposely withhold or forget information, as patients might in so-called real life, they would thwart 
 186 
the pedagogical objectives of the examination. Nevertheless, the transformation of patient into 
automaton for the purposes of the OSCE generates the seductive force that characterizes virtuality. 
In this virtual space, there are non-life automata that nonlife cognitive style that opposes itself 
against a categorical other, a life cognitive style.  
 
4.4.3 Cultural Competence Trainings: Life-nonlife in Patient Care 
 
Cultural competence is often cited as the Flexnerian enterprise’s answer to the challenges put forth 
by questions of the socio-cultural determinants of health and health disparities between various 
demographics. As with the medical humanities, the health humanities, the arts and medicine, these 
terms – cultural competence, health disparities, social determinants of health – often overlap in 
confusing ways and can refer to a variety of different projects. One of, if not the only, binding 
thread is that they seek improvement in patient care and health outcomes, rendering anything under 
these broad rubrics inherently clinical projects. The clinical further raises the stakes of these 
interventions and any potential problems with them.  
One particularly trenchant criticism of these projects challenges their reliance on “stable 
cultural norms or predictable culturally based behaviors where none exist” (Gregg and Saha 543). 
In this way, the great lifelike force of culture joins the fate that biology suffered with the creation 
of the Flexnerian curriculum. Affixing culture to competence enacts the presumption that culture 
can be comprehended and mastered like any of the other material of medical curriculum in which 
students and practitioners must achieve competence. In this way, competence does to culture what 
learning objectives do to the standard scientific material of biomedicine: thingification. With 
thingification comes an inflated sense of mastery, the extreme and unwanted version of what the 
use of the comparatively humbler word, ‘competence,’ strives for. Writing on the difference 
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between cultural competence and what they call cultural humility, Tervalon and Murray-García 
demonstrate by way of personal anecdote the misleading, and, in this case, clinically dangerous 
confidence afforded by cultural competence that relies on thingified culture:  
To be avoided […] is the false sense of security in one’s training evidenced by the 
following actual case from our experience: An African American nurse is caring for a 
middle-aged Latina woman several hours after the patient had undergone surgery. A Latino 
physician on a consult service approached the bedside and, noting the moaning patient, 
commented to the nurse that the patient appeared to be in a great deal of postoperative pain. 
The nurse summarily dismissed his perception, informing him that she took a course in 
nursing school in cross-cultural medicine and ‘knew’ that Hispanic patients over-express 
“the pain they are feeling.” (Tervalon and Murray-García 118-119). 
As first letters stood for the names of the cranial nerves in the cranial nerve mnemonic, so does 
“Hispanic,” for the nurse, stand for “over-expression of pain.” How this tchotchke understanding 
of cultural difference became so solidified as to seduce the nurse into allegedly ignoring signs of 
pain in her patient is multi-factorial, being a combination of the materials used in her cross-cultural 
medicine, the manner of instruction, the learner herself, the overall learning environment and the 
like. Examining the role of one of these factors – cultural competence materials – leads to the 
revelation that materials used to train cultural competence do indeed afford the thingification of 
culture, which, in turn, presupposes a nonlife cognitive style opposed against a life cognitive style. 
One such set of materials is “A Physician’s Practical Guide to Culturally Competent Care,” 
an interlocking 9-part video module series developed by the U.S. Health and Human Services’ 
Office of Minority Health. Though asserting this video series figured among the materials that the 
anonymous nurse encountering in her cross-cultural would amount to pure speculation, the series 
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does serve as the cultural competence training for the intake volunteers of Avicenna Community 
Healthcare Clinic – a multi-cultural facility in Champaign, Illinois that serves immigrant 
populations and receives much of its funding and support from the Central Illinois Mosque and 
Islamic Center. The stakes of cultural competence training are thus particularly high for Avicenna; 
as such, the likelihood that its choice of the HHS modules is an expression of honest dedication to 
cultivating cultural competence is perhaps greater than the likelihood that it is merely lip service 
to the diversity and cultural issues, as is perhaps the case at some health care facilities. Despite 
honest intentions, however, the choice of these material for cultural competence training is highly 
questionable.  
One problem with the series is that what exactly makes it a “practical” guide is unclear; if 
the pure-applied dichotomy is insisted upon, the series is perhaps more of pure cataloging of 
various races, problems-posed and the various ways medical personal might deal with those 
problems. Broken down into three parts, each with three sub-parts, the series indeed traces the 
members of a single medical practice as they witness and confront ‘culture’ in the everyday 
business of running the clinic. The first two sub-parts of each module dramatize physician-patient 








Table 3: The Physician-patient interactions of “A Physician’s Practical Guide to Culturally-competent 
care”   
Module  Patient Ethnicity  Problem(s)  
1.1 Hispanic  Language barrier; 
accidental overdose  
1.2 Native American  Non-compliance; fear of 
dying in a hospital 
2.1 Vietnamese  Language barrier, faulty 
translation by a family 
member; refusal of 
treatment  
2.2 Hispanic  Culture-bound syndromes 
(ataque de nervios)  
3.1 Black (Ethiopian)  Socioeconomic status; 
health literacy 
3.2 Black (African-American)  Socioeconomic status; 
health literacy 
 
The module-level structure of the series helps provide an answer to the often overlooked, yet 
fundamental question in cultural competency materials about the relationship between race or 
ethnicity and culture. If this structure schematized in Table 3 is any indication, race or ethnicity 
constitutes the basic organizational units of cultural competence: physicians learn cultural 
competence along the lines laid down by conventional racial or ethnic categories. The use of 
conventional racial categories in turn risks deployment of conventional race-problem pairings as 
well. The reification of these categories by this, the module-level structure of the training video, 
contributes to the work of thingification: following the video, the black patient is the patient who 
is health illiterate; the Hispanic patient is the patient who cannot speak English.  
 A particularly evocative thingification of culture occurs in Module 1.2. The patient in this 
module is a Native American woman with Type II diabetes named Geraldine Williams. Geraldine 
resists taking her medication and instead insists on receiving traditional therapy from the Arizona 
community into which she was born. Returning from a 6-month retreat, she meets with her 
skeptical physician Dr. Brown to discuss conventional treatment options. In the climax of the 
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module, Geraldine expresses her belief in traditional folk medicine while Dr. Brown is thinking to 
himself how it could be the case that she could really believe in its efficacy (see Figure 29 below).   
Figure 29: Thingification of Culture from “A Physician’s Practical Guide to Culturally-competent Care”  
  
Time Mark: 2:20 Time Mark: 2:23 
Screenshots from Module 2.2 of “A Physician’s Practical Guide to Culturally-competent 
care”. The sub-titles of the first screenshot are spoken by Dr. Brown (left) whereas the sub-
titles of the second screenshot are spoken by Dr. Rivera (right).  
 
Characterized by exaggerated expressions and mannerisms, the image of a Native American 
woman who is non-compliant functions as a tchotchke figurine like those pictured in Figure 29 
above. Like material figurines, the example of Geraldine, along with the other patients in the 
cultural competence trainings, help constitute the conceptualization of salient, constant behaviors 
that can in turn apply in a variety of situations.  
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In addition to making cultural tchotchke, the cultural competence materials also 
accomplish thingification of competence. An example of this process occurs in Module 2.2 when 
Maria Gonzalez –the mother of Arturo Gonzalez, the patient from Module 1.1 – demands to see 
the practice’s only Spanish-speaking or female physician, Dr. Rivera. In a conversation about Mrs. 
Gonzalez, Dr. Rivera and her colleague, Dr. Brown, get into an argument about cultural 
stereotyping. Predictably, Dr. Rivera emerges, as in the previous modules, as the culturally 
competent figure who must teach her culturally incompetent colleagues a lesson. Figure 31 below 
shows two screenshots capturing what could be characterized as the pedagogical climax of their 
argument:   
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Figure 31: Thingification of competence from “A Physician’s Practical Guide to Culturally-competent 
Care” 
  
Time Mark: 0:58 Time Mark: 1:12 
Screenshots from Module 2.2 of “A Physician’s Practical Guide to Culturally-competent 
care”. The sub-titles of the first screenshot are spoken by Dr. Brown (left) whereas the sub-
titles of the second screenshot are spoken by Dr. Rivera (right).  
 
The face-value objective of the encounter is to discourage the utterance of statements like 
“Who better than a Hispanic woman could get that worked up?” by inculcating the realization that 
no matter their delivery or the intention behind them they invariably “foster stereotypes” (Office 
of Minority Health). Using the video to elaborate on what fostering stereotypes actually is, 
stereotypical utterances could constitute pairings of a readily available categories – i.e. Hispanic 
and woman – with an idiom for, say, flustered behavior – i.e., getting worked up. Both category 
and idiom are ready-made and, by dint of incessant pairing, seem to go together, providing the 
cheap raw material for assembling tchotchke-like assessments of situations. By Dr. Rivera’s 
response, the video works to discourage such assembly, giving the impression that the training 
module serves the moral framework to which cultural competence answers. Such would be the 
obvious intended result of cultural competence training video. However, the utterance of a phrase 
by Dr. Rivera that is meant to show cultural competence – “Fostering stereotypes through humor 
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is still fostering stereotypes” – is no less formulaic than “Who better than a Hispanic woman could 
get that worked up?” the very comment demonstrates cultural incompetency.  
Incidentally, the manner whereby Martin’s racism comes to the fore in Arrowsmith is 
formally similar to the plots of the cultural competence training video whereby Dr. Brown makes 
demeaning remarks about Mrs. Gonzalez. That Arrowsmith would deal with issues of race in 
medicine several decades before it would become a talking point in medicine attests to the 
theoretical prescience of imaginative works. For the majority of Arrowsmith, there is virtually no 
indication of the need for something like cultural competence in clinical practice. As such, there 
could be no nesting of a discrete form of cultural competence as with the mnemonic or the evidence 
hierarchy. It is not until Martin makes his pivotal voyage to St. Hubert that he finds himself under 
conditions in which such a need even becomes apparent, for only there does he have what is 
presumably his first interactions with black patients. It is also the occasion of his first collaboration 
with a black physician, Dr. Oliver Marchand. The entrance of black patients and Dr. Marchand 
compels the disclosure of Martin’s own heretofore hidden racism. Martin’s racist ideas hide not 
because they are a secret withheld for reasons of plot or suspense but rather because the situations 
traced by the novel thus far have not permitted it to emerge. The novel’s silence on Martin’s racism 
up to this point thus represents a formal nesting of institutional racism: since mainstream medical 
schools at the dawn of the Flexnerian enterprise did not accept black students, students like Martin 
would have had less opportunity to even know that they held views that could be considered racist. 
It takes Martin’s voyage to a Caribbean island in order for racist sentiments to emerge.  
The disclosure of Martin’s racist views can be demarcated into three phases, each phase 
making the character assume increasing responsibility for revealing his racism. In the first phase, 
the narrative voice asserts an observation: “like most white Americans, Martin talked a great deal 
 194 
about the inferiority of Negroes and had learned nothing whatever about them” (369). As a 
commentarial statement, the first phase contains the most indirect insight in that it renders an 
observation by drawing on aspects of Martin’s life and character that presumably justify a charge 
of racism. There is indeed no previous scene in the novel in which Martin says anything about the 
inferiority of black people, so the narrative voice has to step in and manifest what is otherwise 
absent. The second phase involves free indirect discourse whereby the narrative voice presents, on 
Martin’s behalf, a thought he had following a productive half-hour conversation with Dr. 
Marchand. Martin’s thought equates Dr. Marchand with a “beautiful young animal.”  the 
focalization of Martin’s thought in free indirect discourse offers relevant evidence taken directly 
from the subsequent scene, which, however, remains under a thick degree of narrative mediation. 
Martin does not actually say that Dr. Marchand is a beautiful young animal, but, by virtue of the 
narrative voice’s access to his thoughts, the reader knows that he thinks it. In the final phase, 
Martin declares in dialogue “I never thought a Negro doctor – I wish people wouldn’t keep 
showing me how much I don’t know!” (370). The direct quote of dialogue further thins the degree 
of narrative mediation by cutting out the narrative voice entirely. 
The presence of vulgar, tchotchke-like racism in both Arrowsmith and the cultural 
competence trainings raises considerable questions over the difference between the artistic 
ambitions of the former and the clinical ambitions of the latter. Adopting a perspective that regards 
aesthetic forms and pervasive and mundane forms nested inside one another forecloses the 
possibility of establishing any essential, categorical difference between the two types of texts. Yet 
the same scene in Arrowsmith involving Martin and Dr. Marchand shows what cultural 
competence training videos still cannot do: offer an alternative vision of what cultural competence 
strives for in patient care.  
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This alternative vision of cultural competence is theorized on the occasion of the two 
physicians first meeting. On this occasion, Dr. Marchand makes his way to care for quarantined 
families, which serves as a testament to the seriousness of the epidemic: “oh yes,” Dr. Marchand 
explains to Martin, “in this crisis they permit a Negro doctor to practice even among the whites!” 
(Lewis 370). An arrangement in which members of a group cannot practice medicine among 
another group nests a “pattern that incorporates the experiences of [differentiation and 
stratification of humans along the lines of symbolic value attributed to phenotypical traits such as 
skin color]” (Frost 221). It is the effort to understand such patterns that presents an alternative to 
the stable configurations on which the cultural competence materials rely.  
The scene goes on to move the consideration of this alternative vision of cultural 
competence from the periphery to the center of patient care. As the narrative voice observes, “for 
a half-hour did Dr. Arrowsmith and Dr. Marchand forgetting the plague, forgetting the more cruel 
plague of race-fear, draw diagrams” (Lewis 370 emphasis added). Likening race-fear to a plague 
– a word that, in a non-metaphorical deployment, would be reserved for the bacteria-induced crisis 
that Martin has come to vanquish – can be trivialized as a rhetorical flourish highlighting the 
seriousness of St. Hubert’s racialized society. A metaphorical application of plague to race-fear 
would represent a way of borrowing some of the seriousness from the bacterial problem and 
transferring it to the social problem. Such a transfer would proceed from a situation of inequality 
between the two problems: the social problem starts as a less urgent problem and needs an 
unquestionably urgent crisis – a bacterial-induced crisis – to make it feel more urgent.  
However, the qualification made for this second plague of race fear throws a wrench in this 
explanation. The fact that the narrative voice qualifies race-fear as the “crueler” of the two plagues 
negates the possibility that it is in need of rhetorical bolstering from the seriousness of a bacterial 
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crisis. A non-metaphorical of plague for race-fear makes it worthy of the same level of medical 
attention as that received by the bacteria-induced plague. As a disaster equally as serious, Martin’s 
bacteriological expertise has nothing to give race-fear. Moreover, he does not wish to see what he 
does not know. By not wishing to see the racism in his own mind – the assumption that people 
with the phenotype of darker skin tone cannot be physicians – he is incapable dealing with the 
plague of race-fear. In this way, Martin reveals the holistic impulses of the understanding he lacks 
but with which Dr. Marchand forces him to reckon. These understandings attempt to expand a 
strictly biomedical understanding of health that would otherwise leave out race-fear as something 















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION – IMAGINING DISCIPLINARY RECONCILIATION 
FOR HOLISTIC HEALTHCARE 
 
5.1 DOING, KNOWING, BEING 
 
One of the great ironies of the Flexnerian enterprise was, its preeminent historian, Kenneth 
Ludmerer, tells us, assuming rather than proving the existence of harmony among research, patient 
care and medical education, the three once scattered activities it brought together. Viewed from a 
new formalist perspective, the subsequent destabilization of the enterprise’s fragile equilibrium 
can be attributed to failure to appreciate the formal incompatibilities between the activities that 
constitute its three arms. One of the starkest incompatibilities lies in the rhythmic differences 
between the long, contemplative, lingering, sometimes groping dynamic of research, the often 
breakneck, sometimes forcedly linear, highly punctuated pace of patient care and finally the 
carefully regulated, cyclical nature of medical education. The implements used in the course of 
these activities also vary widely. Taken at face value, navigating electronic medical records does 
not look like navigating the intricacies of Institutional Review Board approval. Studying for exams 
in reference to learning objectives does not look like learning how to talk to patients from 
unfamiliar cultural backgrounds. The previous chapter attempted to bring these various 
implements together for the purpose of restoring them to a single plane, thereby establishing a 
precedent for studying them collectively while hopefully arriving at an understanding of how their 
patterns of use, systematicity and sentience of the object of study enact or afford disciplinary 
fragmentation. This chapter states this dissertation’s answer to how the resulting understanding of 
disciplinary fragmentation is inimical to holistic healthcare before offering a vision for what 
disciplinary reconciliation might look like.  
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 When understood as a function of three characteristics of subject-matter difference, 
disciplinary fragmentation is not just a function of the two categories into which these 
characteristics are split. The splitting of subject-matter difference into these three characteristics 
is itself fragmentary as well. The three dimensions along which the Biglan model classifies subject 
matter difference indeed affords a dubious distinction among three domains: doing, knowing and 
being. The respective poles of each dimension then further divide each of these three domains into 
two parts, as shown in the Table 4 below:  
Table 4: Disciplinary fragmentation as a function of separating doing from knowing from being  
Pole 1 of Dimension Three Domains Drawn by 
Three Dimensions of 
Subject Matter Difference 
Pole 2 of Dimension 
Pure Doing Applied 
Hard Knowing Soft 
Life Being Nonlife 
 
Setting aside the issue of how well the Biglan model describes the organization of the twenty-first 
century research university, it is far more important to consider how the casting of the model’s 
three characteristics of subject matter difference as a dualistically splitting up doing, knowing and 
being extends these characteristics beyond questions of disciplinarity. So while critics may easily 
challenge the validity of the Biglan model to successfully classify the similarity of actual academic 
departments, especially those considered interdisciplinary, it would not be so easy to dismiss 
fundamental distinctions it draws between doing, knowing and being. Indeed, the far-reaching 
implications of these oppositions becomes clearer when expressed as the intractable opposition 
between self and other. Under the strictest, which is to say, entirely mutually exclusive categorical 
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disciplinarity, the pure can be regard as existing for itself, applied existing for the other; hard 
proceeds according to rules determined by others, soft proceeds according to self-determined rules; 
the self is alive, that which does not live is otherness (see Table 5 below).  
Table 5: Disciplinary fragmentation as a function of separating doing from knowing from being and the 
Biglan oppositions as a function of self and other 
Pole 1 of Dimensions Domain (Drawn by Three 
Dimensions) 
Pole 2 of Dimensions 
Pure: Doing something for the 
sake of itself 
Doing Applied: Doing something for 
the sake of others  
Hard: Knowing that relies on 
an impersonal, external 
system 
Knowing Soft: Knowing that relies on 
an idiosyncratic, internal 
system 
Life: Being which has 
sentience  
Being Nonlife: Being which does not 
have sentience  
 
 However, the mutual constitution of doing, knowing and being makes it impossible to 
maintain the convenient mutually exclusivity of use, systematicity and sentience of the object of 
study posited by the Biglan model. Instead, these characteristics of subject matter difference, like 
doing, knowing and being, are mutually constitutive: sentience shapes systematicity shapes use. 
The forms of the Flexnerian enterprise elucidate how this mutual constitution operates to enact 
biomedicine. Biomedicine is the project that privileges the biological or physiological as the 
foundation of life, which helps to not only to justify these factors as the center of systematicity for 
the particular form of health care it prescribes but also to ensconce it as the ultimate form of health 
care. Per the exigencies of the resulting systematicity, anything that falls outside of biological or 
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physiological information is either not useful or useful only to the extent that it supports the capture 
of such information. Few if any Flexnerian forms, either examined or not by this dissertation, make 
this more obvious than the relative of the categories that organize the Electronic Medical Record. 
With the exception of the Social History section, along with, to a certain extent, the History of 
Present Illness and Past Medical History, all sections of the Electronic Medical Record are 
formally oriented around biological or physiological factors. It is for this reason that Smith’s 
Patient Centered Interviewing has to make special mention of the Social History’s usefulness in 
order to justify its existence in the medical interview. Yet under a paradigm that regards health as 
a function of such socio-political factors as a stable income or legal status, the information elicited 
in the social history is as useful, which is to say, has as much to do with health, as even the most 
pathologically relevant physiological change.  
With the 1973 publication of the “The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for 
Biomedicine,” George Engel arguably sought to create such a paradigm with his biopsychosocial 
model, thereby attempting to establish systematicity for holistic healthcare that would make 
psychological and sociological information useful. With its Optimal Healing Environment, 
Integrative Medicine currently seeks to extend the biopsychosocial paradigm to include two sets 
of factors that Engel left out, the spiritual and the behavioral, thereby making those factors useful. 
Yet merely expanding the disciplinary scope does not achieve truly holistic healthcare, as chapter 
two’s argument for disciplinary supplementation tried to show. As long as oppositions like the 
applied and pure, hard and soft, life and nonlife continue to divide use, systematicity and sentience, 
there will always be some measure of fragmentation and some aspect of health left out, thereby 
creating the need for the next supplement and deferring the achievement of complete and unbroken 
health care.  
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The mutual constitution of the Biglan categories revealed by the Flexnerian forms denies 
the possibility of categorical distinctness of cognitive styles that those very same categories tried 
to establish. The mutual constitution instead suggests the possibility of a recursive cognitive style, 
which is to say, a cognitive style that exists in the domain of difference-in-sameness. A recursive 
cognitive style does not deny the sheer existence of difference between doing that exists for itself 
and for others, between knowledge that relies on an external system and an internal one, between 
being that has sentience and does not. Rather, it asserts, as Pasteur suggested, that there is an 
indelible connection between them. In the search for this connection, a return to mind is necessary. 
The philosophical observations of another figure of biomedicine, Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-
1894), corroborate this proposition:  
Mathematics and music, the most glaring possible opposites of human thought! And yet 
connected, mutually sustained. It is as if they would demonstrate the hidden [congruity] of 
all the actions of our mind, which in the revelations of [artistic] genius makes us perceive 
unconscious utterances of a mysteriously active intelligence. 11 (Helmholtz 46-7) 
Written in the introduction to a lecture-turned-essay entitled “On the Physiological Causes of 
Harmony in Music” (1857), Helmholtz speculates on the existence of the “secret congruity of the 
mind” that achieves the spectacular feat of finding interconnection between what the systematicity 
dimension of the Biglan model might respectively carve up into soft and hard: music and 
mathematics, artistic genius and rationality.  
Per Helmholtz’s speculations, this hard-soft reconciling secret congruity is a function of 
mathematics and music. There is at once a considerable mystery and puzzling importance 
 
11 Mathematik und Musik, der schärfste Gegensatz geistiger Thätigkeit, den man auffinden kann, und doch verbunden, 
sich unterstützend, als wollten sie die geheime Konsequenz nachweisen, die sich durch alle Thätigkeiten unseres 
Geistes hinzieht, und die auch in den Offenbarungen des künstlerischen Genius uns unbewusste Aeusserungen 
geheimnissvoll wirkender Vernunftmässigkeit ahnen lässt (Helmholtz 122).   
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attributed to these two endeavors, making their point of intersection an intriguing location at which 
possibly to discover something as paradoxical as a reconciling, secret congruity of the mind. 
Despite serving as “an integral part of man’s intellectual training and heritage for at least twenty-
five hundred years,” mathematics boasts a confounding distinction: “no general agreement has 
been reached as to the nature of the subject, nor has any universally acceptable definition been 
given for it” (Boyer 1). As for music’s confounding importance, anthropologist Claude Levi-
Strauss asserts that as the “only language at once intelligible and untranslatable,”12 it is “the 
supreme mystery of the science of man, a mystery that all the various disciplines come up against 
and which holds the key to their progress” (Lévi-Strauss 18).13 The paradoxically undefined 
importance of music and mathematics leaves ample room to imagine that they somehow grant 
access to something as eccentric as a reconciling cognitive style that might, among other things, 
make disciplined holistic healthcare possible.  
A reconciling cognitive style must be distinguished from totalizing theory that relates 
knowledge from various disciplines. It would not be a unified mathesis universalis like the one 
that General Systems Theory tried to construct and from which Engel’s biopsychosocial model 
sought to derive its methodological justification. Nor would it be a unified field theory that, like 
Integral Physiology, seeks to integrate the various forms of energy theorized and empirically 
validated by so-called Western science and the subtle energy posited by various so-called Eastern 
healing traditions. Nevertheless, it does acknowledge that systems theorists may have been on to 
something when they started thinking about disciplinarity in a formal mode. To be sure, the 
promise of thinking in a formal mode a strict foundered under the adherence to a strict 
 
12 La seule langue à la fois intelligible et intraduisible (Lévi-Strauss 26) 
13 Le suprême mystère des sciences de l’homme, celui contre lequel elles butent, et qui garde la clé de leur 
progrès (Lévi-Strauss 26) 
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mathematical formalism that sought to find completeness and rigor in a formal system of systems, 
or a truth-generating mechanism built from axioms expressing general system properties. Formal 
thinking foundered under the attempt to build a mathesis universalis that would use formal 
uniformities between disciplines to serve as a gestalt. The development of a reconciling cognitive 
style amounts instead to further articulating what role form plays in the secret congruity of the 
mind.  
The formalism endeavoring to articulate this reconciling cognitive style takes as its 
definition of form the broadest imaginable definition – arrangement of elements – and folds that 
definition over on itself. When folded over on itself, this definition of form is no longer an 
immaterial ‘putting-together’ of material constituents; rather arrangement is an expanded element; 
element is a bracketed arrangement. It is for this reason that reconciling cognitive style and the 
formalism that attempts to articulate it would be called recursive. Element and arrangement are 
differently-the-same, thereby putting form in the paradoxicality of the recursive domain. 
Reimagined from recursive formalism, medical education, patient care and research would also 
become somewhat paradoxical endeavors, not least because they cease to be the discrete arms that 
their establishment under the Flexnerian enterprise required them to be. Grounded by a rethinking 
of each of the three pervasive and mundane forms discussed in the previous chapter, the following 
three sections imagine what the three arms would look like from the perspective of recursive 
formalism. Accessing this secret congruity of the mind proceeds only by changing forms that 
govern not only the activities of research, patient care and medical education but also those of the 
mind, making holistic healthcare possible.  
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5.2 RECURSIVE PATIENT CARE: NO PATIENT IS NEW, NO PATIENT IS NOT NEW  
 
As the preeminent healing tradition of Western modernity, biomedicine is the project that searches 
for the universal characteristics of disease. Both narrative and schema-based medicine evoke as 
much when they distinguish between nomological, law-based or universal knowledge and the 
various narrative practices they recommend to healthcare providers to help them arrive at the 
singular. By such distinctions, patients are split into two parts, one part constituting difference and 
one part constituting sameness. The biological substrate of the disease constitutes the sameness, 
the story surrounding the illness constitutes their difference. In her praxiography of atherosclerosis, 
however, Mol reveals how the biological becomes the site of difference in manner unsettling to 
the universalist aspirations of biomedical theory. This revelation emerges through the testimony 
of a physician she meets in the course of her research. The physician explains:  
You [referring to Mol], since you’re so interested in atherosclerosis, you should have been 
here last week. We had this patient, a woman in her seventies. She had renal problems. 
Severe ones, too. So she was admitted. And the next day she died. Paff, from one moment 
to the next. The nephrologists were aghast, and so, of course, was her family. So we were 
asked to do an obduction. It was unbelievable. Her entire vascular system was 
atherosclerotic. One of her renal arteries was closed off, the other almost. It was a wonder 
her kidneys still did anything at all. It was hard to see where they got their blood from. And 
it was more or less the same for every other artery we took out: they were all calcified. 
Carotids, coronary arteries, iliac arteries: everything. Thick intimas, small lumens. And 
she’d never complained. Nothing. No chest pain, no claudication, nothing. We phoned her 
general practitioner just to check it. He said she’d been visiting him for coughs and things. 
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High blood pressure. But not with any complaint that make him think of atherosclerosis. 
(45-6)  
In a confirmation of Engel’s fundamental thesis that biological indices neither occupy the 
preeminent role of ultimate disease criterion nor exhaust clinical variability,14 the presence of 
atherosclerosis’ major somatic defect – major deposits of plaque on the vascular intimas – did not 
even trigger deliberation over, let alone a diagnosis of, atherosclerosis for the patient in her 
seventies. This patient had plaque that, in accordance with the theories of histology, which is to 
say, the biomedical science of tissues, did accumulate in her vascular system, but this accumulation 
did not ground a diagnosis of atherosclerosis. As such, this woman’s atherosclerotic plaque was, 
from a clinical perspective, different. In other words, this woman’s atherosclerotic plaque was not 
the atherosclerotic plaque that became the biological substrate grounding a diagnosis of 
atherosclerosis.  
Conversely, the illness narratives can be a site of sameness. In her assessment of narrative 
medicine, Mariam Solomon devotes an entire section in Making Medical Knowledge (2015) to 
implicitly debunking one of its hallmarks, namely, the notion that narrative grants access to 
singular difference. Entitled “Narratives are not entirely singular,” this section explains the 
proliferation of narrative sameness by dint of repeated tropes and narrative classification schemes. 
Repeated tropes include those surrounding breast cancer narratives. As for narrative classification, 
Solomon cites sociologist Arthur Frank’s attempt in The Wounded Storyteller to schematize three 
basic illness narratives. Together, these and other examples help to establish that narrative cannot 
always be considered the gateway to difference. In face of the untenable attempts to resolve the 
patient into different and same ‘bins,’ recursive patient care rejects any further attempt to do so by 
 
14 See chapter 2, page 6.  
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recognizing that while elements like atherosclerotic plaque or the very words that comprise a 
narrative may recur again and again, the variables that govern the arrangement of these elements 
in the flat plane of formal collisions are so enormous that no two patients will ever be alike. In 
short, patients can only be differently-the-same.  
In accordance with the corresponding recursive dictum that no patient is new, no patient is 
not new, there could not be the rigidly fixed categories of the Electronic Medical Record. Yet 
having no structure for charting is just as undesirable as having too rigid a structure. Sitting in the 
middle of these two undesirable poles is the possibility of creatively and spontaneously creating a 
structure. The disciplinary constraint arises not from an external system, like a strict outline, but 
rather from the contingent tensions between what the physician sees, knows and intuits and what 
the patient sees, knows and intuits. From this tension, the structure of a patient chart emerges. At 
the start of this emergence of structure, nothing is initially left out. As such, the need for a distinct 
set of skills like cultural competence vanishes. Rather than some pure catalogue that relates racial 
or cultural categories with potential obstacles to the successful application of biomedical 
techniques, culture instead becomes another arrangement of elements with which to contend. With 
the loss of any distinctions goes any sufficient ground for evidence hierarchies to distinguish 
between health care questions that merit evidence-grading and those that do not, thereby spurring 
research efforts to study health literacy interventions as much as drug interactions for diabetes.  
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5.3 RECURSIVE MEDICAL EDUCATION: LEARNING KNOWLEDGE WHILE 
CRITIQUING KNOWLEDGE  
 
Under the terms of representationalism, which posits knowledge as representational pictures of 
reality, medical education is the process of aligning students with the pictures articulated by 
biomedical research. As such, education becomes a function of words, knowers and things, what 
Karan Barad calls the Representationalist triad. Students are the knowers who rely on words, the 
preeminent, yet unobtrusive entities through which the things of health identified and articulated 
by biomedical research – pathways, molecules, structures – become known. In her praxiographic 
analysis, Mol offers a different understanding of knowledge: “knowledge,” Mol writes, “is no 
longer treated as referential, as a set of statements about reality, but as a practice that interferes 
with other practices” (153). Viewed from this perspective, the paradox of learning knowledge 
while critiquing knowledge becomes possible.  
A glimpse of what of learning knowledge while critiquing knowledge might look like 
emerges with Linda Costanzo’s critique of the Mean Arterial Pressure equation. Costanzo includes 
as part of her discussion of the MAP equation an observation that the equation can deceive, which 
in turn opens up philosophical questions about equations and what exactly they do. Not only does 
this merely disturb the tidy representationalist triad of words, knowers and things, but it calls into 
question the legitimacy of learning objectives, which, by their use of the imperative verb tense and 
other directive formulations, leave little room for, or at least do nothing to guide the student 
towards, anything other than rote obedience. The equivalent of learning objectives for recursive 
medical education would instead invite a critical stance. The official mission of written medical 
school exams of recursive medical education would in turn test the ability to not only use 
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knowledge but to critique it as well. The USMLE board exams, particularly STEP 1, would thus 
be freed from its need to strike a balance between questions that test knowledge of “immediate 
clinical use” and knowledge necessary for “lifelong learning.” For learning knowledge while 
critiquing knowledge reconciles the two. Of course, the task of actually writing such questions or 
tasks looms large, but it would certainly draw on a creativity not commonly associated with writing 
test questions. As for the Objective Standardized Clinical Examination (OSCE), the opportunities 
for critique could be even more pronounced than in the written questions. Exploiting the exigencies 
of standardization that, among other things, require that the simulated patients follow scripts, one 
of the ways to introduce a critical component into the experience would be to instruct the simulated 
patients to ad lib or try to deceive in a way that neither the student nor the test administrators would 
be expecting. Doing so would afford the student the opportunity to examine the interplay between 
the information standardized patients were told to impart and that which they came up with, thus 
amounting to a critical understanding of the OSCE form itself.  
 
5.4 RECURSIVE RESEARCH: HEALTHCARE-CHANGING FORMAL PLAY  
 
As if to confirm Louis Pasteur’s fears over distinguishing sciences théoriques from sciences 
appliqués, Mariam Solomon’s assessment of the rise of translational medicine in Making Medical 
Knowledge (2015) identifies it as a response to the gap between the applied and pure. Translational 
medicine is the effort to address disappointing failures of major research like the Human Genome 
Project to deliver major medical interventions, what some researchers jocularly refer to as the 
“valley of death.” In turn, the “valley of death,” Solomon writes, “is blamed on the ‘gap’ between 
basic and applied research” (161). However, Pasteur’s preferred thinking on research and its uses 
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dissolves the gap, and with it, the valley of death. From the perspective of Pasteur’s belief not in 
sciences appliquées or sciences théoriques but in science and applications of science, the problem 
to which translational medicine responds is given as a response has one of two explanations: the 
proper manipulation of the research that extends it beyond itself has not been discovered or, more 
disconcertingly, the research arm of the Flexnerian enterprise has simply stopped doing research 
that lends itself to anything beyond itself.  
Reflecting on the latter explanation, it may be that one of the conceptual tools of 
biomedicine – the mechanism – has run its course, which is to say, mechanistic thinking has 
nothing left to render, just as, per the terms of Pasteur’s organic metaphor for the bond between 
science and applications of science, a plot of earth may no longer render fruit. In the search for 
how to arrive at new conceptual tools, it may be helpful to turn to the area of contemporary 
biomedicine that has perhaps the greatest need for reality-changing concepts: psychiatry. In Of 
Two Minds (2000), an ethnography of the psychiatric residency, anthropologist T.M. Luhrmann 
observes the practice of “psychiatric scientific play, linking unconventional ideas together and then 
seeing which are foolish and which are powerful” (Luhrmann 170). One evocative illustration of 
this play comes from a clinical researcher, Jonathon Cole, whom Luhrmann observes:  
“Play with the data,” I [Luhrmann] once heard Cole say to a much younger colleague. “Play 
with it until something interesting emerges.” He seems to chop standard categories apart 
and lump the segregated pieces together in unexpected ways: What (for example) are the 
differences between schizophrenia and dissociation when it comes to hearing voices? Will 
the ways in which the two disorders respond to medication tell you anything? (169-70)  
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The formality of the play Cole describes typifies recursive research, establishing a relation, or 
more precisely, works to dissolve the gap between the systematicity of given categories and the 
idiosyncrasy of discovering alternative categories.  
Though it gestures to the playful formality of scientific knowledge that already exists by 
emphasizing the necessity of closely reading and interpreting potentially deceptive equations, 
Linda Costanzo’s Physiology textbook does not extend that same service to knowledge that has 
yet to exist. To consolidate the paradigm of the research from which it is derived, medical 
textbooks erase formal play in the creation of that paradigm. Costanzo’s historical sketch of the 
experiments that helped establish the Law of the Heart do not do justice to the formal creativity of 
Starling’s heart-lung preparation, failing to give the least impression of the risk-taking synthesis 
that required not only a willingness to integrate austere biophysics-inflected research but research 
in difficult prose written in a foreign language. Moreover, as Starling reveals in his Linacre lecture 
of 1915, the pursuit of this research would not have occurred if he had followed what was 
considered useful under the medical paradigm coinciding with his research. The elision of this 
crucial fact from a textbook that relied on that very risk amounts to cutting research off at its feet. 
If the guidelines of two peer-reviewed journals – Toxicology and Applied Toxicology – are any 
indication, potential use is also a preeminent consideration in what research gets published, even 
if doing so would firmly ensconce research in a particular paradigm that does not achieve anything 
beyond its own goals.  
Thus, the role of paradigms does not merely affect researchers but actively determines what 
healthcare providers can and cannot do for their patients. Chief among these health care-
influencing paradigms are those that determine what life is. Institutional Review Board Guidelines 
bluntly rely on a concept of life that reduces it to a simple either-or proposition. Skirting direct 
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engagement with the question of what living means, IRB guidelines establish that either a research 
subject is living or it is not. Such is the limitation, perhaps, of a strictly materialist and mechanical 
conception of life. A promising, alternative conception of life and potentially mind is theoretical 
biologist Rupert Sheldrake’s formative causation. The centerpiece of Sheldrake’s theory is the 
morphogenetic fields, a concept going back to the 1920s that argues field-like forces help render 
the characteristic form that animals, humans, insects and plants exhibit, bringing the well-
researched energetic forces that underlie matter closer to the liveliness of these creatures. 
Morphogenetic fields in turn cast the principles articulated by biomedical research not as laws of 
nature but as habits. Unsurprisingly, Sheldrake’s theories have received much resistance from the 
mainstream scientific community, a startling indication of which is the removal of Sheldrake’s 
2013 TED talk from the TED collection on the grounds that it peddled pseudo-science. Regardless 
of the extent to which morphogenetic fields represent viable alternative to the mechanistic 
conceptual scheme of biomedicine, the dream of disciplined holistic health care represents an 
opportunity to follow Sheldrake’s lead and at least contemplate an alternative to the strictly 
biomedical understanding of life and health.  
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